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Preface
The task of municipal problem solving has become a team sport that has spilled beyond the borders 
of government agencies and now engages a far more extensive network of social actors - public as 
well as private, non-profit and profit. Solid waste management is one of the key tasks associated 
with municipal authorities. It is of particular interest because of its flexibility compared to other 
services at the municipal level. This means the number of options for addressing solid waste 
management at municipal level are considered many.
The Lake Victoria Basin allows a comparison of institutions and practices in the different urban 
centres that are found in the basin. The ultimate aim has been to advance plausible options for 
institutional arrangement to improve solid waste management at the benefit of the urban poor 
in the Lake Basin in East Africa.
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Elizabeth Sargant, Leah Ombis, Harry Dabban, Eira Carballos, Carolina Marciel, Sarah Stattman 
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into Dutch in a short notice.
Next, I must thank my parents, Wycliffe and Eunice Majale. You have provided encouragement 
in my academic pursuits. You have also helped make this possible by being there to do whatever 
needed to be done, especially taking over the parental duties of looking after Benaya. Mum 
Philgonna Mulamba, you have also have also been a source of support and help for which I am 
grateful. Thank you for being there and for the encouragement you have provided along the way. 
To the rest of the family, thank you!
I thank my dear husband and best friend, Reuben. There are not adequate words to describe 
the support you have provided. There would have been no way this accomplishment would have 
been possible without your unwavering encouragement, love and commitment. We share this 
8  Modernising solid waste management at municipal level
degree as we share everything else in the life we have built together. This life now includes our 
son, Benaya, who provided a new motivation to finish this dissertation. Benaya, you are a source 
of inspiration and awe in my life and this degree is shared with you as well.
I would also like to thank my contact persons and interview participants for the access each 
of you granted me into your experiences in Kisumu, Jinja, Mwanza, Kisii, Homabay and Migori. 
Hopefully, it will start a dialogue and spark future studies that will inform the theoretical debate 
surrounding governance in municipal service provision in East Africa.
Last and most importantly, I must thank my Lord and Savior, Jesus Christ. For, I can do all 
things through Christ who strengthens me - Philippians 4:13.
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Chapter 1. 
Introduction
1.1 Urban authorities and solid waste management
Waste as a subject is certainly part of a growing discourse attracting the attention of anthropologists, 
economists, historians, sociologists, amongst others, most of whom point out that waste is an 
indication of the negative side of different dichotomies such as efficiency/inefficiency; usefulness/
uselessness; order/disorder; gain/loss; clean/dirty; alive/dead; fertile/sterile. Sociologist Gille in 
her book - From the cult of waste to the trash heap of history - speaks of waste proving to be a 
good lens through which social scientists can get a glimpse of other underlying social and cultural 
anxieties and moral dilemmas. Anthropologist Douglas in her book - Purity and danger - speaks 
of dirt as an indication of disorder, that is ‘matter out place’. In the same tone, scholars who have 
written on governance speak of waste management as being one of the most visible urban services 
whose effective and sustainable management serves as an indicator for good local governance, 
sound municipal management and successful urban reforms (UN-Habitat 2010; Van Dijk, 2008; 
Van Dijk and Oduro-Kwarteng, 2007). Waste management is thus very much connected to the 
performance of municipalities.
Urban authorities in most developing countries are the institutions generally responsible for 
the provision of solid waste collection and disposal services. A solid waste crisis therefore can 
significantly undermine the credibility of an urban authority. According to UN-Habitat (2010), 
solid waste management may not be the biggest vote-winner, but it has the capacity to become a 
full-scale crisis, and a definite vote-loser, if things go wrong.
Yet for the urban centres in East Africa, the storage, collection, transporting, treatment, and 
disposal of solid wastes, particularly wastes generated in medium and large urban centres, are 
reported to have become a relatively difficult problem. In most urban areas, only a fraction of 
the waste generated daily is collected and safely disposed off. In Nairobi for instance, generation 
rates as of 2009 are estimated at 1,850 tons/day of which just about 33%1 is collected and gets 
to the dumpsites (JICA, 2010). In Kampala, of the 1,300 tons generated daily, just about 21.7% 
is collected (Okot-Okum, 2006). Where people have stored waste prior to collection using non-
biodegradable material instead of the skips provided by councils, this material ends up at the 
dumpsite with the waste.2 Collection of solid waste is usually confined to the city centre and high 
income neighbourhoods, and even there the service is usually irregular. The urban poor - often 
residing in informal settlements with little or no access to solid waste collection and often in areas 
that are contiguous with open dumps - are particularly vulnerable. Most parts of cities therefore 
never benefit from public waste disposal. Consequently, most urban residents and operators 
resort to burying or burning their waste or disposing of it haphazardly. The capacity of urban 
authorities to process, or re-use solid waste in a cost-efficient and safe manner is reported to be 
1 UN-Habitat (2010) reports the collection estimates to be 60 to 70%, but most of this is by the private 
collectors and does not get to the dumpsite.
2 See Okot-Okum (2006) for describing the case of Kampala.
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far more limited (Karanja, 2005). This situation brings to the fore the question of institutional 
arrangement for solid waste management (SWM) at the municipal level.
A number of academic studies have been done on solid waste management in Africa including: 
Awortwi (2003) who focuses on governance in multiple arrangements and the relationship 
between capacity and contractual arrangements. Obirih-Opake (2002) focuses on the impact of 
decentralisation and private sector participation on urban environmental management. Karanja 
(2005) focuses on solid waste management and sustainable development issues, identifies different 
actors and institutional arrangements, looking at the role and interests of different actors, their 
successes and failures.
This thesis will build on some of the arguments of these authors. It however, deviates slightly 
from these studies by adopting a bioregional perspective that covers the Lake Victoria Basin and 
using the Ecological Modernisation theory and the Modernised Mixtures approach. Thereby this 
thesis seeks to present feasible options for institutional arrangement for solid waste management 
at the municipal level.
The remainder of this chapter therefore presents a brief on the trends in SWM infrastructure 
provision; the theoretical basis that guides the study; the study context and the further outline 
of the thesis.
1.2 Trends in SWM infrastructure provision in East Africa
For the urban centres of East Africa, SWM under the local authorities has for a long time been 
centralised through the use of large scale infrastructure in service provision. The use of highly 
mechanised refuse collection trucks, which in most cases have been imported from industrialised 
countries (Karanja, 2005; Rotich et al., 2006), has been common practice. These trucks cannot access 
most of the low income areas and experience frequent breakdowns due to lack of maintenance 
and repair (ADB, 2002). In other towns skips for waste collection can be found centrally located 
denying areas located far from the central business district access to this collection infrastructure. 
Infrastructure for waste disposal in most urban centres have been the centralised open dumps 
designated more for convenience of available space rather than because of accessibility and 
ecological sustainability considerations. Illegal dumpsites have therefore sprung up time and 
again. In essence, the large scale, centralised infrastructure provision has reinforced inequity in 
the distribution of SWM services other than perhaps the intended need of making it accessible to 
most people. The inadequacies of these large scale systems of SWM infrastructure provision by 
the local governments necessitated the move towards small scale infrastructure. Dating back to 
the 1970s, the use of appropriate technology was encouraged but this was more oriented towards 
waste re-use and recycling. With the growth in the roles of civil society and private firms in the 
1980s, such small scale, flexible, low technology and decentralised approaches flourished more. 
Today, it is commonplace to read about small scale waste collection using wheelbarrows and 
pickups by CBOs and private firms, neighbourhood transfer stations and recycling and treatment 
practices like household or community waste composting initiatives. These small scale technologies 
however, offer only solutions to individual households and/or locations, and are developed where 
the finances, technological capabilities and organisational capacities are severely limited. According 
to Spaargaren et al. (2006), both users and local authorities consider such technologies ‘low quality’. 
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Local authorities are thus faced with a dilemma of which path to choose for improving SWM as both 
the centralised and the decentralised systems show serious weaknesses. Attention should therefore 
be given towards exploring alternative modes of modernising the SWM system. Apart from the 
challenge of increasing the coverage of waste collection (to parts where there is less infrastructure 
and ability to pay is low), attention should also shift from merely removing waste before it becomes 
a health hazard to creatively minimising its environmental impact (Un-Habitat, 2010).
1.3 Ecological modernisation theory and modernised mixtures approach
Ecological Modernisation Theory (EMT) focuses on environmental reforms in social practices, 
institutional designs, and societal and policy discourses to safeguard societies’ sustenance bases 
(Mol and Sonnenfeld, 2000). In SWM, EMT argues for improved performance in both economic 
and environmental dimensions (Scheinberg and Mol, 2010). It includes criteria for assessing 
ecological performance like the ones put forward by SWM research in OECD and transition 
countries: minimising the formation of contaminated water (‘leachate’) from ‘sanitary landfills’ 
to prevent its release into groundwater and surface water; working as much as possible with 
separation at source and recycling/re-use; closing nutrient cycles by capturing organic waste (see 
UN-Habitat, 2010). EMT also argues for the use of ‘modern’ institutions when working towards 
solutions where the market, technology and professional NGOs have key roles to play next to 
governments at their different levels/scales. Yet since EMT was developed in the context of OECD 
countries, it is not directly applicable to the East African context and this is where the Modernised 
Mixtures Approach (MMA) comes in.
Modernised Mixtures refer to sociotechnical configurations of infrastructures – in this case 
SWM infrastructures and services - in which a variety of features of (modernising) systems 
are deliberately and reflexively being constructed in response to the challenges created by a 
changing social, economic, and environmental context (Hegger, 2007; Oosterveer and Spaargaren, 
2010; Scheinberg and Mol, 2010; Spaargaren et al., 2006). Under the MMA, we have intelligent 
combinations (or mixtures) of simple and advanced technologies; small and large-scale systems; 
centralised and decentralised forms of control; public, private, formal and informal actors; citizen 
participation and professional management; and uniformity and diversity of systems. In essence, 
when working with modernised mixtures, one leaves behind the dichotomy dividing centralised, 
large-scale, high-tech solutions on the one hand from the decentralised, appropriate, small scale and 
low-technology solutions on the other (Spaargaren et al., 2006). Instead of opposing centralised and 
decentralised paradigms, the best of both paradigms are to be combined into new configurations. 
Specific criteria under the MMA guide the assessment of different options (or combinations) 
optimised throughout waste flows, institutions and economics. They are:
• Ecological sustainability of the infrastructures and practices involved: to what extent do the 
new systems or the new technological options that become part of existing systems, improve 
the environmental performance of the urban infrastructure?
• Institutional sustainability concerns the extent to which a new system becomes embedded in 
existing socio-political and cultural systems at the local and national level, while improving 
their performance.
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• Accessibility (particularly of the poor to avoid exclusion of particular groups): to what extent 
are specific groups included or excluded from environmental infrastructure due to financial, 
physical or cultural reasons?
• Flexibility and resilience (in both technological and institutional respect): how does the system 
or unit fit into more embracing future systems and how does it behave under different forms 
of instability (climatic, political, economic, institutional)?
This thesis focuses on institutional arrangements and uses the above criteria of ecological and 
institutional sustainability, accessibility and flexibility to present feasible options for SWM at 
municipal level. These criteria are operationalised in line with the different variables that are 
used in the study.
1.4 The question of institutional arrangements for SWM
How are SWM services actually delivered to people in developing countries today? The types 
of arrangement for service provision today range from self-provision through collective action 
independent of external agencies to indirect state provision through sub-contracting to other 
agencies – NGOs, private for profit companies, user groups among others. Generally, there is 
much agreement that monopolistic provision realised entirely through state agencies is unfeasible, 
undesirable, or simply rather old fashioned. However, there is little consensus on the alternative. 
Joshi and Moore (2004) argue that there is need to look beyond new discourses like New Public 
management and Public Private Partnerships indicating that the trend now is towards pragmatism, 
pluralism and adaptation to specific circumstances because the reality in developing countries 
is highly diverse. Some services, it is argued, cannot be effectively delivered to the ultimate 
recipients by state agencies because the environment is too complex or variable, and the costs of 
interacting with very large numbers of poor households are too high. In such cases, users become 
involved in an organised way at the local level. There are arrangements therefore that do not fit 
into standard categories. Some of these unorthodox arrangements are of recent origin, and are 
seen to constitute (smart) adaptations to prevailing local circumstances. They are widespread in 
developing countries but they raise many issues. Being cognizant of these diverse issues that come 
into play between what is considered standard and that which does not fit into such standard 
category, perhaps the next question would be what the most feasible institutional arrangements 
for SWM are at the municipal level? To help answer this, the following specific research questions 
are defined to guide the study:
1. What is the current status of the (physical) environmental infrastructures and the level of 
service provision for SWM in three designated urban centres in EA namely Kisumu (Kenya); 
Mwanza (Tanzania) and Jinja (Uganda)?
2. What are the existing policy arrangement for SWM in these three urban centres and what can 
be learnt from the differences and/or similarities amongst them?
3. What are the possibilities for cooperation in solid waste management amongst small 
neighbouring municipalities in Kenya namely Kisii, Homabay and Migori municipalities?
4. What is the role of regional organisations and networks in enhancing cross border infrastructure 
provision in solid waste management amongst municipalities in the lake basin?
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1.5 Study context
The study is part of a bigger project – Partnership For Research On Viable Infrastructure 
Development (PROVIDE) – in East Africa that covers the Lake Victoria Basin and seeks to 
improve sanitation and solid waste management in the basin as part of achieving MDG7. MDG 
7 intends to ensure environmental sustainability and two of its targets are particularly relevant 
for the PROVIDE project:
• Target 10: have by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water and basic sanitation;
• Target 11: have achieved by 2020 a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million 
slum dwellers.
Key requirements to address the MDGs in general are: improved governance, technological 
innovation and diffusion, and enhanced financing mechanisms. Achieving targets 10 and 11, 
therefore also needs an integrated approach and to include contributions from political and social 
sciences, technology and economics. Different studies in the PROVIDE project are covering different 
aspects (technical, social, economic and governance issues) of sanitation and solid waste at different 
levels (household, neighbourhood, municipal, national and regional scales). The studies are also 
covering different urban centres in the East African Region. This study as earlier mentioned deals 
with solid waste management, emphasising governance issues at the municipal level. Jinja, Mwanza 
and Kisumu are the main urban centres under study, but the second part of the study also covers 
small municipal authorities (Kisii, Homabay and Migori) on the Kenyan side of Lake Victoria.
1.5.1 Profiles of the main urban centres
The three urban authorities that form the core of the study area are Kisumu (Kenya), Jinja (Uganda) 
and Mwanza (Tanzania). This section gives a brief description of their geographical location within 
the Lake Victoria Basin; their sizes and population figures.
Kisumu is the third largest urban centre in Kenya after Nairobi and Mombasa. It is located in 
Nyanza province in the Western part of Kenya. Geologically it sits on the arm of tertiary lava, which 
extends southwards overlooking the plains to the East and Winam gulf of Lake Victoria to the West. 
The lava formation is attributed to the tectonomagnetic activities associated with the Kano-Rift 
valley system. As a result the city is curved into a trough with the walls of the Nandi escarpment 
to the East dropping onto the floor of the Kano flood plains and gently flowing to the Dunga 
wetlands at the shores of the Lake Victoria. Kisumu covers an area of 297 km2 of land mass and 
120 km2 under the lake. The population of the council has been increasing rapidly, and at a growth 
rate of 2.8% per annum it was estimated at about 500,000 in 2007 from 322,734 people in 1999.
Jinja is the second largest urban centre in Uganda after Kampala city. It is located 81 km East 
of Kampala. It is situated just north of the equator, on the northern shores of Lake Victoria and 
at the source of the Nile River. The town lies on a tapering plateau with an average altitude of 
1230 meters above sea level. The municipality has an extensive shoreline in the east, south and 
west of both Lake Victoria and the voluminous waters of the Victoria Nile. It occupies an area of 
28 km2. It has a resident population of about 86,512 people (population census 2002) with a day 
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population that doubles that figure due to peri-urban migrant labour. At a growth rate of 2.4% 
per annum, the population as of 2007 is estimated at 95,121 people.
Mwanza is the second largest urban centre in Tanzania after the city of Dar-es Salaam. It 
covers an area of 1,325 km2 of which 425 km2 is dry land and 900 km2 is covered by water. Of the 
425 km2 dry land area, approximately 86.8 km2 is urbanised while the remaining area consists of 
forested land, valleys, cultivated plains, grassy and undulating rocky hill areas. According to the 
2002 National Census, Mwanza City had 476,646 people. With an annual natural growth rate of 
3.2%, the population as of 2007, is estimated at 714,060 people.
The three were chosen because of certain similarities (and differences), but more so because 
they are all found on the shores of the lake basin as described above and they are all primary 
urban centres which makes them comparable in urban status.
1.6 Outline of thesis
The next chapter of this thesis, Chapter two, brings out a historical overview as well as the 
theoretical perspectives of the study. The historical part brings out the dimensions of change 
in the political landscape with reference to the place of local authorities, privatising municipal 
services, the role of civil society and regional integration. This allows the study to make arguments 
for institutional arrangements drawing from occurrences in the history and the changes that have 
taken place over time. The part that discusses the theoretical perspective seeks to show the effects 
of different institutional arrangements on decentralised public service provision and in turn on 
SWM. Therefore theoretical debates on centralisation vs. decentralisation and developmental state 
vs. network governance are presented. Multi-level governance is also discussed. These theoretical 
perspectives culminate into the conceptual frameworks that guides the empirical part of the study.
Chapter three is the first empirical chapter and it discusses the internal organisation within 
municipalities. It compares the performance of SWM tasks in technical and social respect amongst 
three municipalities-Jinja, Mwanza and Kisumu. In this chapter, the study also dedicates a brief 
section to explore municipal autonomy in SWM.
Chapter four compares the collaboration (formal and informal) between the municipal 
authorities and non-state actors in their respective jurisdictions. Arguments are made alongside 
the developmental vs. network governance debate.
Chapter five takes the study a step further by assessing opportunities for inter-municipal 
cooperation amongst three small neighbouring municipalities (Kisii, Homabay and Migori) on 
the Kenyan side of the Lake Victoria Basin. Discussions are made with reference to the multi-level 
governance discourse.
Chapter six presents the role of regional organisations and networks in cross country SWM at 
the municipal level. It narrows down to a study of two regional organisations, Lake Victoria Basin 
Commission and Lake Victoria Region Local Authorities Cooperation, which are categorised as 
statutory and voluntary regional arrangements respectively. The two organisations are assessed 
for their role in enhancing cross country cooperation in SWM.
Chapter seven is the concluding chapter and in answering the research questions formulated 
at the beginning of the study, it presents the conclusion of each part of the study. Towards the 
end, it presents the final observations.
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Chapter 2. 
Changing dynamics of politics in East Africa
2.1 Introduction
The existence and performance of municipalities in East Africa in environmental infrastructure and 
service provision of which solid waste management is one, has a historical component depicting 
changes that have occurred dating back to the 1960’s when the three East African countries attained 
independence. Olowu (2002) explains that when these countries attained political independence 
with formal structures of democratic, representative government, political leaders in their bid to 
consolidate political power then opted for highly centralised modes of governance. This centralised 
mode of governance was reinforced by a culture of politics of patrimony in which all powers and 
resources flow from one source of power (‘the father of the nation’) to clients to shore up the regime. 
This pattern of power and resource distribution was strongly supported by both domestic and 
external actors until the late 1980s. The reasons adduced for adopting this approach included – 
rapid economic and social development actualised through centralised planning, unity and national 
integration, containment of corruption and political stability. In fact the argument was that if 
decentralisation would be necessary at all it must be in the form of administrative decentralisation 
or deconcentration - the sharing of responsibilities between central and local administrations 
which do not exercise any discretionary authority nor dispose of resources. Yet the 1990s marked 
an era of political and democratic approaches wherein decentralisation was progressively being 
seen (by governments, external actors and the increasingly influential civil society lobbies) as 
a means of enhancing democracy and citizen participation and (by governments and external 
actors) as a way of reducing the role, and in particular the expenditures, of the central government 
(Conyers, 2007). Over time, these changes have necessitated governmental reconfigurations, 
many of which have a powerful ‘local’ governance orientation. They include resurgent regional 
organisations, public private partnerships in infrastructure creation and maintenance and service 
delivery, decentralisation, devolution and deconcentration of expertise and accountabilities within 
government departments, and contractual relationships between government and community 
providers, among others (Olukoshi, 2005 ).
The aim of this chapter is to present the changes that have occurred in the political landscape 
that have a bearing on the institutional arrangement of public service provision and in turn on 
solid waste management at the municipal level. Discussions are made alongside three categories 
of actors (the state-municipalities, the private sector and the civil society). Regional organisations 
are also seen to play an important role in municipal service provision. The changes are detailed 
in section 2.2. and they lead to the theoretical discussions in section 2.3 that eventually guide the 
build-up of the conceptual frameworks on which the study is based. Section 2.4 therefore presents 
the conceptual models which is followed by a section on the methodology.
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2.2 Dimensions of change
2.2.1 The place of local government
At independence, that is 1961 for Tanzania, 1962 for Uganda and 1963 for Kenya, all three countries 
inherited rather strong local governments (LGs) with substantial responsibilities for services. 
Yet even with the existence of these decentralised systems for all the three countries, the period 
immediately after independence was one of centralisation. This was justified on the grounds that 
central policymaking and planning were necessary to bring about the rapid economic and social 
transformation required. Some of the existing decentralised systems were thereafter abolished 
while others had their powers reduced substantially. A brief look at each of the three countries 
just after independence reveals the following.
Uganda
At independence, Uganda was bequeathed with fairly autonomous and well developed local 
administrations. They were, however, largely ineffective and inefficient, and weighed down by 
sectarian (clan, ethnic and religious-political factionalism)3 (Mutebi, 2008). The post-colonial 
government therefore inherited a local government system already beset with problems. The 
search for solutions during the Milton Obote regime that began in 1962, was undermined by the 
government’s greater enthusiasm for the elimination of opposition at all levels of government and 
stifling dissent within the ruling party itself. Local government was thus subjected to the will of the 
ruling party. The Local Administrations (Amendment) Act 1962 marked the beginning of a series 
of legislative measures that stripped local administrations of most of their powers and autonomy. 
The government justified these measures on the grounds that district councillors were of low levels 
of education and lacked experience. Reacting to the local conflicts its reforms had re-ignited, the 
government passed yet another Act, the Local Administration (Amendment) (No.2) Act 1963. 
All secretaries-general, finance secretaries and chairmen of district councils were dismissed. 
These and other changes with the passing of the Local Administrations Act, 1967 essentially 
put local governments at the mercy of the centre and provided the central government with the 
opportunity to influence the functioning of local administrations. Centralisation, however, had 
many unintended consequences. Civil servants and local administrations continued to perform 
poorly. Political factionalism, stocked by the ruling party’s search for dominance, crippled local 
administration’s capacity, even to collect revenue, which in turn rendered them incapable of 
performing their functions. But the regime of Idi Amin, beginning in 1971, went even further and 
abolished district councils to reduce costs of administration next to other objectives. Domination 
by the centre went on until 1986 when National Resistance Movement (NRM) opted for devolution.
3 At independence Uganda had a multi-party political system with three main parties: the Uganda People’s 
Congress (UPC); the Democratic Party (DP); and Kabaka Yekka (KY). Each party represented particular 
ethno-religious and regional interests. Broadly, the DP was allied with the Catholic Church. The UPC had 
strong connections with the Protestant Church, although it worked closely with the Muslim community as 
well. The KY was a Protestant-leaning royalist party.
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Under the Movement system, the Local Council (LC) system was originally proposed as 
democratic organs of the people in order to establish effective, viable and representative local 
authorities. Since then a number of important steps have been taken. In 1993 a first thirteen 
districts were decentralised, and they were given the authority to retain a proportion of the locally 
generated revenues. A new national Constitution adopted in 1995 clearly stipulated the principles 
and structures of the LC system. Following this new Constitution, the Local Government Act 
1997 was enacted. The Act was made to give full effect to the decentralisation policy. The objective 
of decentralisation is to ensure good governance and democratic participation in the decision 
making process. Today there are different levels of local councils, five in total. Local Council three 
(LC3) is charged with service delivery at the municipal level including solid waste management.
Tanzania
In Tanzania, following colonisation, the British local government model was adopted. In the 
post-colonial era the local government system, starved of resources, was unable to deliver 
adequate services to the people (because of among other reasons gross mismanagement of funds 
collected and granted by the Central Government; little or no capacity to maintain and run a 
lot of infrastructures constructed by the Central Government and a general lack of qualified 
personnel). In 1972 local governments were abolished in favour of a more centralised system of 
government. Central government and line ministries were put in charge of the administration of 
basic government services at the local level, including primary education and health care. However, 
the delivery of public services actually deteriorated under this system of deconcentration, and 
local governments were re-introduced by the Local Government Acts of 1982.
While Local Government Authorities, (LGAs), were technically reintroduced in mainland 
Tanzania in 1984, the system was a top-down model and local governments were tightly constrained 
by the central government bureaucracy. This system also failed to yield the desired improvements 
in the delivery of local services, while stifling local democracy, and, by the early 1990s it had 
become evident that a fundamental reform of the system was imperative.
By the 1980’s Tanzania was the world’s second poorest country in GDP per capita terms which 
certainly affected service delivery at the local level and in 1981,Tanzania tried its own Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) to address this challenge. For most of the developing countries, the 
three East African countries included, SAPs were intended to reduce the size and the reach of the 
state. But for Tanzania in particular, the SAPs brought with them an increase in foreign aid inflows 
while domestic savings performance deteriorated, making Tanzania more dependent on inflows 
of foreign aid, raising the question of the sustainability of Tanzania’s economic reform program.
During the early 1990s, a Civil Service Reform Program was launched, consisting of six 
components, including one on Local Government Reform. This component was aimed at 
decentralising government functions, responsibilities and resources to LGAs and strengthening 
the capacity of local authorities. Reform of the local government system was initiated in 1996 
through a National Conference seeking to move ‘Towards a Shared Vision for Local Government 
in Tanzania’. This vision was subsequently summarised in the Local Government Reform Agenda, 
and, in October 1998, endorsed by the Government in its Policy Paper on Local Government Reform 
(Mmari, 2005). The overall objective of the policy was to improve the delivery of services to the 
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public, and the main strategy for doing so was decentralisation through devolution, which entails 
the transfer of powers, functional responsibilities and resources from central government to local 
government authorities. Today, the devolved structure in municipalities goes down to ward levels 
with Ward Development Committees considering peoples’ welfare in the wards. There are also 
street leaders in every street to assist on governance issues. Solid waste management in certain 
municipalities is divided into zones.
Kenya
At the time of independence, the Government of the ruling party was totally opposed to 
decentralisation, arguing that the structure was unworkable and politically inappropriate – a tactic 
of divide and rule by the British. And therefore when the ruling party took full control, the central 
Government began the process of bringing the local state apparatus under its control. In 1964, 
a parallel administrative system to the LG, the Provincial Administration (PA), was transferred 
to the office of the president thus strengthening the position of the PA and enforcing its parallel 
stand further. Meanwhile the LG was not relieved of the expanded responsibilities that they had 
acquired prior to independence. They had neither the human nor the financial resources necessary 
to undertake these responsibilities. They were thus forced into a position in which they were bound 
to perform badly and thus giving the Central government the justification to increase its control. 
Steffensen et al. (2004) explain that the ‘Transfer of Functions Act’ in 1969 reduced the powers 
of LG substantially. In 1974 the Graduated Personal Tax (GPT) was abolished and replaced with 
a centrally controlled sales tax as a source of revenue. This tax had no clear relation with the local 
tax base as did the GPT. In 1983, the Kenya’s District Focus for Rural Development system, was 
introduced and this incorporated representatives of lower tier elected local government councils, 
but was essentially a deconcentration of central ministries tightly controlled by officials from the 
regime. Researchers report that local MPs in collaboration with Presidentially appointed District 
Commissioners made decisions on local development and resource allocations routinely on the 
basis of political patronage and access to centrally controlled networks (Crook, 2003).
Since the mid-1990s the Government initiated an incremental reform of LGs that, foremost, 
focused on improving the fiscal aspects of LGs but until the year 2010 this was done without 
substantial legal reforms. Generally the government has, until recently, mainly pursued a policy of 
deconcentration, with only a marginal role for LGs including regarding solid waste management. 
The new constitution, passed in 2010, makes provisions for substantial devolution of powers to 
elected LGs. It provides for the creation of 47 counties based on the boundaries of administrative 
districts dating to 1992. Section 176 of the constitutions states that there shall be a county 
government for each county and that each county government shall decentralise its functions 
and the provision of its services to the extent that it is efficient and practicable to do so. 15% of 
the national revenue is to be sent directly to these counties each financial year and an equalisation 
fund whereby 0.5% of the annual revenue is given to marginalised communities.
It is evident that in East Africa decentralisation to the municipal/local level has been important 
on the development agenda for much of the post-independence period (Conyers, 2007). Though 
these decentralisation efforts were typically politically motivated, they have profound impacts on 
other aspects, such as governance in the public sector, including public services delivery like solid 
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waste management. This history clearly shows the strive between central and local governments. 
Until the 1990s for the case of Uganda and Tanzania and 2010 for Kenya, the local authorities 
were just playing what Davey (1996) refers to as residual roles.
2.2.2 Privatising municipal services
The process of privatisation of municipal services is to varying degrees relatively recent in 
practically all three countries under study. None of these countries has any municipal service 
that is completely privatised as yet. The services most experimented with so far are solid waste 
management and water supply, but the former more than the latter. The following sections depict 
the trend towards privatisation in the respective countries.
Uganda
The 1960s and 1970s saw the nationalisation of much of the Ugandan economy. The expulsion of 
the Asian community in 1970 accelerated this trend with many of the departed Asians’ properties 
falling under the Government’s control. The present government, which came into power in 1986, 
was quick to adopt a policy to reverse this trend and promote the private sector’s involvement in 
the economy. The private sector development at this stage was largely a response to the demand 
for services and benefitted only those who could afford to pay for them. Schools, health clinics, 
garbage collection companies, recreation facilities and cleaning companies sprung up and that 
trend is continuing to meet the demand throughout the country. For obvious reasons this demand 
is higher in high density urban areas where a concentration of markets for these services exists 
than in less populated rural areas. Urban authorities have supported this trend by providing 
trading licenses and permits for operation to private entrepreneurs.
The process of privatisation at national level has affected the means through which urban 
councils acquire resources and run their affairs. At the same time the modes through which 
their constituents can expect to receive the services traditionally provided by local councils, are 
changing. The enactment of the Local Government Act 1997 gives urban authorities autonomy 
over their financial and planning matters. All urban councils now have the power to contract out 
services to the private sector. They are however, still obliged to establish, prescribe, and control 
these services and administer the relevant forms.
Although there is no distinct policy on privatisation of municipal services in Uganda, 
the process of privatisation for municipal services has borrowed from the existing parastatal 
privatisation policies and Acts. Municipal Councils are considering comprehensive privatisation 
programs as a means to reinforce and enhance their ability to govern and increase the level and 
quality of services to their constituents.
Tanzania
After independence, service provision was mainly confined to central government and local 
authorities through agencies. In a way there was some form of privatisation as service users were 
obliged to pay taxes, licenses, fees, etc., which contributed directly or indirectly to financing 
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different services. The practice was changed after the Arusha Declaration in 1967 which among 
other things pronounced the United Republic of Tanzania as a socialist state and advocated for 
widening the role of the public sector at the expense of the private sector. Thus after 1967, the 
role of central and local government institutions in service provision was widened and that of 
the private sector, if anything, ended. The 1982 Local Government Act came into effect at a time 
when private sector participation in service delivery was at its minimum, as it was only in public 
transport in the form of town buses that the private sector was involved. New attempts to encourage 
the private sector to participate in the provision of municipal services were made by the central 
government. For instance the Trade Liberalisation Policy of 1984 was formulated. However, it 
was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that the private sector involvement in service delivery 
became more noticeable. Given the crisis in service provision which developed out of the pre-
1980s policies, various areas attracted the private sector in service provision among which was 
solid and liquid wastes; privatisation in solid and liquid waste collection and disposal was slowly 
taking shape in both small and big towns. Among the municipalities where privatisation has been 
tried the mode has been through contractual agreements between the urban local authority and 
the contractor taking over the new role, leasing services formerly provided by the authority to the 
private operator and the introduction of user charges. However problems can be noted for instance 
in the quality of service offered as well as in the low level of service charges declared to have been 
collected. The Tanzanian government is yet to formulate an overall policy on privatisation of 
municipal services provision. Thus, the privatisation initiatives are mainly based on other factors, 
including pressure from users and the private sector response to exploit the gap between what 
the public sector offers and the residents demand. In the absence of a appropriate policy, local 
councils wishing to privatise the provision of services use the existing legislation particularly the 
Local Government Acts, no. 7 and no. 8 of 1982.
Kenya
At independence, the desire to accelerate economic and social development, to increase citizens 
participation in the economy and to promote indigenous enterprises led to the establishment 
of state-owned enterprises. But comprehensive reviews of the public enterprises performance 
carried out in 1979 and 1982 concluded that the productivity of state corporations was quite 
low. Following this low performance and in response to the Structural Adjustment Programme, 
the government instituted some economic policy reforms which included privatisation of public 
enterprises. Although privatisation of municipal services was not clearly identified as such, 
Moyo et al. (1998) record that the government has been moving towards that direction albeit in 
a ‘stop-go’ nature, given the failure of the local government system in the delivery of municipal 
services. In practice, the provision of municipal services by the private sector has been going on 
for a long time though informally and without the recognition from local councils. Some of the 
privatised services include public transport, road maintenance, health, education services and 
recreational facilities.
Despite the fact that privatisation of municipal services is not new in Kenya, comprehensive 
policy guidelines are still lacking. However, municipal authorities can and are taking advantage 
of policy objectives for privatisation process outlined in several documents such as ‘Economic 
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reforms for 1996-1998: the policy framework paper (1996)’ and the Eighth National Development 
Plan and more recently the Economic Recovery Strategy for Health and Employment creation of 
2003-2007 and now the Vision 2030. The Local Government Act Cap 265 also allows the municipal 
authorities to enter into contracts
Overall, for the three countries, there is as yet an absence of clear policies on privatisation 
of municipal services as well as an absence of appropriate legislation to support privatisation of 
municipal services. Both central and local (municipal) government authorities are understandably 
ambivalent about the necessity to privatise certain municipal services. In some cases, there is 
some residual resistance or lack of enthusiasm on the part of local/municipal authorities to share 
responsibilities with private sector enterprises, let alone completely give up these responsibilities, 
notwithstanding their limited capacities to deliver these services themselves. Moyo et al. (1998) 
record that privatisation of some municipal services is seen by them as giving up power, authority 
and control and municipal authorities and their officials do not find easy to do so willingly. 
Where real privatisation of municipal services has actually taken place in elements of solid waste 
management, it has largely been done selectively and piecemeal, serving or operating effectively 
mainly in the middle- and higher income residential neighbourhoods that can afford to pay for 
these services. This process left a large proportion of the poor and low-income neighbourhoods, 
where residents cannot afford to pay for the privatised services, unserved. This has raised issues of 
equity and social integration and remains an unresolved public policy issue, that is how to provide 
such services to segments of the population that cannot afford to pay for private sector provision. 
Noted though is that for all the three countries, motivation for privatisation of municipal services 
by councils and the national governments range from increasing efficiency to actually developing 
the private sector, as shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Privatisation of municipal services: a comparison of stated motives (Moyo et al., 1998).
City/municipality Increase	
efficiency
Reduce	
fiscal	
burden
Adopt	
innovation	and	
new	technology
Broaden	
ownership
Increase	
revenue	
collection
Develop	
private	sector
Kenya (general) √ √ √
Nairobi √ √ √
Mombasa √ √ √ √ √ √
Eldoret √ √ √ √ √
Uganda (general) √ √ √ √
Kampala √ √ √ √
Jinja √ √ √ √ √
Tanzania (general) √ √ √ √
Dar-es-Salaam √ √ √ √
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2.2.3 Role of civil society
Malunga (2006) gives the definition of civil society organisations as comprising organisations of 
citizens that come together to pursue interests and purposes for the good of all. This definition 
includes NGOs, community groups, labour unions, professional associations, faith-based 
organisations and parts of the media and academia and they may operate at all levels from 
grassroots at village and community levels to national and international levels. These Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) have been instrumental in municipal service provision and the different 
roles that they have played over time are described below.
Uganda
The current characteristics of Uganda’s civil society find their roots in the country’s experiences 
during the past eight decades, going back to the colonial era, when the State was the main provider 
of social services within the overall design of an export-oriented economy based on small-holder 
agricultural production. DENIVA (2006) records that a measured (though highly regulated) 
development of CSOs was then encouraged, with CSOs primarily consisting of co-operatives 
of export crop growers and trade unions/associations, as well as mission-established hospitals 
and educational establishments, and other charitable institutions. These trends went on until the 
time of independence. After independence, the peasant cooperative societies and trade unions 
were taken over by the Government and bureaucratised. Consequently, the demarcation between 
‘civil society’ and ‘government’ started to become blurred. Mission schools were integrated within 
the state education system; political parties were eventually banned and other forms of political 
dissent, often associated with the traditional kingdoms, curtailed. CSOs were henceforth confined 
to the more ‘traditional fields’ (charity, health delivery) and sustained in doing so by the earlier 
interventions of ‘charity’-oriented international NGOs. The National Resistance Movement 
government took over power in 1986 and inherited a near collapsed economy. This was then 
followed by a period of reconstruction and relative freedom that provided space for the emergence 
of indigenous CSOs. Simultaneously, the relative peace that prevailed in many parts of Uganda 
after 1986 encouraged people to build their own CBOs, including farmers self-help groups and 
many other types of voluntary associations. The 1990s also witnessed a very rapid growth in the 
numbers of CSOs because many donors preferred to channel their financial support to them, as 
they were considered less corrupt and more efficient.
Today, the legal environment is judged to be not as enabling as it could, given the cumbersome 
registration procedures for CSOs. The government also shows a hesitant attitude on what constitutes 
allowable advocacy activities for CSOs, especially when they ‘stray’ into what it considers the 
political arena. Nevertheless, this relationship is changing on several fronts (ibid.). Both parties 
increasingly see advocacy work as legitimate for CSOs to engage in, a move supported by donors. 
Moreover the government is opening avenues, especially at district level, for CSOs to contract 
service delivery from its own coffers. It is common today to see CSOs awarded contracts even 
for solid waste management.
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Tanzania
The origins of the modern kind of civil society in Tanzania can be traced back at least to the 
beginning of British colonial rule in the 1920s and this went on even to the time of independence 
with the civil movement spearheading the struggle for independence. However, after multi-party 
elections in 1965, the constitution was changed in a manner that allowed the establishment of a 
one-party system. Nyerere’s socialist one-party rule inherited most of the laws and institutions 
from the colonial period. The state also controlled the legal system, which was used to control and 
coerce the citizens rather than to guarantee rights for them. This political environment was very 
restrictive for non-governmental associations and made it virtually impossible for civil society 
to organise independently. Only religious groups, charity organisations and relief foundations 
were allowed to operate, because their activities were not considered political. (Lange et al., 2000; 
Haapanen, 2007). During the 1980s, structural adjustment programs led to increased funding for 
civil society organisations. Foreign donors’ funding strategies emphasised the strengthening of the 
’third sector’ instead of state institutions, which were seen as inefficient and corrupt. After Nyerere’s 
retirement in 1985, and along with the steps toward multi-party democracy in the beginning of 
1990s, CSOs were given new space and they were now seen also by the state as important for 
community development. The numbers of CSOs started to rise rapidly. The legal framework for 
CSOs has evolved during the multi-party era, and especially NGOs’ position is now established 
and guaranteed by law. Today, there is much diversity among civil society actors in Tanzania. A 
major part of Tanzanian civil society consists of informal groups and small community based 
organisations (CBOs), professional associations and trade unions, as well as numerous faith based 
organisations (FBOs). In terms of numbers, local CBOs and informal groups may be the main 
actors, but there are no exact numbers available, because a substantial part of these groups are not 
officially registered. Usually, these smaller organisations operate at grassroots level, particularly 
with the poor, disadvantaged and marginalised people, in helping to improve their social situation 
and living conditions. Generally, there are concerns about the capacity of local CSOs to take up and 
utilise the political space that enables them to have influence on governmental decision-making.
Kenya
Civil society, and in particular the NGO sector, has undergone fundamental changes in post-
colonial Kenya. As in the period of colonialism, the state has played a central role in defining the 
direction of the voluntary sector especially as relates to its vibrancy. But one thing that is also certain 
is the fact that CSOs have increasingly taken on important tasks in society, and have in their own 
different ways equally influenced the nature and character of the post-colonial state. Accepting the 
enormity of the development problem in the 1960 and 1970s, the Government actively encouraged 
self-help efforts in the generation of development. This was marked in the beginning by the 
important role given harambee (Swahili word for self-help) in Kenya’s development process. But 
harambee had mixed outcomes which negatively affected its credibility. In addition to this form of 
voluntary self-help, many NGOs, both formal and community-based organisations, were rapidly 
expanding their activities and numbers in the country. And most of them especially the NGOs 
in the period between 1964-1978 were largely involved in development activities as opposed to 
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political activism. A number of them later got involved in political activism following the 1982 
constitutional change that made the state a de jure one-party system and thus legally barring the 
formation of opposition political parties that could provide an alternative to KANU (the ruling 
party then). With multi-party arrangement and liberalisation of the national economy in the 1990s 
together with a new political regime in 2002, however, more and more CSOs are seen taking up 
roles even in the public service provision. CSOs are today engaged in government budget processes 
in order to affect policy choices and make public budgeting more open and accountable. There is 
the local Authority Transfer Fund to local authorities whose conditions require the involvement 
of CSOs in decision making at the municipal level. Due to their diversity in activities, the small 
CSOs -in terms of expenditures and the number of people involved- (CBOs and self-help groups) 
remain only dimly understood, making it difficult to determine what their capabilities really are 
(Karuti et al., 2007). Some operate without registration, while others operate after informing the 
provincial administration, but without documentary evidence of existence.
Overall, a major trend in the CSO sector over the last decade for the three countries, but more 
so for Uganda and Tanzania, has been the awarding by governments of contracts to CSOs for the 
delivery of services (Clayton et al. 2000). Clayton goes on to write that while the CSO sector may 
have grown enormously in terms of size, its independence has been compromised and this has 
not improved the capacity of CSOs to provide an alternative development agenda for donors and 
governments. A study by Robinson and White (1997) argues that while CSOs play an important 
role, especially where state provision is weak and the private sector caters to the better off, there 
are a number of common deficiencies with the services provided by the CSO sector. These include: 
limited coverage; variable quality; amateurish approach; high staff turnover; lack of effective 
management systems; poor cost effectiveness; lack of co-ordination; and poor sustainability due 
to dependence on external assistance. Even with these limitations, studies have shown that CSOs 
are needed at the interface between people and decentralised state bodies, the implementation 
level, to represent the interests of the poor and facilitate their participation in decision making. 
Furthermore, community involvement allows for a design that responds, from the beginning, 
to local needs and Karanja (2005) concludes that mobilising communities makes it possible to 
achieve more with limited finances.
2.2.4 Regional integration
Today service provision at the municipal level is characterised by regional actors who according 
to Olukoshi (2005) play an important, even at some conjunctures determinant role in shaping 
outcomes and therefore are critical to the definition of the process of change. Regional integration 
in East Africa can be traced to the 60’s.
The decade of independence in the 1960s witnessed a peaceful and united East and the 
Horn of Africa. United in the common agenda of securing regional peace and tranquillity; 
combating environmental threats and disasters, and investing in trans regional infrastructural 
development, the region excelled in education, communication and cooperation. But soon after, 
this cooperation was shaken by a number of political upheavals ranging from the Sudanese civil 
war of 1983, the 1994 Rwanda genocide and most recently the Somalia mayhem which still rages 
on. The repercussions of these disturbances affected neighbouring countries and at some point 
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only Kenya, Tanzania and Djibouti were islands of peace in the sea of turbulence that marked the 
political landscape of the East African region. Today the East African countries of Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi realise that they have a responsibility towards each other, and that 
they have many challenges in common, some of which are cross-border in nature. These countries 
now see considerable benefits of close regional cooperation, political understanding, economic 
and social prosperity. This new resolve to address issues of common relevance in a cooperative 
manner is reflected in concrete progress being made on the ground. Maruping (2005) records that 
these countries are today all members of one or more regional or sub-regional arrangements that 
seek to promote economic coordination, cooperation or integration among the member countries. 
Mackie et al. (2010) report on the various regional organisations whose agendas have been either 
economic, political or environmental. These include:
1. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) integration which was 
set out in the Preferential Trade Agreement Treaty of 1993, and is focused on the integration 
of markets through the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment to 
achieve full economic cooperation through a gradual process of creating a free trading zone, 
the establishment of a common market and ultimately an economic community.
2. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa which was 
created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
(IGADD), founded in 1986. The main objective of this organisation is to foster economic and 
diplomatic cooperation between its member states with the aim of increasing food security, 
environmental protection, economic integration and peace and security in the region.
3. The East African Community (EAC) is an intergovernmental organisation, regrouping five 
countries from East Africa, created in 1967 to supersede the East African Common Services 
Organisation. This entity aims at strengthening the ties between member states through a 
common market, a common customs tariff and a range of public services so as to achieve 
balanced economic growth within the region. In the last ten years, the EAC has launched 
several projects, at the regional/sectoral level, in support of deeper integration within the 
region. These include, amongst others: the single tourist visa programme to facilitate free 
movement of tourists in the region so as to make the region a more attractive and competitive 
destination for middle class and high class families; the Lake Victoria Development Programme 
to coordinate and promote investment/information sharing among various stakeholders in the 
region as a way to transform the Lake Victoria Basin into a real economic growth zone. Other 
important outcomes of EAC in the Lake Victoria Basin include the formation of sub-regional 
organisations like the Lake Victoria Basin Commission which contributes to municipal service 
provision in diverse ways.
These regional initiatives have to deal with challenges such as overlapping membership which 
weakens integration, inconsistencies between national policies and regional integration programs, 
lack of continuity and sustainability of regional programs, limitations of the regional organisations’ 
financial, technical and institutional capacities and even the definition of what constitutes a 
regional program.
To this end, we see a history in urban governance marked with different actors, each playing 
a role in public (municipal ) service provision and advertently pointing to different institutional 
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arrangements that go beyond the state as the traditional public service provider. This setting 
generates interest in looking at a number of theoretical perspectives that argue for different 
institutional arrangements in order to bring to perspective the modernised mixtures argument 
introduced in chapter one.
2.3 Theoretical perspectives
The history just presented depicts an institutional arrangement for which the central government 
in all the three states has had a powerful leading position as far as municipal level is concerned. 
But we also see non-state actors involved in one way or another from local to international 
level. A number of authors have argued for and against different institutional arrangements 
and this study picks on some of these arguments. In particular the theoretical perspectives of 
centralisation vs. decentralisation; developmental state vs. network governance; and multi-level 
governance to discuss how these arrangements at municipal level affect decentralised governance 
and environmental service provision (SWM).
2.3.1 Centralisation versus decentralisation
While it is not the intent of this study to emphasise the merits of decentralisation (i.e. as compared 
to centralisation), the political arena in East Africa is characterised by distinct centralised and 
decentralised features making it necessary to take a closer look at them. The different positions 
taken in the centralisation versus decentralisation debate give insights into the effects that a 
centralised system would have on environmental service provision as the study seeks an optimal 
institutional arrangement for the decentralised public services.
A number of authors, among them Crook and Manor (1998), Oyugi (2000), Fjeldstad (2001), 
Crook (2003), Mitullah (2004), Conyers (2007), and Robinson (2007) record that decentralisation 
has done little to improve the quality, quantity and equity of public services. Yet others (Rondinelli 
et al., 1984; Azfar et al., 1999; De Vries, 2000) report that centralisation does not take local 
stakeholder knowledge and interests into account. Centralisation imposes a top-down view 
which often benefits the vested interests as opposed to those with less power in the process, while 
ultimately it is only at local level that policies can be implemented and decentralisation will ensure 
effective and probably more cost-effective implementation.
The two schools of thought are looked at here against the following criteria: efficiency, 
resource availability, participation and equity in public service provision and in turn in solid 
waste management at the municipal level. In this review we borrow on discussions by Prud’homme 
(1995), Klugman (1994), De Vries (2000), Wunsch (2001), Jutting et al. (2004) and Ahmed et al. 
(2005), who write on decentralisation, centralisation or on both in relation to public policy, service 
delivery and in some cases with particular reference to Africa.
When it comes to efficiency, Klugman explains that the design of public goods and services may 
be more in accordance with local preferences under a decentralised system (allocative efficiency), 
but weighing against this are central standards which can ensure a minimum degree of quality 
and quantity of the services provided. Further, the utilisation of local resources, information and 
technology may lower costs (technical efficiency), but the existence of economies of scale points in 
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favour of a more centralised approach to service provision. A certain minimal area and, therefore, 
a certain degree of centralisation seem necessary prerequisites for the provision of some public 
services, or at least for their cost-efficient provision. She goes on to say that local decisions which 
rely solely upon local information may ignore the potential for externalities and economies of 
scale, which in turn creates wider costs for the society. Yet dis-economies of scale may also exist, 
where costs rise disproportionately with size.
Looking at resource availability, a frequently-cited problem is the lack of capacity at sub-
national levels of government to exercise the responsibility for public services (Wunsch, 2001). 
The possible advantage of effectiveness under a decentralised system is disputed, because local 
governments lack the financial resources to finance the decentralised policies (see De Vries, 
2000; Prud’homme, 1995). Furthermore, large public agencies are seen as necessary for the 
recruitment of qualified and skilled staff. Under a decentralised system, professional staff may 
be relatively more isolated and lack the frequency of contact with colleagues, than would have 
occurred under centralisation. This has been said to lead to a lower quality of service provision 
than would otherwise have been the case. Yet decentralised institutions and policies are associated 
with innovations which happen because good ideas bubble up from employees, who actually do 
the work and deal with the local people
From the angle of participation, decentralisation might be favoured because it is deemed to 
increase effective democratisation. This is the basis of empowerment for local communities. To 
proponents of decentralisation, the centralisation of policy strategies at national level is inimical 
to citizenship because it deprives local civic forums of weighty matters to deliberate about. De 
Vries (2000) who presents the arguments in favour of both centralisation and decentralisation 
of public policy making, points out that the use of local people for the provision of local services 
would render these services cheaper and more effective. An example given is the low cost Orangi 
sanitation pilot project in Karachi that involved the community. De Vries goes on to write that 
decentralisation can cut through red tape and may increase officials’ knowledge of and sensitivity 
to local problems. This may result in better penetration of national policies to remote communities, 
greater representation for various religious, ethnic and tribal groups in the policy process, and 
greater administrative capability at the local level. Decentralisation can provide a structure in which 
local projects can be coordinated, civic participation enhanced, and entrenched local elites, who 
are often unsympathetic to national development policies, neutralised. It may result in a flexible, 
innovative and creative administration, and be more effective in its implementation, because of 
simplified monitoring and evaluation. On the other hand, decentralisation is also reported to 
increase the possibility of political capture within these lower governmental tiers (Jutting et al., 
2004; Shah et al., 2005; Wunsch, 2001).
As relates to equity, Klugman (1994) explains that while decentralisation can promote equity 
among different groups within a region, through increased local public expenditure and the wider 
provision of public goods and services, there is a risk that disparities between districts may worsen 
due to different tax bases and inadequate fiscal equalisation. Therefore there may be a need for 
greater decentralisation in some cases or centralisation in others so that the central government 
at least retains a strong redistributive role.
For some an absolute choice for centralised or decentralised options is necessary, but like 
Hegger (2007) argues, none of the two extremes is completely preferable over the other. What 
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is coming out clearly at this point is that the arguments used for or against centralisation can at 
other moments also be used to make opposite claims. The features of decentralisation are likely to 
differ for different countries and depend on the environmental service in question. Decentralised 
responsibilities in some areas is more sensible than in others especially for issues having national 
causes and consequences, that is, services that are provided at the national level. A number of 
other aspects also play a crucial role when looking at decentralisation for instance, the dependency 
on central grants, autonomy of local government in the policy area, possibility for the public to 
participate among others. This study therefore builds on the theoretical arguments posited above 
by adapting them to specific existing situation because as De Vries concludes, it cannot be pointed 
out often enough that an optimal institutional arrangement fits the specific situation in a specific 
area in a specific country given the specific problems at stake.
2.3.2 Developmental state versus network governance
This debate takes the study a step further from solely focusing on the government as an institution 
(both local and national) to giving attention to the non-state actors who are increasingly taking 
an important place in public service provision. Emphasis is thus on the adequacies in the role of 
African state in urban environmental infrastructure development and public service provision in 
East Africa and the presence of non-state actors therein. Questions regarding the adequacy of the 
structural arrangements of public authorities are raised. Therefore this study looks at the arguments 
for ‘neo-developmental state’ – a concept brought forth by Oosterveer (2009), which suggests 
a renewed and active role for governments in promoting development and ensuring adequate 
service provision also for the poor, and, on the other hand, the ‘network approach to governance’ 
which acknowledges limitations to the state’s capacity and suggests a further involvement of other 
societal actors in the governance of urban environmental infrastructures and services.
The developmental state is different from the traditional authoritarian state because its 
legitimacy derives from its achievements and not from the way it came to power (Johnson, 1999). 
Proponents of the developmental state point out that states should foster economic development 
and avoid being captured by particular interest groups (Krieckhaus, 2002; Menocal and Fritz, 
2006). Thus, a developmental state is broadly understood as one that shows a clear commitment 
to a national development agenda, that has solid capacity and reach, and that seeks to provide 
economic growth as well as poverty reduction and the provision of public services (Menocal 
and Fritz, 2006). Referring to Africa specifically, Mkandawire (1998) gives the definition of a 
developmental state as a state whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and that 
seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of economic 
development. The theory of developmental states, as explained by Krieckhaus, argues that states 
with a combination of high bureaucratic capacity and significant autonomy from society can 
successfully allocate financial resources to strategic industrial sectors and thereby generate rapid 
industrial advances. Developmental states are seen to be able to generate massive savings within 
the public sector and use these resources to finance high levels of investment and growth. Under 
this school of thought, civil servants are more professional and more detached from powerful 
rent-seeking groups attempting to influence them (Menocal and Fritz, 2006). Oosterveer (2009), 
argues for a revised understanding of the developmental state, as this has evolved from its initial 
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form in the 1960s and ‘70s into a ‘neo-developmental’ state in the new millennium. Whereas the 
original developmental state was oriented towards monopolising the process of economic and 
societal growth, its renewed form acknowledges the role of other sectors in society (market, civil 
society) but insists on the essential role of governments in protecting the interests of the poor. 
Oosterveer gives an elaborate theoretical discussion of the role of the neo-developmental state in 
urban environmental infrastructure and service provision in East Africa. He reports that under the 
view of the neo-developmental state, privatisation is not excluded but should be firmly controlled 
(against corruption and underperformance) and not be limited to contracting large (foreign) 
companies, but include smaller local companies and NGOs/CBOs. Oosterveer further records 
that proponents of the neo-developmental view claim that it is only through active government 
interventions that access of the poor to environmental infrastructures can be secured, as their 
economic and political power is too limited to realise this in another way. Stronger national and 
municipal governments are considered better able to bridge the gap that very often exists between 
the formal laws and regulations and their limited implementation in practice. Effective market 
economies are essential but require functioning and capable state and societal institutions in 
order to operate and grow.
Critics claim that assigning an active developmental role especially to the contemporary African 
state is anachronistic (Kütting, 2004 in Oosterveer, 2009). A neo-developmental state demands 
strong governmental organisations, which becomes increasingly unlikely under the present 
economic and international conditions (Callaghy, 1993; Lewis, 1996). Instead of strengthening 
the African states’ capacity to intervene they suggest to limit their role even further and rely more 
on other societal actors through network governance.
Network governance involves the collaboration between various institutions and structures 
of authority to allocate resources and to coordinate and control joint actions across the network 
as a whole. A number of authors have contributed to the discussion of network governance. 
The works of Jones et al. (1997), Provan and Milward (2001), Provan and Kenis (2007) in their 
own different ways, assess the effectiveness of networks. Provan and Kenis (2007) examine the 
functioning and governance of networks, thereby distinguishing between organisational and 
network governance. They even go further and present different forms of network governance. 
They ultimately present what they call tensions in network governance tied to legitimacy, stability 
and efficiency in relation to inclusive decision making. Jones et al. (1997) do not refer explicitly 
or exclusively to a public sector context but focus on a general theory of network governance. 
Using transaction cost economies and social network theory, they provide an assessment of 
alternative forms of governance. They identify conditions for network governance and explore why 
networks, rather than markets or hierarchies, are employed. Provan and Milward (2001) focus on 
the definition of network performance indicators by identifying three relevant levels of analysis: 
community, network, and organisation/participant. At each level the authors propose a set of 
criteria to measure effectiveness and conclude that overall effectiveness of the network in service 
delivery will ultimately be judged by community level stakeholders. Oosterveer (2009) records 
that a network approach permits inter- organisational interactions of exchange, concerted action, 
and joint production in a more or less formal manner. The composition of such networks vary 
from domain to domain, but they are likely to consist of government agencies at different levels, 
key legislators, pressure groups, relevant private companies and civil society organisations such as 
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NGOs and CBOs. Network governance arrangements intend to achieve their objectives through 
the combined efforts of these different sets of actors, but their respective roles and responsibilities 
remain distinct without the state being the sole locus of authority. He goes on to write that these 
non-state actors start developing their own sets of rules or standards to fill ‘institutional voids’ 
where rules to guide behaviour are needed but not provided by the state. The national government 
remains an important political actor and a point of orientation for citizens but must compete with 
others and can no longer assume a monopoly on legitimate interventions. Oosterveer concludes 
that the network approach to governance seems more promising to deliver urban environmental 
services to the poor in East Africa than the neo-developmental approach.
Network-based views are criticised for the lack of legitimacy of the non-state societal actors 
involved. Unlike state-based regulators, whose actions can be legitimised via formal, democratic 
procedures and supported by law, non-state actors cannot rely on legal authority to motivate 
people, nor derive legitimacy from their position in a wider official order (Provan and Kenis, 
2007; Oosterveer, 2009). There is also the question regarding the balance between the need for 
administrative efficiency in governing infrastructures and services and the need for stakeholder 
involvement, through inclusive decision making. The more participants are involved in the network 
decision process, the more time consuming and resource intensive that process will tend to be 
(Provan and Kenis, 2007). Furthermore while networks are discussed as adaptable, flexible forms 
that are ‘light on their feet’, the issue of stability necessary for developing consistent responses to 
stakeholders and for efficient network management over time come to the fore, especially where the 
networks are not temporary outfits and where there is shared participant governance as opposed 
to lead-organisation governance (ibid.).
The two schools of thought provide valuable (theoretical) insights into what service provision 
can gain from either neo-developmental state or network governance each on its own. The idea 
of neo-developmental state in Africa has been criticised and even dismissed by some. While the 
East African countries are not on the same footing with their East Asian counterparts from where 
the developmental state model emerged, we can certainly talk of a neo-developmental state in 
East Africa. Mkandawire (1998) writes that the answer lies in institutional arrangements and he 
goes on to say that the way forward does not lie in the wholesale neglect of existing capacities in 
the quest for ‘new’ ones, but in utilising, retooling and reinvigorating existing capacities. Yet it is 
becoming increasingly clear that development cannot be left to the state alone, It has to involve 
the participation of the people concerned. Network governance arrangements create room for 
effective local communities’ participation in developing their own preferred approach while 
harmonising with other stakeholders and other levels of governance. Oosterveer (2009) argues 
that this form of governance could assure that services reach the urban poor. Therefore there is 
need to look at the two schools of thought and build on the strength of each. This study provides 
empirical evidence to build on the arguments presented.
2.3.3 Multi-level governance
To continue the discussion on state and network governance, the study also looks at multi-level 
governance (Harlow and Rawlings, 2006). A defining characteristic of multi-level governance 
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(MLG) is the pooling and sharing of authority and influence between actors and across different 
levels (Develtere et al., 2005).
Marks and Hooghe (2003) explain that, in recent decades, centralised authority has given way 
to new forms of governing. Formal authority has been dispersed from central states both up to 
supranational institutions and down to regional and local governments. At the same time, public/
private networks of diverse kinds have multiplied at the local and international levels. Marks and 
Hooghe (2004), explain that the diffusion of authority in new political forms has led to a profusion 
of new terms: multi-level governance, multi-tiered governance, polycentric governance, multi-
perspective governance, FOCJ (functional, overlapping, competing jurisdictions), fragmentation 
(or spheres of authority), and consortia and condominiums, to name but a few. This dispersion 
of governance across multiple jurisdictions is seen as both more efficient than, and normatively 
superior to, central state monopoly. It is also seen as more flexible than concentration of governance 
in one jurisdiction.
Literature on MLG claims that governance must operate at multiple scales in order to capture 
variations in the territorial reach of policy externalities. Because externalities arising from the 
provision of public goods vary immensely - from planet-wide in the case of global warming to local 
in the case of city services like waste management - so should the scale of governance. Multiple 
jurisdictions also reflects better the existing heterogeneity of preferences among citizens. However, 
beyond the presumption that governance has become (and should be) multi-jurisdictional, there 
is no agreement about how multi-level governance should be organised. Marks and Hooghe 
distinguish between Type I and Type II MLG:
Type I MLG describes jurisdictions at a limited number of levels. These jurisdictions – 
international, national, regional, meso, local – are general-purpose. That is to say, they bundle 
together multiple functions, including a range of policy responsibilities and, in many cases, a 
court system and representative institutions. The membership boundaries of such jurisdictions do 
not intersect. This is the case for jurisdictions at any one level, and for jurisdictions across levels. 
In Type I governance, every citizen is located within a certain set of nested jurisdictions, where 
there is only one relevant jurisdiction at any particular territorial scale. Territorial jurisdictions 
are intended to be, and usually are as well, stable for periods of several decades or more, though 
the allocation of policy competencies across jurisdictional levels is flexible.
Type II MLG is distinctly different. It is composed of specialised jurisdictions. Type II 
governance is fragmented into functionally specific pieces – say, providing a particular local 
service, solving a particular common resource problem, selecting a particular software standard, 
monitoring water quality of a particular river, or adjudicating international trade disputes. The 
number of such jurisdictions is potentially huge, and the scales at which they operate vary finely. 
There is no great fixity in their existence. They tend to be lean and flexible – they come and go as 
demands for governance change. Each public good or service should be provided by the jurisdiction 
that most effectively internalises its benefits and costs.
Following the above grid that has often been used to research MLG in Europe, Develtere et 
al. (2005), in their study on MLG in Kenya write of the two types 1 and II MLG as vertical and 
horizontal dimensions respectively. The ‘vertical’ dimension refers to the linkages between higher 
and lower levels of government, including their institutional, financial, and informational aspects. 
Here, local capacity building and incentives for effectiveness at sub-national levels of government 
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are crucial issues for improving the quality and coherence of public policy. The ‘horizontal’ 
dimension refers to cooperation arrangements between regions or between municipalities as a 
means by which to improve the effectiveness of local public service delivery and implementation of 
development strategies. This study builds on the categorisation above, particularly the horizontal 
or type II MLG which calls for opening up the political space to non-state actors. Hereby this study 
appreciates the conclusion from Develtere and colleagues that MLG in the Kenyan context, as a 
system of pooling and sharing of authority and influence, does not come into being on the basis 
of a predesigned plan but is instead the result of many different actors, pursuing very divergent 
agenda, getting interested in a more participatory multi-stakeholder mode of governance that 
works at different levels in order to satisfy their specific interests.
Type II MLG thus provides a good basis to assess the opportunities of inter-municipal 
cooperation for SWM and further the role of regional organisation and networks in environmental 
service and infrastructure provision.
Looking at these theoretical perspectives from the angle of modernised mixtures, the study 
can at this point argue that it is the intelligent and flexible mixtures of institutional layouts and 
management systems from opposing paradigms but adapted to the specific local context, that will 
pass for a good arrangement for SWM at the municipal level. SWM is one of the environmental 
services considered a public service and mandated to the municipal authorities. Section 2.4 
therefore presents conceptual frameworks of analysing the new political configurations at the 
municipal level that show a mix of institutional layouts and management systems.
2.4  In search of new political configuration for SWM at municipal level under 
the modernised mixtures approach
There is need to conceptualise new political configurations under the MM framework that take 
cognizant of the roles played at different government levels by different actors (both state and 
non-state actors). These actors operate at the local, national and regional levels. The actors perform 
SWM tasks which are both technical and social and operating along the waste chain either as 
combined or differentiated waste flows and this translates into different options or combinations 
of options for institutional arrangements which offer solutions to the problems facing SWM in 
East African cities. The conceptual models 2.1 and 2.2 below illustrate this (see Figure 2.1 and 2.2).
Solid waste management is the underlying subject of study and some of its elements that are 
critical for its assessment at this point include waste collection; transportation, treatment/ recycling 
and disposal. These are tasks under the waste chain and involve a number of actors at different 
stages who define the different institutional arrangements.
The municipalities are the key actors in solid waste management. Their activities are influenced 
by the state and the citizens in the neighbourhoods/wards to whom they seek to provide services. 
Therefore important questions which are part of research questions 1 and 2, are whether these 
municipalities …
• have the tools/resources;
• are organised to perform their functions; and
• perform as expected?
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Answering these questions, allows the research to look at the internal organisation aspect of the 
framework. Other issues that are part of the internal organisation include: the actors involved 
and their power relations (in this case issues of autonomy), the policy documents and how they 
have been interpreted and how they have accommodated new definitions of problems or new 
approaches to solutions (Arts et al., 2006)
Note that in Figure 2.1 the arrow between the state and municipality is dotted because in 
the study, the municipality is at one point looked at as local government whereas the state is the 
central government while elsewhere the municipality is considered as constituting the state itself.
It is evident, that there are other non-state actors involved in SWM. Their participation is 
either formal or informal and to assess this, the study looks at their collaboration with each other 
and with the municipalities (formal/informal) where present. Some of the issues assessed are 
the legitimacy and decision making power: the relationships between the municipalities and 
the non-state actors, amongst non-state actors themselves and between the non-state actors and 
the households in the wards/neighbourhoods. The existing payment systems are also looked at.
The small municipal councils which are also cases under study could collaborate with each 
other in their efforts in solid waste management. This can be realised through inter-municipal 
cooperation within the lake basin. Specific issues looked into for inter-municipal cooperation in the 
study include the geographical location, institutional organisation, waste collection, transportation, 
re-use/recycling and disposal and the opportunities presented in line with economies of scale, 
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Figure 2.1. SWM at municipal level: actors and relationships.
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equity, subsidiarity, internalising externalities and participation of other public and private entities. 
This allows the study to answer research question 3.
The ultimate options for solid waste management should reflect accessibility, flexibility and 
ecological and institutional sustainability which are the criteria of the modernised mixtures 
approach.
SWM can also be done across borders, that is cross-country and to look at this more in detail, 
conceptual model 2.2 was developed (see Figure 2.2).
Cross-border cooperation has to take into consideration constraining and/or enabling factors 
at the regional, national and municipal levels and specifically those considered relevant for solid 
waste infrastructure and service provision. Two regional organisations are assessed for their role in 
enhancing cross-border cooperation in infrastructure provision by looking at municipal autonomy 
in decision making within their organisational arrangement and the availability of resources within 
these organisations. This allows the study to answer research question 4.
To operationalise these models, the next section presents the research methodology that aided 
in the collection of data.
2.5 Operationalising the conceptual frameworks: research methodology
This section presents the overall research methodology but specific details are given under each 
empirical chapter that follows hereafter.
As mentioned in chapter one, this study seeks to contribute to the improvement of solid waste 
management in the Lake Victoria Basin. More specifically, attention is focused at the municipal 
level as shown in the conceptual models above, and the aim is to present options of institutional 
arrangements under the modernised mixtures approach that would improve infrastructure and 
service provision. With the three countries in question, it was of necessity to study cases in each 
of the three and compare them in order to make an informed appraisal that reflects the real life 
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Figure 2.2. Cross border actors and relationships in the Lake Victoria Basin.
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context. This required an in-depth study of each case. In-depth insights were sought with regard 
to existing institutional arrangements for solid waste management and changes that have occurred 
over time. To sufficiently do such a study, case study research strategy was used because as explained 
by Noor (2008) and many other authors, case studies become particularly useful where one needs 
to understand some particular problem or situation in-depth, and where one can identify cases 
that are rich in information.
2.5.1 Case study research
According to Yin (1994, 2009), case studies can be exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. De 
Vaus (2001) gives further categorisations of either single or multiple case; holistic or embedded 
units of analysis and parallel or sequential case studies. With the theory already in place, research 
questions defined and the intention to solve a problem – which is solid waste management – then 
descriptive and explanatory case study designs are more appropriate. This is because the study 
seeks to show how and why a modernised mixtures approach would be appropriate in realising 
institutional arrangements that would improve solid waste management.
Case selection
In order to study cases in each of the three countries, three urban centres in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania were selected as multiple cases for comparative purposes on the basis of:
• diversity of experience, including diversity within one country, and therefore the potential for 
improving our understanding, identifying good practices and disseminating relevant lessons;
• feasibility of the field research in terms of the researcher’s existing level of knowledge and 
contacts;
• geographical representation of the Lake Victoria Basin;
• existing partnerships, expertise and knowledge of the centres and countries.
The three selected urban centres are Jinja (Uganda), Mwanza (Tanzania) and Kisumu (Kenya). 
Besides the points listed, in their respective countries the three towns all come just after the capital 
cities, in terms of urban status, and therefore their institutional position is comparable.
In responding to the first and second research question, the three cases, Jinja, Kisumu and 
Mwanza municipalities, help to show how the modernised mixtures approach holds for different 
conditions. The research was able to make a parallel comparative study of the three urban centres, 
whereby all three were studied at once. The comparative approach brought out contrasts in 
institutional organisation which would have been lost in a single case study.
The third research question is addressed by looking at embedded units of analysis. With lake 
Victoria Basin being considered as the main case, three small urban centres also referred to as 
secondary towns neighbouring each other were picked from the Kenyan side of Lake Victoria 
and they formed the embedded units. This approach was informed by the findings from research 
questions one and two which showed clear differences in the organisation and legal provisions 
of urban authorities in handling solid waste management amongst the three countries, therefore 
making it more appropriate to consider inter-municipal cooperation on infrastructure provision 
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within one country. The three towns were purposely picked out of 6 municipalities in Kenya4 
because of their geographical proximity in the Lake Victoria basin. The three small urban centres 
are all within 100 kms of each other.
To respond to the fourth research question, two regional organisations in the Lake Victoria Basin 
were selected, one categorised as voluntary (Lake Victoria Region Local Authority Cooperation) 
and another as statutory (Lake Victoria Basin Commission) in order to assess how the roles they 
play (if any) in solid waste management at municipal level are conditioned by their organisational 
structure.
2.5.2 Data collection
Since the cases consist of different elements, different methods of data collection were used (see 
also De Vaus, 2001). A number of issues in the research design required in-depth interviews, 
hence in these case studies the emphasis was on qualitative methods. Interviews were conducted 
with city/municipal and town council officials responsible for solid waste management in one way 
or another to assess the institutional arrangement at their respective council and for the smaller 
town councils additional information was sought to assess the opportunities for inter-municipal 
cooperation. Interviews were also made with representatives of non-state actors in solid waste 
management (private companies, CBOs, solid waste management associations) to assess the 
relationships that exist amongst themselves, with the councils and with the households/citizens 
(see Annex 8). Representatives of regional organisations were also interviewed to assess their role 
in SWM and to establish if there are opportunities for municipal cooperation. Details of each part 
of the research are further explained under each chapter.
Two stakeholder workshops also informed this study. One held in Kisumu brought stakeholders 
particularly from the small urban centres to a round table discussion on opportunities for inter-
municipal cooperation and more details on this workshop can be found in Chapter five. One 
of the outcomes of this workshop which is important for the study concerned the actual and 
potential roles that regional organisations play in SWM. Specific aspects analysed under areas for 
cooperation included economies of scale, internalising externalities and ensuring equity amongst 
participating councils which allowed the study to conclude on the flexibility, accessibility and 
sustainability of inter-municipal cooperation. There was also a Bukoba workshop organised under 
the auspices of LVRLAC which had a wider spectrum of participants compared to the Kisumu 
workshop, with participants from Kampala, Mwanza and even Kisumu. The role of regional 
organisations and networks in SWM was looked into and the specific areas analysed included, 
the autonomy of participating councils and the availability of resources, reflecting the flexibility 
of regional arrangements and their institutional sustainability.
The research also entailed looking into legislations, policy documents and other relevant 
material. This was helpful in discovering the history surrounding the institutional arrangements 
for public service provision and in understanding the different theoretical perspectives that assisted 
in the development of the conceptual models in line with the modernised mixtures approach.
4 The Kenyan side of the Lake Victoria Basin has 25 councils: one city Council; 6 municipal councils; 7 town 
councils and 11 county councils which are rural.
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Direct observation of SWM infrastructure was necessary to provide a description of the status 
quo in the urban centres under study.
To complement the qualitative approach and to answer certain questions, questionnaire-based 
household surveys were conducted in Jinja, Kisumu and Mwanza with a total of 200 questionnaires 
administered in each of these three urban centres. A number of 200 questionnaires is considered 
enough for a first impression of the situation in each town because the study ensured to have the 
samples randomly spread over the different sections of each town. The number 200 is also the 
maximum the researcher could afford in terms of time and money.
Sample selection for the household surveys
Mwanza
In Mwanza, there are two districts and each has urban and rural wards. Urban wards were 
purposively selected because they receive SWM services. Every urban ward receives services 
either from a CBO or a private company working under a contract so all urban areas irrespective 
of income levels receive SWM services. For the survey, stratified sampling was used. It was a 
disproportionate stratified sampling because for all the 14 urban wards (which were the strata- see 
Table 2.2), on average 13-14 households were interviewed irrespective of population figures in 
each ward. The goal was to have each ward represented by a minimum number of 10 households 
Table 2.2. Overview of selected districts and wards in Mwanza with number of inhabitants, households 
and households interviewed per ward.
Districts Wards Pop.	2002	census Number	of	households	 No.	interviewed
Ilemela district
Pasiansi 25,310 5,410 13
Butimba 31,109 6,287 12
Nyakato 82,381 17,410 15
Ilemela 23,952 4,922 12
Nyamagana district
Mkuyuni 13,343 3,416 10
Nyamanoro 42,731 9,647 12
Igogo 28,570 7,289 14
Pamba 23,546 5,130 16
Nyamagana 5,851 1,236 21
Mirongo 5,332 1,109 14
Mbugani 37,522 9,111 15
Isamilo 17,916 4,096 15
Kirumba 21,642 4,989 21
Kitangiri 14,282 3,115 10
Total 200
Source: Field work 2007-2009.
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and to arrive at a maximum total sample of 200 households. Using the population census data and 
with the help of the ward leaders and the public health officers posted to each ward, households 
were randomly picked from a list and questionnaires administered (Table 2.2).
Kisumu
In Kisumu, SWM is patterned much more along income levels. Previous empirical work indicated 
that the council had not officially permitted non-state actors to operate but all SWM activities 
by these actors went on unofficially. SWM service providers (the non-state actors) defined their 
clients on the basis of their income. Community self-help groups were common in low income 
areas while private companies dominated high and middle income areas. Therefore a list of low, 
middle and high income estates was made, and then a few estates from each of the three categories 
were randomly picked
Note that just like in Mwanza, Kisumu has civic wards, some of these wards are estates in 
themselves for instance, Nyalenda is a ward and an estate at the same time, while in other wards, 
there is more than one estate. There are in total 17 civic wards covering 41 estates.
There are about 41 estates recognised by the council (11 high income, 17 middle income and 
13 low income). The council provides waste management services in only 12 of these estates. 
The study aimed to administer 200 questionnaires just like in Mwanza. About half the number 
of estates in each income category mentioned earlier was randomly selected. The study ended 
up administering questionnaires in 6 high income, 9 middle income and 7 low income estates 
listed in the Table 2.3. About 10 questionnaires were administered in each of the estates selected.
The number of households per estate varies from about 3,200 to about 12,000. Selecting 
households within the selected estates was done differently depending on the kind of estate 
Table 2.3. Overview of selected estates in Kisumu city per income category and number of households 
interviewed per estate.
High	income Number	
interviewed
Middle	income Number	
interviewed
Low	income Number	
interviewed
Milimani 10 Dunga 10 Railways 10
Tom Mboya 7 Mosque 10 Nyawita 10
Mt.View 8 Upper railways 10 Manyatta 10
Poly View 10 Makasembo 9 Manyatta Arabs 10
Mayfair 10 Arina 8 Nyalenda 11
Migosi 10 Robert Ouko 11 Shauri Moyo 7
Okore 5 Nyamasaria 4
Nubian 10
Ondiek 10
Total 55 83 62
Source: Field work 2007-2009.
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arrangement. In planned estates like the Railway estates, the houses are numbered and organised 
in a certain pattern so it was easy to do systematic sampling, selecting every fourth household. 
In the informal estates like Nyalenda, the houses are not numbered or arranged in any particular 
order, the researchers were guided by the village names within Nyalenda which were listed and 
then one household from each village was randomly selected. To avoid covering a village more 
than once, the study used one research assistant per estate.
The income categorisation used to obtain the sample reflects the general pattern of service 
provision in the town. The estates were classified according to one of the three distinct income 
categories. From each group of estates about half was randomly selected. Within each selected 
estate about 10 households were randomly selected. Therefore, based on the argument of inferential 
statistics, the data can be considered to reflect the situation of service provision among the different 
income categories in the town as a whole.
Jinja
In Jinja, there are three divisions (Table 2.4). Within each division there are parishes but solid 
waste management services have been contracted out per division and the work is given to two 
contractors. The divisions are:
• Central division;
• Walukuba division;
• Mpumudde division.
One contractor serves both Central and Walukuba divisions while the other contractor serves 
Mpumudde division. Service is therefore not structured along income levels as in Kisumu neither 
per ward as is the case in Mwanza.
Waste is collected from skips (collection points) and not directly from the households. 
Contractors are paid per emptied skip. There are 119 collection points (skips) in Central, 10 in 
Walukuba and 20 in Mpumudde. Central and Mpumudde Divisions were picked for the study in 
order to show the differences (if any) in service provided by the two contractors.
Table 2.4. Overview of divisions in Jinja Municipality with number of inhabitants, households, 
collection points and households interviewed per selected division.
Division Pop.	2002	census Number	of	
households
Number	of	
collection	points
No.	of	households	
interviewed
Central Division 26,698 5,519 119 180
Mpumudde 19,901 4,220 20 38
Walukuba 24,614 6,795 10
Total 71,213 16,534 218
Source: Field Work 2007-2009.
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Frequency of questionnaires administered was higher in Central with about 180 questionnaires 
randomly distributed and 38 randomly distributed in Mpumudde. These frequencies were more 
or else in line with the distribution of collection points which are many in Central division. In the 
end, in total 218 household questionnaires were administered, so the aim to get a total minimum 
of 200 questionnaires, as for the other two towns, was reached.
With a list of street names (also referred to as roads/avenues/zones which are equivalent of the 
villages in Kisumu), households (numbering up to 10 in certain streets) were randomly selected 
from each street.
For all three towns, questions asked included the income status of the household; who the 
service provider is; whether the household pays for service provision; how much they pay for 
SWM; whether they consider the service satisfactory; which among water, electricity, security 
and SWM as services would they pay for first, second, third and fourth (see Annex 1 for the 
questionnaire). This was done to assess, among other things, service distribution to conclude on 
accessibility, different service providers to conclude on flexibility and the relationship between 
households and service providers on legitimacy and social trust. The household data collected 
were analysed using SPSS-PASWStatistics_17.0 from which frequency distributions were made 
which added onto the descriptive parts of the study findings. Qualitative data were coded guided 
by the dimensions of the conceptual framework and this made it easy to categorise and compare 
remarks from different interviewees.
2.5.3 Internal validity of research
Yin (2003) gives four tests that are commonly used to establish the quality of any empirical social 
science research. Prominent among the four is the test for internal validity. Internal validity means 
basically that you really measure what you want to measure. Triangulation is one of the ways 
used to ensure internal validity of social research (Meijer et al., 2002; Modell, 2005) and it refers 
to the use of multiple methods and measures of an empirical phenomenon in order to realise a 
more accurate analysis and explanation of it. It can occur with data, investigators, theories and 
even methodologies. In the context of data collection, triangulation serves to corroborate the 
data gathered from different sources (Yin, 2003). This study gathered data from different sources 
including documents, resource persons in the field, from households and also from observations 
intended to explain certain issues in the study. This study used various methods of data collection 
to get more reliable explanations for certain issues. These research methods include open interviews 
with resource persons, household surveys, stakeholder workshops and a round table discussion 
and finally direct observations.
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Chapter 3. 
Municipal authorities and performance of solid waste 
management tasks
3.1 Introduction
Solid waste management at the municipal level involves a number of crucial tasks which have 
both technical and social dimensions (Oosterveer and Spaargaren, 2010; Spaargaren et al., 2006) 
that run along the waste chain from collection to the point of disposal. While it is obvious that 
SWM infrastructure has a technological dimension, they need to be implemented and managed 
in order to fulfil their task. At the same time, they have a social dimension as well, because they 
need to accommodate the (sometimes widely diverging) local cultural practices and to perform 
in a sustainable manner to prevent negative environmental impacts. In addition, managing these 
infrastructures effectively also requires some form of coordination between institutions and 
actors at multiple scales: neighbourhood, city, national-level, and sometimes even the global level 
(Oosterveer and Spaargaren, 2010).
With numerous reports by scholars and even local media on non-performance of municipalities 
in SWM, a crucial question is therefore, what is a good solid waste management system at the 
municipal level? And to partly answer this, this chapter compares and assesses the performance of 
three urban authorities (Kisumu, Mwanza and Jinja) focusing on their institutional arrangements 
for the different SWM tasks. These tasks are presented based on the dimensions discussed under 
the modernised mixtures approach (MMA) on which this study is based (see Spaargaren et al., 
2006). These are the technical dimension which represents the technical aspects of SWM tasks 
along the waste flow reflecting the municipalities’ functional capacity in collection, transportation 
and disposal of solid waste as well as the managerial requirements involved. Then there is the 
social dimension which has got to do with the actors/organisations bringing out the social aspects 
of SWM tasks including the relational capacity of municipalities to engage with other public and 
private actors, using influencing and networking skills to work collaboratively, to encourage public 
participation and to build social trust. In this regard, the ways in which local authorities arrange 
their organisation is a vital issue, as these institutional arrangements can provide for, or hinder, 
their capacities related to both the decisions around, and the delivery of, key services (UNDP, 
2009). The MMA aims for optimisation via combining technical and social dimensions, depending 
on the specific local situations. To allow for assessing the result of this optimisation attempt, the 
MMA suggest to use the criteria of robustness, flexibility, accessibility and sustainability.
Briefly the research methodology is explained in section 3.1.1, followed by section 3.2 which 
presents the tasks identified according to theory and their actual performance on the ground. 
The last portion of this section explains the (lack of adequate) performance of the tasks. Section 
3.3 takes the MM discussion a little further by exploring the relevance of municipal autonomy 
for dealing with SWM tasks by focusing on relations between municipalities and other actors 
(both state and non-state) at local and supra local levels. Section 3.4 presents the conclusions of 
this chapter.
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3.1.1 Methodology
This study employs the Parallel Multiple Case studies research design already explained in Chapter 
two. The cases studied are the three urban authorities (Kisumu, Jinja and Mwanza) and the research 
is parallel because all three cases were studied at the same time and not one after the other. The 
data that informed this chapter was collected through the application of different methods:
Relevant documents, such as pieces of legislation and policy papers were analysed. In particular, 
the legislation governing the urban authorities in each of the three countries was studied, followed 
by the legislation on solid waste management and in particular the specific by-laws on SWM that 
exist for each council, followed by a review of reports on the profiles of each council.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted. Even though a structured list (see Annex 2) 
was used of issues to be addressed, the semi-structured interviews allowed interviewees to raise 
additional and complementary issues some of which will be presented in this chapter as verbatim. 
Performance of the technical and social tasks by the municipalities were included in the interviews. 
The interviewees included 12 resource persons from the three municipal offices Others interviewed 
were non-state SWM service providers who included two contractors in Uganda, 31 informal 
group representatives in Kisumu and 16 contractors in Mwanza.
Direct observation of the SWM management infrastructure was also helpful in drawing 
conclusions about their status.
Data analysis is done mostly qualitative. The different SWM tasks form the categories to 
present the results from the research and they are assessed for robustness, accessibility, flexibility 
and ecological sustainability.
3.2 SWM tasks for municipal authorities
3.2.1 Tasks identified according to theory
SWM tasks performed at the municipal level have both technical and social dimensions. Looking 
at the tasks from these two dimensions builds on the many studies on social-technical systems 
that acknowledge the co-evolution of technical and social developments.
In this section, I present these two dimensions separately as shown in Figure 3.1. First, I look at 
the technical dimension drawing upon the discussions surrounding centralised and decentralised 
modes of environmental infrastructure and service provision. Secondly, I present the social 
dimension from the perspective of the discourse of developmental state vs. network governance 
in infrastructure and service provision.
Technical dimension
The technical dimensions covers tasks regarding planning, implementation and maintenance 
of collection and transportation systems, waste recovery and final disposal. Thereby one has to 
take into consideration the design and selection of facilities and equipment with regard to their 
operational characteristics, their performance and their maintenance requirements. The need 
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for repair and the availability of spare parts should not be forgotten either (see Schubeler, 1996). 
These tasks along the waste chain are covered under the following heading:
1. Scale of technology. The scale of technology refers to the scale of infrastructure and service 
provision which ranges from large-scale which is typical for centralised systems to the small-
scale infrastructure and service provision which are usually decentralised. The scale of 
technology can be clearly pointed out under waste collection, transportation and disposal.
2. Scale of management. The scale of management refers to the way in which system operation, 
management and maintenance tasks are handled and this usually ranges from centralised 
to decentralised management (Hegger, 2007). Included here are the ways in which SWM is 
financed and how service costs are collected because the argument has always been that local 
governments are mainly reliant for funding on central governments and donor transfers that 
are often conditional, unpredictable and not sustained (Okot-Okumu and Oosterveer, 2010; 
Rotich et al., 2006; UNDP, 2010). Local governments are generally seen to be weak in revenue 
mobilisation.
From these two headings, it is clear that we have two extremes and which are centralised 
technical and management scales on the one hand and decentralised ones on the other. The 
choice between ‘centralised’ and ‘decentralised’ options is certainly a crucial issue and lies at the 
core of many debates around environmental performance of urban infrastructure and service 
provision (Tjallingii 1996 in Hegger, 2007). The centralised mode as discussed in Hegger (2007) 
is seen to have a certain degree of security because the very crucial tasks are in the hands of a 
few people, in this case the municipal authorities, receiving directives and resources from the 
central governments; they are also considered robust because of minimal interference from 
the larger public while they also allow for economies of scale. This centralised and hierarchical 
organisation is typical of large technical systems which are characterised by the presence of a 
dominant perspective on the role of technology and how technology should be implemented (Guy 
Solid waste management tasks
Social dimensionTechnical 
dimension
1. Scale of technology
2. Scale of management
• ways of financing
• service costs
1. Participation of citizens
2. Public private partnership
3. Social trust
Figure 3.1. Dimensions of SWM tasks.
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et al., 2001; Hegger, 2007). Yet, in the case of East Africa there is reported to exist a considerable 
mismatch between this approach and the actual situation, because large centralised technological 
systems make strong assumptions about the presence of homogeneity in housing stock, density, 
degree of urbanisation, accessibility, related infrastructure (such as street paving and drainage), 
and the like (Spaargaren et al., 2006). On the other end, there are decentralised initiatives like 
small scale neighbourhood waste collection by community groups considered flexible and able 
to reach the poor and unplanned neighbourhoods. Oosterveer and Spaargaren (2010) report 
that these decentralised systems have been noted to be more robust, cheaper and better able to 
deal effectively with the existing environmental challenges. However these technologies offer 
solutions for individual households but they do not solve the massive challenges of addressing the 
SWM problems of large cities in developing countries because it is challenging to up-scale such 
technologies. Large cities in developing regions such as East Africa are therefore faced with the 
dilemma of which path to choose for improving solid waste infrastructures as both large-scale 
centralised systems and small-scale decentralised systems each show serious weaknesses. The 
modernised mixtures approach on which this study is based, argues for getting the best mix out 
of both the centralised and the decentralised systems.
Social dimension
The social dimension of municipal SMW allows the study to focus on tasks such as capturing the 
participation of citizens, the possibilities of public-private partnerships and the presence of social 
trust. The relational capacity of municipalities to engage with other public and private actors, using 
their influencing and networking skills to work collaboratively is brought to the fore as well (UNDP, 
2010). To be effective in this domain, knowledge and expertise are to be coordinated, rather than 
controlled by a single source of authority. When working in collaboration with citizen groups, a 
combination of trust and the ability to monitor and exercise some control are needed. However, 
entering into partnerships with non‐state actors in the delivery of core municipal functions and 
services requires an immense cultural shift for most local governments and a willingness to give 
up some of their control over material and non-material resources.
An interesting area of debate has therefore to do with the participation of citizens and the 
involvement of other non-state actors in service provision because this relates to the debate on 
the neo-developmental state versus network governance. As presented in Chapter 2, proponents 
of the neo-developmental state claim that it is only through active government interventions that 
access of the poor to environmental infrastructures can be secured, as their economic and political 
power is too limited to realise this in another way. While according to the network governance 
view, (urban) governmental authorities are no longer pivotal in securing urban environmental 
infrastructures and services, because they have become one among the various societal actors 
that contribute. Network governance arrangements are seen to create room for effective local 
communities’ participation in developing their own preferred approach while harmonising this 
aim with other stakeholders and other levels of governance.
Along the same line of non-state actors, a practical livelihood aspect that nuances the discussion 
on the social dimension of municipal SWM is the issue of social trust. Social trust is difficult to 
define precisely, but it has been encapsulated as an ongoing motivation or impetus for social 
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relations that form the basis for interaction (Jordan, 2005). Social trust can entail perceived 
honesty, objectivity, consistency, competence, and fairness, all of which foster relationships between 
individuals/parties that must be maintained by the sustained fulfilment of these standards. In the 
field of municipal SWM infrastructure and service provision, this can be reflected by sustained 
or consistent service provision which is accessible to all, irrespective of their income levels. Of 
particular importance here is to distinguish between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ trust. As Hegger (2007) 
explains, active trust (for example in public figures, institutions and certain others) can no longer 
be taken for granted, as it used to be (i.e. passive trust), but has to be negotiated. Trust needs to be 
continuously reconfirmed, and may be withdrawn if it turns out to have been given unjustified. 
In those cases, actors may direct their trust to others (e.g. other persons, or other institutions). It 
cannot be determined a priori whether a public or privatised modes of provision is most conducive 
to trust building, as what matters most is whether mutual expectations are met and people know 
what to expect from each other. Poor levels of service, interruptions, low coverage levels, and 
other problems can undermine the quality of life in municipalities and erode public trust in the 
local government. On these grounds, social trust is included in this study and it is presented 
in the empirical section under the question whether the service providers, and particularly the 
municipalities, have invested in social trust. Though not measured directly, this social trust is 
reflected in the level of satisfaction about services and the level of public participation.
On the basis of this theoretical understanding, the next section presents the empirical evidence 
that will allow the study to conclude on the feasible options for municipal SWM as concerns the 
performance of their tasks under both the technical and social dimension
According to the MM approach it is essential to explore the municipal autonomy to ensure 
that the local solutions identified are considered potential building blocks for larger responses 
and dealt with in the framework of the complete waste chain, from collection to final disposal, 
and at multiple levels from local up to the regional and international levels. This allows the study 
to further assess the flexibility of the MM approach.
3.2.2 Tasks performed
Technical dimension: scale of technology
Collection
The collection of municipal solid waste varies between the three towns. In Kisumu there is a 
centralised mode of collection by the municipal authority which is completely detached from the 
informal/unofficial arrangement by the private firms and community groups. During the field 
work, the Deputy Director of Environment informed the study that the informal service providers 
collect 10-15% of the waste generated. This is a significant amount given that the council which is 
charged with the responsibility for waste management is only able to collect 25-30%. The frequency 
of collection varies between the council and the private collectors. The private collectors have 
their own arrangement with the clients ranging from collecting daily to only once a week. The 
council collects daily from the central business district (CBD) and the main municipal market 
and once a week from certain residential areas. For instance in the Nubian Estate they collect on 
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Saturdays, in Tom Mboya estate every Tuesday, in certain areas of Manyatta and Milimani, every 
Wednesday while in the Russian quarters, they collect every Friday. Both the 1954 Kisumu By-laws 
and the 2005 draft require that all business, residential, entertainment and recreational premises 
have a waste receptacle for storage of the wastes generated before collection and that all landlords 
must provide waste receptacles and ensure that their tenants do not dispose of their waste in the 
open. These instructions are not put in practice on the ground. While the CBD and the markets 
have litter bins and collection chambers respectively, the private companies supply plastic bags 
and some of the community groups use sacks and buckets to do the collection which are easy to 
transfer to their collection point or disposal site using small vehicles. Overall, the percentage of 
waste collected remains very small, and this could be attributed to a number of reasons. One of 
the main reasons is the detached, informal arrangement implemented by the private companies 
and community self-help groups. Private companies only cover the high and middle income 
areas where they receive payments for the service provided, but the council’s services are also 
concentrated in the CBD leaving the low income areas to the community self-help groups who 
only offer limited services. Another reason for this weak performance are the limited resources 
available to the council and this is explained further in subsequent sections in this chapter.
In Jinja, even after a process of privatisation has been implemented, the collection system 
still follows a centralised mode. A contractor collects waste from households and commercial 
enterprises by means of skips using council vehicles and monitored by a council officer. The 
contractors are able to collect between 40 and 60% of the waste generated, a figure slightly higher 
compared to Kisumu which can be explained by the formal contracting arrangement on waste 
collection as opposed to the informal arrangement in Kisumu which is not linked to the municipal 
authority. Therefore the nature of linkages between municipalities and the formal/informal status of 
service providers influences whether the system is of a robust nature. Amongst the three divisions 
in Jinja, there are 119 collection points in Central, 20 in Mpumudde and 10 in Walukuba Division. 
This means that service provision is concentrated in the Central Division and that households in 
the other two divisions have limited access of the service so they may end up practicing backyard 
dumping and composting. The frequency of emptying skips depends, among other considerations, 
on how fast the skips fill up but in general the collection is done daily, meaning at any one day, there 
is a skip that is collected and emptied. The contractor serving Central and Walukuba claimed that 
the company collects and empties on average 18 skips per day while the other contactor serving 
Mpumudde reported to emptying on average 7-8 skips per day. This number of skips emptied 
is small compared to the number of collection points available and this can be explained by the 
limited resources available in the council since according to the arrangement the contractors use 
council vehicles for collection.
In Mwanza, centralised and decentralised modes of collection are combined. Waste collection 
has been privatised which is a form of external decentralisation but for every zone to which a 
contractor is assigned, there is also a council officer who supervises their performance. Since 
privatisation, the percentage of waste collected has gone up from 28%5 in 2003 to 88% in 2007 (field 
5 Information obtained through an interview with the solid waste manager and corroborated by SWM data 
of Fredrick Salukele (PhD Wageningen University). See also ILO, 2006 which gives collection rates of 28% 
in 2003, 47% in 2004 and 80% in 2005.
3. Municipal authorities and performance of solid waste management tasks 53
data, 2007-2009). The frequency of collection varies between the different wards. In the wards of 
the CBD, waste is collected from transfer stations daily and sometimes even twice a day because 
in addition to households business activities are going on there and they generate a lot of waste. 
In the other wards, waste is collected at a maximum of three times per week. While the Refuse 
collection and Disposal by-law Article 4 and 5 requires that every landlord/tenant has a standard 
dustbin for storage of waste before disposal, it was observed that only the private companies give 
waste containers to their clients. In the other wards people use whatever containers available to 
them to store their waste. A ward has at least two transfer stations which are either in a form of 
an open ground collection area or a skip bucket. Mwanza has a total of 30 skip buckets. The high 
percentage of waste collected in Mwanza compared to the other two towns can be explained by the 
formal incorporation of CBOs and private companies in the arrangement. CBOs serve different 
zones according to their capacities, while the private companies have been allocated the CBD area 
because they have more resources compared to CBOs. Private companies are able to collect and 
transport the waste to the dumpsite while CBOs are relying on municipal vehicles. These non-
state actors bring their resources with them to complement the little that municipalities dispose 
of and in turn ensure the continuity of service provision and a system that is accessible to all.
Transportation
The municipal transport system for all three councils can be categorised as large technical 
infrastructure when compared to the small pick-ups and wheelbarrows used by non-state 
actors. The transport system is characterised by the utilisation of imported vehicles provided by 
international donors or otherwise sourced from areas beyond the local scale and this has direct 
impacts on the efficiency of operating and maintaining these vehicles (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1. SWM vehicles in the three councils.
Type	of	vehicles No.	vehicles	in	use No.	vehicles	broken
Kisumu Bulk compactor 1 0
Truck lorries 2 0
Tractor 1 0
Jinja Truck (Benz) 1 1
Tippers (Tatas) 2 0
Tractor scooper 1 0
Bulldozer 1 0
Mwanza Skip loader 2 0
Side loader 4 0
Small vehicles for monitoring 2 0
Excavator 0 1
Source: compiled by author based on data provided by the council between 2007 and 2009.
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For Kisumu (as indicated in Table 3.1), there were no cases of broken vehicles, however the 
deputy director informed the study that the bulk compactor is very old, donated in the 1980’s, 
and unable to be put to work continually especially with the increasing weight of (particularly 
organic) waste. Repairs and spare parts of the vehicle are also a problem as it is difficult to source 
these locally. The loading height of the two open trucks is very high and since they do not compact, 
they carry less than two tones with much dirt flying out. The deputy director further explained 
that in some cases the vehicles have been used inappropriately:
We have had instances where these municipal branded vehicles for waste collection 
have been seen transporting building materials or used to shift peoples’ belongings 
when moving house and therefore creating some kind of competition with their use 
for waste transportation.
These issues reduce the efficiency of the vehicles and result ultimately in the small percentage of 
waste collected. The informal waste collectors, particularly the private companies, use pick-ups 
which is contrary to the provisions6 in the law because they are not ecologically sustainable as 
dirt easily flies out, but these small vehicles can easily access the unplanned neighbourhoods with 
their small access roads. Most of the self-help groups use handcarts and wheelbarrows to transport 
waste from the households to the transfer points while those operating near the dumpsite, take 
the waste directly from the households to this dumpsite.
In Jinja, the contractors hire and use council vehicles with council drivers – a mixed arrangement 
but still highly centralised. Only three vehicles were in use at the time of the field study, two by the 
contractor serving Central and Walukuba and the other one by the contractor serving Mpumudde. 
Apart from evidence for a collection rate of just about 50%, the contractors complained about 
the inadequacies of the vehicles. They are paid per number of skip emptied, yet the Benz truck 
can only take the 3.5 ton skips and the Tatas take on the smaller skips which are 3 tons. The Benz 
truck is broken down and may remain in that position for a long time because according to the 
contractual arrangement the contractors are expected to take care of the major and minor repairs 
needed for the vehicles as well as paying for the fuel. Yet from the field work, it has become evident 
that these contractors are only small companies who were previously CBOs and are unlikely to 
have adequate resources to pay for major repairs unless the council intervenes. The study was 
informed that the Benz truck was sourced from Germany and the other vehicles from India, so 
if the spare parts cannot be sourced locally, broken vehicles remain grounded for a long time.
In Mwanza, the council operates a refuse collection fleet made up from the trucks shown in 
Table 3.1. The skip loaders carry approximately a load of 7 tons per trip and the side loaders have 
6 According to environmental Management and coordination (Waste Management) Regulation 2006, a 
person granted a license to transport waste shall ensure that:
the collection and transportation of such waste is conducted in such a manner that will not cause scattering, 
escaping and/or flowing out of waste;
the vehicles and equipment for the transportation of waste are in such a state that shall not cause the scattering 
of, escaping of, or flowing out of the waste or emitting of noxious smells from waste.
The Municipal council of Kisumu Environmental by-law 2005	requires that an operator shall not cause any 
waste to spill in unwanted areas during the course of his operation.
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a carrying capacity of 7 tons as well but they manage to carry only approximately 4.5 tons per 
trip due to the density of waste. These vehicles only manage to collect 30% of all waste (Mwanza 
City Profile). The study was informed that the council planned to add 2 more skip loaders and 
3 more side loaders. The current arrangement in Mwanza, however benefits from the input of 
private companies who transport the waste they collect using their own vehicles and since these 
private companies serve wards in the CBD and market, they are able to collect more than the 
council. This flexible and mixed arrangement in transportation has allowed for 88% of the waste 
collected to be transported to the dumpsite which is very high compared to the other two towns.
Disposal
All three towns use centralised open dumping grounds which are operated by the municipal 
authorities.
The dumping site in Kisumu is about 3 kms from the CBD. This dumpsite it is not fenced and 
located very close to a major supermarket outlet, a major highway (Nairobi-Kisumu Highway) and 
some residential housing units. Although most of these infrastructural developments came up when 
the dumping site was already in existence, it is nevertheless ecologically unsustainable because of 
the environmental impacts associated with uncontrolled open dumping, including leachates, odour, 
contacts with unhealthy hazards among others. The Deputy Director of Environment informed the 
study that the dumpsite has been in use for the last 40 years and that the council has been practicing 
open burning of waste at the site to reduce the volume of the waste and this raises questions as 
to oblivious nature of the council towards smoke emanating from this practice of burning. There 
are two officers from the council manning the site and they collect a fee for every private vehicle 
coming in to dump waste. They charge Kshs100 per entry (USD 1.42).7 Scavenging is however 
not controlled or restricted and this poses other health concerns. The Deputy Director explained 
that the council is in the process of relocating the dumping grounds and by the year 2008, there 
were five potential sites that had been identified awaiting Environmental Impact Assessment.
In Jinja, the dumping site (Masese) is about 6 km from the CBD. It is an open site where entry 
is restricted by council officers. Waste other than that brought by council vehicles is charged for 
disposal. For a 2 ton vehicle Ugshs 5,000 (or USD 3.7) is charged, for a 4 ton vehicle Ugshs 10,000 
(or USD 7) and Ugshs 30,000 (or USD 21.4) for each vehicle above 4 ton. This arrangement ensures 
robustness of manning the disposal grounds compared to the standard ‘small’ fee charged in 
Kisumu. Unlike the dumpsite in Kisumu, Masese is a bit ‘hidden’ from the busy residential areas 
and scavenging is not common. It remains however, an ecologically unsustainable practice of 
disposing waste. At the beginning of 2009, the study learnt about and observed the initial phase 
of a composting plant that would use the windrow technology at the dumping site. This is an 
initiative of World bank and the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA). The 
Health Inspector overseeing SWM in Central Division informed the researcher that once the 
construction work will be complete, the plant will be run by the municipality. This is an ecologically 
sustainable venture and the Director of Environment explained that NEMA expects the compost 
7 USD 1 is considered to be equal to 70KsHs; 1Kshs is calculated for 20Tshs and 20 Ugshs.
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project to be self-sustaining and that at one point the council would be able to generate a revenue 
from the sale of compost.
In Mwanza, the dumpsite (Buhongwa) is about 18 kms away from the CBD, a distance that 
can be considered relatively far for small-scale private entities with limited resources. Though it 
is an open ground, it is partially fenced and has a small office building at the entrance for the two 
dumpsite attendants who are employees of the council. At the entrance, vehicles pay the fee shown 
in Table 3.2. The Mwanza arrangement with a stationary office is exemplary compared to the other 
two because it signifies the management attention given to waste disposal. Just like in the other 
two towns, however, the open dumping is not ecologically sustainable but at the time of the field 
work, the study observed some form of small-scale plastic waste collection at the dumpsite for 
recycling into reusable products. This was however not a council initiative but done by individuals. 
The study learnt that the council recognised this initiative but not on paper – it is a kind of ‘silent 
agreement’. This is an initiative which if encouraged by the council, with proper official working 
conditions could reduce the amounts of waste ending up at the disposal site.
Technical dimension: scale of management
Managerial organisation
In all the three councils solid waste management is run by particular departments. This is a 
form of administrative decentralisation to lower units of management but the three different 
departments depict different modes of addressing solid waste management which in turn reflects 
on how robust these systems are.
In Kisumu SWM was under the docket of the Public Health Department until the year 2004 
when it was moved to the Department of Environment because the classical approach to handling 
waste has always been considered the responsibility of public health. It is now managed by the 
Environmental Planning and Management Division though the functions spill over to other 
divisions in the department and even to other departments in the council stemming from the 
inevitable fact that environmental issues transgress the domain of one department. Locating 
solid waste management in the department of environment however, has allowed SWM issues 
in Kisumu to receive more attention than when it is tucked into a sub-department of another 
department. Such an arrangement ideally should allow resource allocation for waste management 
to receive priority just like other services at the council and in turn ensure a robust SWM system.
Table 3.2. Charges for waste disposal for different groups in Mwanza.
Industries Institutions Organisations Individuals Others
100,000 Tshs  
(USD 71) per trip
30,000 Tshs  
(USD 21) per trip
50,000 Tshs  
(USD 36) per trip
10,000 Tshs  
(USD 7) per trip
40,000 Tshs  
(USD 29) per trip 
Source: Field work in Mwanza.
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As concerns the staff in Kisumu, SWM is overseen by a director and from the field interview 
we found that the director has qualifications (Tertiary Qualification) in environmental matters in 
accordance to section 125 of the LG Act. This is important in ensuring a robust department. This 
is concluded with an understanding that such an officer will be able to inject the right skills and 
experiences to keep the SWM system operating efficiently. Next, there are a deputy director and 
heads of different sections. The bulk of the staff exists of casual workers but even then (at the time 
of field work),the waste management section had a deficit of 34 staff members (see Table 3.3) who 
would be required to provide adequate services. An inquiry as to that finding revealed that the 
absent officers were either ill or deceased and yet have to be replaced. The hiring and appointment 
of low cadre personnel follows a committee system. There is the technical committee, then the 
staff committee whose minutes are read to the environmental committee. The finance committee 
then has to approve and then the full council meeting has a final say. This procedure can actually 
be done within a month, however in practice the process faces delays from vested interests and 
political interference from those in charge, while the municipal authority has some autonomy in 
effecting the low cadre appointments. This inadequacy in available staff impacts directly on the 
services provided and the robustness of the municipal system and contributes to explaining the 
low percentage of waste collected in Kisumu by the council.
In Jinja, solid waste is managed by the department of Public Health found at the Local Council 
IV. The department is headed by a Medical Officer of Health and serves both the curative and 
cleansing tasks of public health provision. A health inspector oversees waste management in every 
division of the council. The health inspector also monitors the operations from the contractors in 
their respective division, an indication of some form of public-private partnership (PPP). SWM in 
Jinja however, takes a subordinate position as compared to medical/health issues. During the field 
study, as one enters the department, a queue of patients waiting to be attended to is the first sight 
and then one has to inquire where the office handling waste is located. So while environmental 
concerns are just as important as medical ones, waste management remains of little priority in the 
department and this affects its institutional sustainability. Okot-Okumu and Oosterveer (2010) 
record that in the financial year 2006/2007, less than 10% of the total municipal budget was used 
for solid waste management and sanitation by local governments in Uganda.
As concerns staff, there are two health inspectors in charge of SWM in each of the three 
divisions. The field interviews revealed that they have tertiary (diplomas) qualifications in 
environmental health and the contractors who provide SWM services went through training 
Table 3.3. Summary of staff positions (cleansing and management section) in Kisumu.
Category Present	level Optimal	level Deficit
Street cleaning & management 23 46 23
Refuse collection & disposal 12 21 9
General supervision 2 4 2
Totals 37 71 34
Source: Kisumu City Council Offices.
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on SWM (by ILO) as part of an induction process in conjunction with the council. There are a 
few sweepers employed by the council but one of the contractors informed the study that there 
is a plan to have the sweepers employed under the contractors’ arrangement to improve on the 
coordination of cleaning up areas and collecting waste. Currently sweeping is done by the council 
and collection of the swept waste is done by the contractors. While recruitment and employment 
has been decentralised to the local level and done by District Service Commission unlike in 
Kisumu, the number of staff is not as high because service has been contracted out to private 
enterprises. Before privatisation in 2004, the council had 125 members of staff working on SWM 
most of whom were retrenched. Privatisation could be seen to have been effective in reducing 
the financial load of the council with regard to paying workers. And in reiterating this, on being 
asked whether this is a better arrangement, one of the health inspector said:
It may be seen to have reduced the cost incurred by the municipality in paying these 
workers because I am aware what the workers are paid by the contractors is much 
less than what the council used to pay workers for the same job.
In Mwanza, the Health and Sanitation department is responsible for solid waste management under 
one of its three sections, the cleanliness section. This section is headed by a solid waste manager. 
The waste manager oversees the public health inspectors posted to each ward. The public health 
inspectors work in collaboration with the contractors assigned to the different wards. From the 
field visits, like is the case in Jinja, it is evident that medical/health issues receive more attention 
compared to SWM. On arrival at the council offices, there is a big medical clinic and offices 
handling medical issues at the front yet SWM office is located at the back and a visitor would 
need to ask to be shown where it is. This in turn also depicts the resources allocated to SWM. 
The arrangement however also shows flexibility in the mix of public and private actors where the 
public officers monitor the private initiatives. This is necessary to allow SWM to gain from the 
benefits that each group brings on board.
In terms of staff, there is at least one public health inspectors (PHI) from the council for 
each ward monitoring the activities of the CBOs and the two private companies who have been 
awarded contracts. The solid waste manager informs that the PHIs have academic qualifications 
and experience before one is appointed, as is required. They are therefore knowledgeable on waste 
management issues. They report to the solid waste manager who is in charge of solid waste in 
the city as a whole. The study was informed that there are 44 PHIs in total. Their employment or 
recruitment is done with permission from the central government through the Prime Minister’s 
office meaning that the council is not in a position to influence this process. In addition to the 
PHIs, the council has also nine drivers and two attendants at the dumpsite. In the meantime, any 
inadequacies in the council’s capacity to manage waste on its own are partly addressed by inputs 
from the CBOs and the private companies.
Ways of financing
When looking at the financing of the three municipal councils in general, Kisumu’s funds received 
from the central government makes up approximately 24% of the overall council’s revenue. On the 
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other hand, Jinja and Mwanza receive more than 50% of their council funding from the central 
government. This gives an indication of the dependency of municipal authorities’ budgets from 
fund received from the central governments.
For Kisumu council, SWM receives its funds from the conservancy fee of USD 0.67 charged 
per household per month through the water bill, but this includes only those households that 
have metered water connection (that is connected to the central grid). There are also other funds 
originating from the dumping fee charged at USD 1.4 per load of a pick-up truck. Businesses, 
particularly the markets and other commercial areas, are charged for SWM through their 
business license. The other percentage of funds for SWM comes from what is transferred from 
the national government to the local authority - the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF). All 
these contribution combined are however, not sufficient to adequately run the SWM system for 
the municipality as a whole. In the financial year 2006/07, the annual income from solid waste 
management was USD 70,000 against an annual expenditure of about USD 420,000. To address 
this problem, the study was informed by the Deputy Director of Environment of an ongoing 
Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Programme funded by SIDA. Also involved are 
UN-Habitat, ILO, Lake Victoria Local Authorities Cooperation (a regional organisation), Practical 
Action (an international development charity organisation) and Umande Trust (a Kenyan rights-
based organisation). These organisations all handle different components of the programme and 
through them funds are channelled to ensure transparency and accountability.
For Jinja, the interviews revealed that the municipal authority has a budget for SWM which 
is mostly funded by the central government. There are also fees collected from business premises 
(Ugshs 20,000 - USD 14 per business) and a dumping fee at the disposal site but all these go to the 
central reserve at the council where they tend to be absorbed by overall council expenditures. The 
Director of Environment informed that the council actually has relative autonomy in putting up 
its own budget as provided for in the Local Government Act 1997. Yet it is evident that because 
most of the funds come from the central government and they are conditional, it is unlikely that 
adequate resources would be set aside for waste management compared to other ‘important’ 
municipal services. For the year 2008, the budgeted expenditure for waste management was Ugshs 
69,600,000 (USD 49,714) but the actual expenditure came to Ugshs 120,000,000 (USD 85,714) 
reflecting a deficit of about Ugshs 50,000,000 (USD 35,714) on the budget. Though the council 
has authority to raise revenues and initiate development projects as provided for in the Local 
Government Act (1997), the council has not fully exploited this opportunity. Households do not 
pay for waste collection leaving the council to pay the contractors from the Property Tax which 
is not very reliable. The contractor serving the central Division therefore complained about this 
form of payment:
A lump sum paid at the end of the month is better than the bits of money we are paid 
from the Property Tax, because at the end of the day, I also have to pay 18% VAT 
and in case I default, I pay withholding tax of 6%.When I remove my expenses and 
the total tax, then I am left with very little money.
In Mwanza, the study learned that the council also gets most of its SWM funds from the central 
government. There are additional funds from the fee charged at the dumping site and also from 
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the fee charged to CBOs to have their waste transferred to the dumping ground but like in the 
other two councils, these funds end up at the central reserve in the council. The solid waste 
manager informed the study that SWM is not properly defined in the council’s overall budget but 
that their total expenditures for the year 2007 went up to Tshs 210,900,000 (USD 150,643). This 
figure like the one in Jinja is small compared to the expenditures in Kisumu and this could be 
linked to the fact that the costs incurred in Jinja and Mwanza are shared by the council and the 
private sector contracted to provide SWM services. Overall however, Mwanza, like the other two 
councils, has not exploited all the avenues for raising its revenues given that it has the mandate 
to do so through the Local Government Finance Act of 1982. Its own sources for SWM revenue 
remain the dumping fee and the fee for transporting waste collected by CBOs to the dumpsite.
Service costs
In Kisumu, the cost of SWM provision charged at household level varies from place to place.
The council has been charging Kshs 40 (USD 0.6) per household per month but this is only 
for those households that are connected to the central grid-metered water connection. Charges 
for collection by the private sector range between Kshs 150-500 (USD 2.1-7.1) per household 
per month, a figure which is way beyond the capacity of the urban poor8. CBOs however charge 
as little as Kshs 40 (USD 0.6) per household, per month. Although informal, this flexibility in 
pricing ensures a wide coverage of SWM services. What is also interesting to note is that Section 
148 of the LG Act gives the council the power to impose fees or charges which shall be regulated 
by a by-law or if not regulated by by-law, may be imposed by resolution of the council with the 
consent of the Minister of Local Government. The input from the public in deciding on fees 
is obviously missing in this legal provision and in the event that the informal waste providers 
are made formal, then this will impact on the flexibility of pricing that both the public and the 
informal waste providers enjoy at the moment. The low amount charged by the CBOs could be 
because they do not pay tax and may not be renting premises but as to whether this is sustainable 
in terms of them recovering costs is another issue. It also follows that the low charges reflect the 
quality of service given compared to that provided by the private companies who from the field 
work serve different clientele.
In Jinja, households do not pay for waste collection. Field interviews revealed that attempts 
to introduce a fee of Ugshs 2,000 (USD 1.4) were unsuccessful because households are of the 
understanding that SWM should be provided by the council and for free. This impacts negatively 
on ensuring that the SWM system remains sustainable. This turn of events is taking place despite 
the fact that Section 80 of the LG Act, provides for the municipality the authority to levy, charge 
and collect fees and taxes. At the time of the field work, the officers interviewed were optimistic 
that the user fees would ultimately be enforced as these are part of the provisions in the Jinja SWM 
draft bylaw 2005, yet to be passed. For a sustainable system that will allow full cost recovery from 
service provision, there is need to have the households pay for the services provided.
8 According to the 1999 poverty rate for rural locations and urban sub-locations (CBS, 2003), and the 1999 
poverty rate for constituencies (CBS, 2005), the urban poverty line for Kenya is given as Kshs 2,648 per 
month (about USD 1.26 per day). This means that 48% of Kisumu’s population live below the poverty line. 
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In Mwanza all households pay a standard fee of USD 0.3 per month per household. This fee, 
the study learnt, was agreed upon in consultation with the households and has served to ensure 
an almost uniform coverage of SWM service. The LG Act of 1982 in Section 66 gives Mwanza 
municipality the power to charge fees for any service or facility provided by it or for any license or 
permit issued by the authority under the Act. Through its by-laws, Mwanza is to constitute fees for 
waste collection in consultation with the public. This is a notable contrast to the legal provisions 
governing Kisumu. When compared to the contributions in the municipalities of Dar-es Salaam, 
the capital city of Tanzania, as provided in their by-laws, of Tshs 500 (USD 0.4) per household 
per month for low income, Tshs 1000 (USD 0.7) for middle incomes and Tshs 2000 (USD 1.4) 
for high incomes, the standard uniform amount of Tshs 400 (USD 0.3) charged in Mwanza, can 
be gradually increased. This rise will also be commensurate with the changing economic times 
so that the SWM system remains robust.
Social dimension
Participation of citizens
In Kisumu, there was no evidence of active citizen involvement in solid waste management 
within the municipal structures. There are no legal or administrative structures for community 
participation particularly at the ward level to influence decision making within the municipal 
authority. What was evident however, is that citizens are taking it upon themselves to provide SWM 
services. They have formed youth groups, women groups and private companies to provide SWM 
services (discussed more in detail in Chapter 5). The law only guarantees political participation 
through civic elections.9 There has been marked attempts at using the Local Authority Service 
Delivery Plan (LASDAP) process as a requirement before disbursement from the LATF. LASDAP 
is a local level participatory planning and action tool that requires local authorities to hold 
consultative meetings with various stakeholders and citizens to agree on the broad allocation of 
the budget. There are questions however, related to the composition of the participants to these 
sessions, to the extent to which they are representative for the wider public. As part of LASDAP, 
every local authority is to have a LA budget day but experience from past sessions has shown 
that such attempts are marred by political intrigues. In the year 2009, the Kisumu Budget day was 
marked by a heightened tension and tight security as councillors opposed to the sitting mayor 
boycotted the event. Police had to face off youths who were hired to disrupt the functioning 
of the session.10 Its thus unlikely that such a well-intended function could achieve meaningful 
public participation in practice. For LADSDAP to have an effective contribution towards effecting 
public participation, it should be institutionalised at the municipal level as opposed to just being 
a condition before accessing LATF
In Jinja, there are lower level offices within the municipal structure that provide avenues for 
public participation. Apart from these lower local level administrative offices (Level II which is 
9 Once elected, the  government remains the key decision maker on local developmental matters. It is assumed 
that the councilors effectively represent citizens (UN-Habitat, 2002).
10 Kenya Broadcasting Corporation. Local Authorities Present Budgets. Rose Kamau, 25th June, 2009.
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the parish council and Level I which is the village level), the health inspector in Central Division 
informed the study that they have had cases where the public have complained about poor 
waste management through the local media and this triggered a response from the council. The 
chairperson of the village level (LC I) can also report to the health inspectors at the municipal 
division level (LC III) who deal directly with the contractors in the event that there is a filled up 
skip that has remained unattended for a long time. This arrangement involving the lower level 
administrative offices has allowed the public to access municipal authority and be part of waste 
management to a certain degree and in turn this ensures continuity of service provision to those 
areas that are already receiving services.
In Mwanza, just like in Jinja, there are also lower level administrative offices in the municipal 
structure. These are the ‘Mitaa’ or neighbourhood level which consists of a number of households 
and which reports to the Ward Development Committees. When any scheme or program for the 
development of the ward has been approved by the council chief executive or by the village councils 
concerned, the Ward Development Committee is required to inform all persons within the ward 
area about the scheme or program and the date, time or place upon which the ward residents 
will report in order to participate in its implementation. From the field work, it was evident that 
households can and do access the ward leaders and raise complaints in case of a problem because 
waste collection has even been organised according to the ward structure. The ward leader in turn 
works with the health inspector from the council and the contractor in the ward. This depicts a 
mixed arrangement involving the legislative and the executive arm of the council together with 
the private contractor. In case of any default in paying for waste collection, then the contractor 
takes this up with the ward leader. One Public Health Inspector explained that the households 
were indeed involved even in deciding the appropriate location of transfer points.
Public-private partnerships/involvement of non-state actors
In all three councils there is some form of private sector involvement either formal, informal, or 
both. Apart from this involvement in practice, some provision for it is also made in their respective 
legislation. There is no national policy on privatisation in the three East African countries but 
different pieces of legislation allude to it.11
In Kisumu, there is evidence from the field work of participation from private companies and 
community self-help groups (youth groups, women groups) in collecting waste from different 
neighbourhoods. Their participation is however not formalised as such to warrant calling it a PPP. 
As will be discussed in chapter 5, the municipal authority is however aware of the existence of these 
groups and some have actually benefitted from services offered by the council like transporting 
the waste they collect to dumping grounds or dumping the waste at the disposal site at no cost. 
While these groups, particularly the community self-help groups, are registered by the ministry 
11 In Kenya, the Local Government Act Cap 265 section 143 mandates local authorities to enter into contracts. 
In Uganda,  the Local Government Act of 1997 gives urban authorities autonomy over their financial and 
planning matters. All urban councils have power therefore to contract out services to the private sector. In 
Tanzania, Regional Administration Act No. 2 enacted in 1997 provides for the decentralization of municipal 
services from local authorities to the private as well as the popular sector including individuals, private 
companies and local communities.
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in charge of community development, the registration is purely an administrative exercise as the 
statutory laws do not provide for it. Registration under this administrative system does not give 
to the groups any legal personality and neither do the groups acquire corporate identity under the 
statutory laws. This lack of legal and corporate personality notwithstanding, these community self-
help groups together with the private companies as will be shown in chapter 5 have actually scored 
positively where municipal services are not yet in place. This is particularly the case amongst the 
low income groups where legal personality and corporate identity in terms of statutory law seem 
to have relatively little relevance. Yet for the continuity of such an arrangement, it is necessary 
to link the operations from these community organisations and private companies with the 
municipal authority. The community self-help groups may need to register as a cooperative society 
as provided for under the Cooperative Society Act Cap 490 for them to advance the economic 
interests of their members because as it is, they have no legal authority to compel their clients to 
pay for services rendered.
In Jinja, there is some form of PPP, because SWM has been privatised and contracts are 
awarded. At the time of this study, contracts had been awarded to two small private companies. 
It is actually a real form of partnership because the private companies hire and use council 
vehicles to collect waste. Besides, the drivers of these vehicles are council employees paid by the 
council. The council has also employed workers who do the sweeping and make sure waste is 
put in certain designated areas awaiting collection by the contractors. The council officers also 
monitor the operations of the contractors on a daily basis. As mentioned above, these contractors 
are paid by the council from the returns from the Property Tax and during the field interviews 
with the contractors, there were complaints about delayed payments by the council. Therefore this 
arrangement, though promoting flexibility by allowing the involvement of the private sector, needs 
to consider changing the arrangement so that SWM remains robust. The director of Environment 
actually reiterated this by saying:
If the municipal does not create a separate fund for refuse collection or go franchise, 
the problem with contractors will continue.
Mwanza has also incorporated the private sector, in particular CBOs and private companies. 
The arrangement actually displays some form of PPP because the council works hand in hand 
with the contractors. It transports waste collected by CBOs from the transfer stations to the 
dumping site though at a fee. Council officers also monitor the operations of the contractors and as 
mentioned earlier, the council helps to address issues concerning payment defaulters. The Mwanza 
arrangement reflects more flexibility and potential for remaining robust because the CBOs and 
the private companies have been awarded contracts in different zones according to their capacity 
to deliver and households pay the contractors directly for waste collection.
Social trust
Social trust was not directly measured in the three towns but is reflected in the levels of satisfaction 
which are detailed in the next chapter and the extent of public participation and service coverage 
discussed above. From the field work, despite the presence of lower level administrative offices in 
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Jinja and Mwanza, there was no evidence of direct investment in social trust per se by the three 
municipalities. If the public expresses trust in municipal authorities, it is certainly not because 
these actively invested in it. While these authorities could be excused because governmental 
action is bounded by the canons of public law and laws and rules framed under them are often 
not sufficiently versatile to enable customised responsiveness, this is an area where input from 
the government could play a great role in improving the relationship with the public and in turn 
improve SWM. This input could be manifested in different forms including direct investment in 
public participation and ensuring accessibility to quality and reliable SWM service by all at costs 
that reflect the local circumstances.
At the time of the field work, in Kisumu, regular service provision by the municipal authority 
was skewed towards the planned estates and the CBD, which are mainly high and middle income 
areas. The community self-help groups had to build trust with the low income earners to whom 
they provide services and one group interviewed in Manyatta explained that they had to offer the 
service for free for the first six months before they could introduce a user fee.
In Jinja, service is concentrated in the Central Division where the central business district 
is found, although this does not necessarily signify a concentration according to income levels. 
The availability of skips where waste is collected is higher in the CBD. There is the ‘entitlement 
culture’ and subsequent non-payment by households for waste collection which reflects their social 
trust towards the municipal authority. Because as earlier mentioned, households believe it is the 
responsibility of the council to provide services and to provide them free of charge. The principal 
public health officer in whose docket SWM lies, affirmed this when he said:
The public has a low opinion over management of waste thinking the council is 
responsible; even for dumping rubbish outside the skip.
The fact that the contractors are only able to provide service to certain areas contributes to painting 
a picture of low social trust from the public towards the municipal authority.
In Mwanza, there is almost universal service coverage. The city has been divided into three 
sections:
• section one has Nyamagana and Pamba wards and this is the CBD;
• section two has Mbugani, Isamilo and Mirongo wards and these are the planned areas with 
more affluent residents;
• section three covers the remaining wards which include planned, unplanned and newly 
developed areas for the affluent. They are located much further from the CBD compared to 
areas in section two.
Unlike the situation in Kisumu and Jinja, in Mwanza every ward in the different sections receives 
services because each ward is served by a particular CBO that has been awarded a contract. The 
CBOs are made up of groups of local community members who provide services to the wards 
they live in. This could act to further build the social trust that the public has towards the CBOs 
and in-turn the municipal authority that contracted them thereby ensuring the building of a 
robust system.
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3.2.3 (Lack of) performance explained
Table 3.4 summarises the results from the performance of SWM tasks presented in this chapter.
Looking at the performance of tasks under the technical dimension within the municipal 
structure, reveals that all three cases apply a centralised mode of operation that needs to be 
implemented through under-resourced municipal authorities, particularly concerning the 
availability of vehicles for collection and transportation. These councils have vehicles sourced 
from outside their countries whose spare parts cannot be easily found locally. Only in Mwanza the 
private companies use their own vehicles for collection and transportation of waste. In Kisumu, 
initiatives by the private sector remain unofficial/informal and in Jinja the skips for collection 
are unequally distributed. The existing arrangement of collection vehicles and the case of skips 
in Jinja, as explained in Spaargaren et al. (2006), makes assumptions about homogeneity in the 
housing stock, the density of housing, the degree of urbanisation, the accessibility of vehicles, the 
existence of related infrastructures, thereby creating a mismatch between resources provided and 
the actual situation on the ground.
The scale of management in all the three councils depicts a decentralised mode of approach 
to departments. The managerial organisation in Kisumu however, where SWM is located under 
the department of environment, serves to give more emphasis to waste management as compared 
to those in Jinja and Mwanza under the departments of Public Health where medical concerns 
receive priority. Though this attention is not evident in the amounts of waste collected or the 
resources available for SWM in Kisumu city council, the interest from major organisations like 
Table 3.4. Summary of performance of SWM tasks.
Dimensions Kisumu Jinja Mwanza
Technical	dimension
Scale of technology Centralised and informal 
small scale 
Centralised Central and decentralised
Scale of management Decentralised to department. Decentralised to 
department
Decentralised to 
department
Ways of financing From central goverment
From other sources
Mainly from central 
government
Mainly from central 
government
Service costs Municipal: low cost (fixed)
Private: flexible but informal
Non Low cost (fixed)
Social	dimension
Public participation Informal initiatives
LASDAP not institutionalised
Evident public 
participation within 
council structure
Evident public 
participation within 
council structure
PPP Informal PPP Formal PPP Formal PPP
Social trust Evident between public and 
community self-help groups
‘Entitlement culture’ Evident between public and 
all service providers
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SIDA and UN-Habitat in Kisumu’s SWM is an indication of the kind of attention SWM in Kisumu 
is receiving. The inadequate numbers of staff in Kisumu is linked to the fact that the department 
of environment has to await direction from the top committees charged with appointments. 
Appointments of low cadre officials are influenced by vested interests but also pegged on the 
financial resources available. For senior officials though, the ministry of local government has 
the upper hand.
Under aspects of financing SWM, and cost structure, the three councils depict different 
performances. For all three councils, funding for SWM for which a high percentage is transferred 
from the central government to local authorities, is not adequate. As this transfer is also conditional 
this limits the relative autonomy of the councils in deciding on their immediate needs when using 
the funds. Where local councils have relative autonomy over their budget like in Jinja, the funds 
are not adequate enough or not prioritised for SWM. Kisumu benefits from the input from SIDA 
but for all the three councils, there is need to build on own-source revenues to remain robust and 
sustainable, for instance, by exploiting waste to energy options or the composting initiative that 
is coming up in Jinja (see Cointreau, 2005). Finances for SWM should be more prioritised and 
sourced at the municipal level compared to other municipal services like heath care which could 
continue relying on the central government funds. This is because local autonomy in SWM allows 
for more flexibility in addressing the challenges in terms of technology and the actors involved.
The way customers pay for SWM services in Kisumu depicts a certain flexibility in order to 
capture what different income groups can pay for waste, but again this needs to be regulated so 
that such services reach a wider group of households. The water meter billing remains restricted to 
only those who have metered water connection. Jinja’s low average performance in waste collection 
could also be linked to the fact that households do not pay for waste collection and therefore there 
is need to introduce user charges or collection fees. Mwanza’s low standard fee can be progressively 
increased, as is evident from the case of Dar-es Salaam, so that the SWM system remains robust.
When it comes to the social dimension focusing on participation of citizens and PPP, the three 
councils record some degree of success in the different aspects. Both Jinja and Mwanza municipal 
authorities have certainly scored positive on public participation, because the municipal structures 
have lower level administrative offices that the public can easily access. The LASDAP process 
in Kisumu may show positive output provided it is institutionalised, because that will translate 
into the creation of proper structures and offices to guide the selection of participants and the 
conducting of public sessions.
There is some evidence of a move towards network governance for SWM tasks though it is clear 
that municipalities retain a strong hold over the operations. It may be necessary to monitor the 
operations of the non-state actors and also ensure that the poor neighbourhoods receive services 
as well. There is some form of PPP in these municipalities. PPP in Mwanza and Jinja shows levels 
of success because here private actors are officially/formally recognised by law and in practice by 
the municipal authorities. In Mwanza, the contractors are even authorised to collect user fees from 
the households depicting some form of external decentralisation. In Kisumu, though provided 
for in the legislation, the private companies and community self-help groups providing service do 
this informally. Hereby they illustrate the existence of well elaborated, laws and regulations which 
are not enforced, the so-called ‘enforcement gap.’ In the end, this analysis shows that while PPP 
may mean a change in the role of the municipalities, this does not reduce the scope of municipal 
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authority intervention because it requires new forms of regulation and accountability to ensure 
that private interests accommodate the official state policies (see Bach, 2000).
The three municipalities do not show evidence of direct investment in social trust. The situation 
in Kisumu depicts low social trust from the public towards the municipal authority because SWM 
services do not reach most households. Households in Jinja still refer to an ‘entitlement culture’ 
and that about 50% of waste generated is not collected, thereby also depicting a low level of social 
trust in the municipal authority. Even without direct investment, one can conclude that Mwanza 
municipality enjoys considerable social trust from its residents because not only has collection level 
gone up to 88% but the contracted CBOs are members of the wards they serve. This as explained 
by Hegger (2007), acts as a trust builder because information about the functioning, efficiency, 
levels of achievement, failures and pathologies of groups is then easily available.
3.3 Exploring municipal autonomy under modernised mixtures
To this point, it has been made clear that the tasks of managing SWM by the municipal authority 
are becoming a ‘team sport’ that have spilled beyond the borders of government agencies and 
now engage a far more extensive network of social actors, public as well as private, local as well 
as supra-local, and, according to Kumar (2004), their participation must be coaxed and coached, 
not commandeered and controlled.
The concept of autonomy is commonly understood as freedom and capacity to act (Lundquist, 
1987). The discussion of municipal autonomy here, derives from the empirical evidence about 
the involvement of different actors under SWM which has always been a domain of municipal 
authorities at least for the case of these East African towns. Looking at the relationships between 
municipalities and these other actors (both state and non-state actors) allows this study to formulate 
conclusions on the impact these relations have on the capacity and autonomy of municipalities 
in dealing with SWM tasks.
The relationships between municipalities themselves and between municipalities and non-
state actors at the municipal level is obviously key to service provision with a focus on the amount 
of control, competition, coordination, cooperation and collaboration. These relationships are 
discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.
When it comes to the relationships between municipalities and agencies beyond local level, it 
is evident from the empirical work so far that municipalities are supervised by ‘superior’ levels of 
government. This supervision is evident in the support given, different interventions, control over 
budget and control over administrative affairs by national governments. Steytler (2005) explains 
that the level of supervision inevitably defines the level of autonomy.
The arguments of MMA seek a balance between centralised and decentralised organisation. In 
the three cases presented under section 3.2.2, central governments display the higher power. From 
a design point of view, the local governments systems have the requisite legal (and constitutional 
for the case of Jinja) and institutional frameworks from which to operate and to operate effectively. 
Though the decentralisation process going on in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania differs, on a general 
level, the municipalities within the three countries have been given the mandate to manage waste. 
They have also been given resources and for the case of Jinja, recruitment of personnel is even 
done at the local level. However, that over 50% of the financial resources are from the central 
68  Modernising solid waste management at municipal level
government and conditional, translates to the fact that, these municipal authorities cannot decide 
themselves how such funds will be used. And for Kisumu and Mwanza where (senior) personnel 
are appointed by national bodies, such personnel are likely to have no personal stake in the 
success of operations at the municipal authorities. The degree of autonomy and capacity of these 
municipal authorities is thus checked directly from the national level. Though the study at this 
point is inclined to propose options for more municipal autonomy, it is within the MMA discourse 
that the allocation of powers and functions to municipalities need not be at the expense of states. 
Steytler (2005) writes that often strong local government is good for state government. What is 
required however is clearly defined complimentary roles for each sphere. While local government 
is crucial in the development and well-being of any country, it cannot be left completely to its 
own. Supervision is vital but the appropriate balance between supervision and autonomy should 
be struck.
The relationship between municipalities and regional, east African, actors is discussed in 
detail in Chapter 6. It presents two regional institutional arrangements and explains the autonomy 
afforded to municipalities under the different regional arrangements.
Relations between municipalities and the international level are evident in the World bank 
initiative of composting in Jinja and the input from SIDA towards Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste 
Management Programme (KISWAMP). Contrary to what Mitchinson (2003) in Oosterveer and 
Van Vliet (2010) explains that international aid programs seem to move away from project-based 
interventions (which allows for local government support) toward budget support that shifts 
decisions back to the centre, these two cases actually display project based interventions. From the 
field work, upon completion of constructing the compost plant in Jinja, the project will be given 
to the municipality to run it. This reflects some degree of autonomy for the international actors 
at the point of infrastructure construction and strengthening the managerial autonomy for the 
municipality once the construction is complete. Just as is the case at the national level, there is need 
for balance when it comes to international interventions to allow municipalities some measure of 
autonomy but also to allow the international actors some autonomy as they play crucial roles not 
only in the provision of funding, capacity building and technical support, but also in pressing for 
environmental issues to be at the top of the development agenda. DFID (2005) reiterates this when 
it says that approaches for donor support should be adopted in a manner that does not undermine 
the role of the state (municipality) but seek to build on where the state can operate (for example 
in aspects of regulation). Municipal operations can be supported through other organisations as 
exemplified in the case of SIDA in Kisumu working through ILO, UN-Habitat, Umande Trust, 
Practical Action and Lake Victoria Region Local Authorities Cooperation, which all play different 
roles towards effecting the SWM but with UN-Habitat as the lead agency to oversee the program 
and avoid any conflicts in the performance of the tasks.
3.4 A look into the future
The modernised mixtures approach stands for combining technological and social dimensions, 
integrating the management of waste flows from collection to final discharge, and linking the 
different technological and social aspects involved in the provision of environmental infrastructures 
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and services. SWM systems should be seen as socio-technical systems which have become strongly 
techno-economically, institutionally and socio-culturally embedded.
Improving the performance of local municipalities in SWM tasks therefore calls for a broad and 
nuanced view of handling different SWM aspects. Municipalities will have to become more strategic 
in their orientation, be open and flexible to changing circumstances and maximise integrated 
capacity from both the centralised and decentralised options of service provision. Use should be 
made of both the large scale and the small scale infrastructure and services as situation permits.
Robust and sustainable institutional arrangements are those that integrate with non-municipal 
actors while at the same time ensuring that the neo-developmental role of the state is fulfilled 
effectively. Integrating with non-municipal actors also ensures accessibility of SWM services 
for most if not all people. Where PPP has been practiced, it has yielded positive results in terms 
of increased service coverage and increased amounts of waste collected and transported to the 
disposal site.
Building and maintaining social trust of the wider public would require an assurance of not only 
accessibility to SWM services but also sustained service provision and their (public) participation 
particularly in decision making. This translates to the condition that municipal authorities like 
their private counterparts need to invest in social trust.
Flexibility in the organisation of SWM should be balanced (not too much flexibility) to ensure 
that all actors have the needed relative autonomy to make decisions and exercise control over 
infrastructure and service provision. Such flexibility should not be realised at the expense of the 
quality of the SWM services.
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Chapter 4. 
Municipal authorities and non-state actors
4.1 Introduction
A study of governance and urban waste must examine not only the formal structures of government 
but also the informal structures created by society, such as community-based institutions, 
associations, and organisations, their relationships, and the relationship between the formal and 
informal structures for collection, transportation, and disposal of waste.
To advance this discussion, this chapter builds on the debate of neo-developmentalism versus 
network governance which was briefly captured in Chapter 3. Several authors, as well as large 
sections of the public opinion in Africa, criticise the suggestion of a minimal state and insist on 
a return to an active involvement of the government as the promoter of development. On the 
other end, there are scholars who consider the current African state fundamentally incapable 
of delivering services in a reliable manner and therefore in order to adequately implement and 
manage urban environmental infrastructures the active involvement of private companies, non-
governmental organisations and local communities should be promoted.
In the quest of continuing to answer the question of what a good solid waste management 
system at the municipal level should be, this chapter compares the involvement of non-state 
actors at the municipal level in the three towns (Jinja, Mwanza and Kisumu). Based on empirical 
findings presented in Chapter 3, the study presents the arrangement in the three towns following 
three different models: a market-like arrangement for Jinja, a community-dominated model for 
Mwanza and a hierarchical arrangement for Kisumu.
Section 4.2 gives a theoretical introduction to the chapter. Section 4.3 brings out the more 
detailed aspects of the models of markets and networks, community and networks and hierarchies 
and networks as revealed in the field work. It is in section 4.4 that the question is posed whether 
it is most appropriate to opt for markets, communities or hierarchies. The answer to this question 
is reflected in the conclusions of this chapter on formal and informal collaborations and on the 
position in the debate on neo-developmental state versus network governance.
4.2 Participation of non-state actors in municipal SWM
Although governments are generally expected to provide environmental services such as sanitation 
and solid waste collection for their citizens, in most Sub-Saharan African cities and as discussed in 
Chapter 3, the (municipal) governments are not able to provide these services solely by themselves. 
Without ignoring the lack of material resources caused by poverty, there are other structural 
causes as well for this failure and they relate to the way in which the role of the state is understood 
(Oosterveer, 2009). The withering away of the African state and its diminishing capacity and 
sovereignty in various fields have created considerable room for non-state actors to move into 
traditional state tasks (Mol, 2001). These non-state actors start developing their own sets of rules 
or standards to fill ‘institutional voids’ where rules to guide behaviour are needed but not provided 
72  Modernising solid waste management at municipal level
by the state. These interventions and their associated institutional arrangements have resulted in 
three different models:
1. Market dominance. Here the focus is on the arena of economic actors and this relates to the 
various mechanisms in which economic actors can or cannot cooperate to resolve common 
problems without distorting the basic mechanisms of the market. In this model these economic 
actors dominate the scene and when it comes to SWM, this means that the actual mode of 
organisation is a matter of preference and choice on the side of the client and of competition 
amongst the service providers
2. Community based organisation dominance. Just as the government, society itself can also be a 
major implementer (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Governments may use organisations in societies 
to implement programs for a variety of reasons, not least because when these groups do the 
implementation, this will save the government money and make the public sector appear 
less intrusive. Furthermore, implementation of programs through social groups enables 
governments to utilise the expertise from those groups to make better decisions. The basic 
question which emerges thereafter is the degree of governability of these societal organisations 
and/or the degree of autonomy these societal organisations should have.
3. The hierarchical governance mode. Sub-national governments (local authorities) enjoy some 
degree of autonomy from the national governments. These local authorities, however have 
their own constituted ‘powers’ – they are conceived as the epitome of collective interest at 
that local level, governing society by imposing the law and through other forms of regulation. 
It is a hierarchical system of command and control down to the departments and divisions 
within these local authorities. Even with the presence of other actors in society like the CBOs 
and NGOs, there according to this model is no need for much flexibility or diversification or 
informal exchange. There should be a rather strict division between the public and the private.
For the East African states, there is no case where the state is acting in isolation, neither are there 
cases where the non-state actors take the full lead in SWM. Important questions arise therefore 
as to whether to strengthen governmental authorities to take their responsibilities more seriously 
(following the model of the neo-developmental state) and/or to actively involve private companies, 
non-governmental organisations and local communities in implementing and managing urban 
environmental infrastructures (following the network governance approach). Based on arguments 
for the modernised mixtures approach on which this study is founded, especially in the field of 
waste, building relationships with non-state actors should get special significance since the past 
performance of the state in this field is not very good, and citizens tend to use this (lack of proper) 
performance as an important indicator for the legitimacy and authority of the state and in turn 
the local authorities.
Jinja, Mwanza and Kisumu12 display significant variation as to how municipal authorities have 
shaped their relationships with the non-state actors in the field of SWM. These are discussed in the 
section 4.3 under the headings: markets and networks, communities and networks and hierarchies 
and networks. Under each section legitimacy and influence on decision making, relations and 
alliances as well as the payment systems all of which take on a specific meaning are looked into 
12 More background information on these three towns is given in Chapters 1 and 4.
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as aspects of governance which in turn influence accessibility, flexibility and sustainability of 
SWM services. Matovu (2002) asserts this by writing that good governance occurs only if there is 
legitimacy of authority, public responsiveness, public accountability, and public tolerance of other 
actors with a public character, information openness, and effectiveness in public management.
4.3 Methodology
This part of the study also employs the Parallel Multiple Case studies research design, already 
presented in Chapter 3. The cases are the three urban authorities (Kisumu, Jinja and Mwanza) and 
it is parallel because all the cases were studied at the same time and not one following the other. 
Different data collection methods were used to get the information presented below.
Interviews were conducted with resource persons, with the aim to get data that would help 
analyse the legitimacy of the groups involved in SWM, the relations and alliances amongst these 
groups and the efficiency of payment systems. Those interviewed were:
• heads of the departments managing solid waste in the three councils;
• CBOs involved in waste management in Kisumu (17) and Mwanza (14);
• private companies in SWM in Jinja (2), Kisumu (8) and Mwanza (2);
• recyclers in Kisumu (6);
• 2 SWM associations – one in Mwanza and another in Kisumu.
In Jinja and Mwanza, all the representatives of the SWM providers were interviewed, because 
they were fewer in number and accessing them was easy as they were all formal contractors. In 
Kisumu on the other hand, as is elaborated in section 4.3.3, not all groups were interviewed, but 
a selection on the basis of the availability of the interviewee but the researcher made sure to get 
several of them in each category of (CBOs, private companies and recyclers). So that out of a total 
number of 68 groups active in Kisumu, 31 groups were interviewed.
A questionnaire-based survey amongst households was conducted in all of the three urban 
centres. This method is already described in the methodology section at the end of Chapter 2. 
These surveys helped to get data on which households received SWM service and from which 
service provider they received this, which households paid for SWM and how they rated the service 
provided and also whether they would pay for waste as a priority service compared with others 
to gauge whether households pay for other services better/more regular and that the payment 
problem is only an issue to do with waste management.
Observations about the actual SWM management infrastructures were also helpful in drawing 
conclusions about their status.
SPSS-PASWStatistics_17.0 is used to analyse the quantitative data while coding has been 
helpful in handling the qualitative data.
4.3.1 Jinja - governance as markets and networks
Governance as markets and networks refers to an arena of economic actors with a reduced political 
sphere in SWM management. The networks aspect is relevant because of the inclusion of other 
actors who also take part in SWM issues albeit to a lesser degree.
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Of the three towns, Jinja is the closest representative of the model of market and networks. As 
discussed in the previous section, this is because of the presence of economic actors in the SWM 
arena. It is a close representation because as will be argued below, these actors are not exactly 
the determining players in the field of SWM, yet they provide most of the SWM services to the 
council and its people.
Jinja has three administrative divisions: Central, Walukuba and Mpumudde. Due to the efforts 
to move towards privatisation in the country, the council contracted out solid waste management, 
specifically collection and transfer to the disposal site, through open bidding.
The arrangement is an annual contract between the municipal council and the private 
entrepreneur and in the last financial year (2008/2009) two contractors won the tenders. One serves 
two divisions: Central and Walukuba, while the other contractor provides service to Mpumudde. 
These contactors are actually private entities in form of companies with several employees and 
casuals (see the profile of one of the companies in Box 4.1). The casuals do the collection and 
sweeping. Payments from the council to the contractors are made as per the number of skips 
emptied to the disposal grounds. The contractor earns Ugshs 28,000 (USD 20) per small skip (3 
tons) emptied and Ugshs 30,000 (USD 21.4) for a bigger skip (3.5 tons) emptied. On average the 
contractor serving the two divisions empties 18 skips per day while the one serving Mpumudde 
division empties on average 7 skips per day.
One outstanding aspect of the Jinja arrangement which is not the case for Mwanza and 
Kisumu (and which is also contrary to the ‘markets’ arrangement), is that households do not pay 
for the service. The reticence to pay for SWM is because households are convinced that it is the 
responsibility of the council to provide the service and at no cost. This conviction remains very 
strong so that attempts to introduce a fee of Ugshs 2000 (USD 1.42) per household per month were 
not successful. This is further depicted in the results of the survey which revealed the following 
percentages (See Table 4.1) about who the households perceived to be their service providers as 
relates to waste collection:
Interestingly, still 38.5% of the households interviewed perceive the council to be the one 
collecting their waste. Yet from the field work, it is very clear that the collection and disposal of 
solid waste from households is done by the two contractors (companies) awarded contracts by the 
council. A particular reason for explaining this surprising percentage could be that the contractor 
often moves around with the public health officer (who is an officer from the council) to identify 
which skips are full and need emptying. Besides, the contractors also use council vehicles branded 
‘Jinja Municipal Council’ to collect the skips and this may appear as if the council is doing the 
Box	4.1	Profile	of	Solid	Waste	Management	Enterprise	Limited.
The enterprise started operating in 2005 as a CBO but changed status to a private enterprise in 
2007. It is owned by an individual-Beatrice Arigo. At the moment the company provides SWM 
services to Central and Walukuba Division. It employs 18 casuals who do collecting of waste and 
sweeping the streets. The company is only involved in SWM activities that is collecting and emptying 
skips and sweeping. They also collect plastics and metal waste and sell to recycling firms.
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collection. It is therefore important for the council to have the capacity to rally the citizenry 
behind the established public and private partnerships even through civic education. This will 
help in sensitising the households on who provides them with SWM service and subsequently 
on the need to pay for it.
The important category (40%) referred to others, includes 38.5% of the households who 
responded that they provide their own service (self). These are households that manage their own 
solid waste either through burning or burying or re-using on farms. Finally there was a small 
group of housholds (1.9%) whose response was categorised as ‘none.’
Networks
Even within the ‘market model’, the study established that there are still other actors with shared 
interests in SWM though the degree of cohesion varies between them. There is the involvement of 
women and youth groups in the road sweeping and clean-up activities which are done occasionally 
and mostly on a voluntary basis. There are also environmental groups that are actively involved, 
including NEMA as a wing of the government which has established pedagogic centres to showcase 
exemplary activities and is helping to source additional skips to be used in the council. This effort 
by NEMA augments the services provided by the contractors who are actually paid depending on 
the number of skips emptied, therefore newer and better quality skips is of added value for the 
work of the contractors. Also involved are international institutions like Lake Victoria Region Local 
Authorities Cooperation (LVRLAC) who promote exchange of practices amongst the councils 
member of the organisation. Also ILO and the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) have 
actively taken part in capacity building. These efforts by different actors towards SWM not only 
depict the flexibility of SWM systems but through their different inputs they also ensure that the 
system remains sustainable.
Legitimacy and influence on decision-making
Legitimacy and influence on decision making acquire specific interpretation in a market model. 
Inherent in the formal authority given to contractors to operate, is the presence of a suitable 
environment for competition, speed, allowing greater room for market forces and making the 
Table 4.1. Perceived service provider by households (n=218) in Jinja.
Service	provider Frequency Percentage
CBO 1 0.5
Municipality 84 38.5
Private company 45 20.6
Others 88 40.4
Total 218 100.0
Source: Household survey in Jinja, 2009.
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use of commercial criteria appropriate. In the market sector, time is of essence. Thus timeliness in 
ratifying contracts, paying on schedule with minimal bureaucracy are critical for making a good 
return on an investment (Adei, 2009).
The legitimacy of the contractors is realised in a number of ways. First the Jinja Solid Waste 
Management By-Laws 2005, in their objectives recognise the role of private companies in the 
collection and disposal of waste, when this is practiced in a sustainable manner and at a fee. The 
two contractors serving currently are thus officially recognised by the council and in turn by a 
number of the clients they serve (20.6% in Table 4.1).
Secondly, the tenders for contracts in SWM are advertised through the media and as earlier 
mentioned, there is open bidding. Contracts for companies that were involved previously can 
only be renewed on the basis of their performance. Prior to the commencement of their work, 
they took part in an introduction training facilitated by the council and ILO. Payments to the 
contractors are made from the property tax accounts, indicating that they are factored-in in the 
council budget. This arrangement is however not free from complaints from the contractors, 
such as delayed payments which affect the robust nature of the system. Adei (2009) points out 
that such delays can only be prevented if the regulatory framework is changed in such a way as 
to make delays and inefficiency costly to an official (in this case, the council official in charge) in 
terms of promotion, remuneration and overall performance assessment.
As far as decision making is concerned, the council is still at the helm of SWM, making 
policies and seeing to their implementation. The contractors do not attend council meetings and 
are therefore unable to make or influence decision-making. From an interview with one of the 
contractors however, it became clear that they are free to voice their opinions directly to the town 
clerk, which may or may not be taken into account when formulating policies.
Relations and alliances
Here the focus is on the stability of the relationship between the municipality and the contractors 
and also amongst the contractors themselves. For this aim the study intended to find out whether 
this relationship is strong (based on a written agreement or contract) or loose (a simple supportive 
relation based on verbal agreement) (see Grafakos and Baud 1999). Furthermore, the relationship 
between the households and the contractors in this study is assessed by looking at their satisfaction 
about the service provided.
a. With municipality. As mentioned earlier, the arrangement in Jinja is a formal contract. The 
study found out that the contractor works together with the Divisional health inspector in 
identifying which skips are full and therefore need emptying. This exercise is done every day. 
There is therefore close monitoring of the waste-flows (a very relevant authority doing the 
monitoring on a very regular basis) and there is also a monetisation of the waste flow going 
on (contractors get paid for skips delivered). These practices are in themselves a first step in 
(ecologically) modernising the waste handling system. The arrangements are a mixture of 
market and state dynamics.
In addition, the contractors use council vehicles for transporting the skips to the dumpsite. They 
hire the vehicles at Ugshs 100,000 (USD 71.43) per truck per month. They cover the costs for 
minor and major repairs and fuel as well. The drivers of the trucks are however employed by 
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the council and not by the contractors themselves. This is to allow the municipality to control 
and monitor the disposal of waste because the contractor is paid as per the number of skips 
emptied. From the field interviews, this arrangement that does not seem to auger well with 
one of the contractors who said:
I prefer to have my own driver(s), that way the I can give instructions accordingly 
and make my own schedule for waste collection, it is hard to dictate the council driver 
because I am not his employer.
b. With other contractor. As far as relations between the contractors themselves is concerned, it 
was noted during the field interview that market competition prevents the two contractors 
in Jinja from having any form of cooperation. As their contracts have an annual nature, they 
need to stay on top of the game to win the contract the coming year.
c. With households. Of the 130 households who responded to be receiving service (either perceived 
to result from the municipality, CBO or private sector) their rating on their satisfaction of 
service is indicated in Table 4.2. These figures show that about 62.6% (57.7% - satisfactory plus 
4.6% - very satisfactory) of this groups responded to be satisfied with the services provided. 
In cases of filled-up and uncollected skips, households have been able to raise complaints 
through the local media or report directly to the health inspectors. From the council records, 
since privatisation waste collection in Jinja has gone up and varies between 40-60% of the total 
amount of waste generated.
An arrangement such as this one in Jinja, would in an ideal setting ensure that every household 
in the council receives SWM services because the contracts are awarded annually and depend 
on the performance of the contractors.
Payment systems
The contractors are paid by the council per skip disposed of, while households do not pay for waste 
management per se. The payments to the contractors are made from the property tax and ideally 
this is an efficient and effective way to fully cover all solid waste costs. In practice, however, there 
Table 4.2. Household perceptions (n=130) towards SWM services in Jinja.
Service	rate Frequency Percentage
Satisfactory 75 57.7
Very satisfactory 6 4.6
Not satisfactory 49 37.7
Total 130 100.0
Source: Household survey in Jinja, 2009.
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are challenges on the implementation of the property tax including issues related to the adequacy of 
cadastral property and the appraisal system and the efficiency of collecting the tax. This situation, 
makes payment recovery from all residents through property tax an un-feasible option.
A question asking the households to indicate which service (choosing between water, 
electricity, security and waste management) they would pay for first revealed that payment for 
waste management is not among their top priorities. (see Table 4.3). Only, 8.7% would pay for 
waste management as their first priority in service-delivery, while 52% percent indicated that they 
would pay for it as the last service amongst the four (see Annex 3 for details).
If households made payments (user fees), markets are also believed to empower citizens in 
the same way as we exercise powers as consumers. Introducing a market-like situation for public 
services allows clients to choose directly, hence the final say on public services rests with the 
people (Pierre et al., 2000).
Introducing charges for waste collection is important because only a fee reflecting the costs 
will encourage users to value the service they receive correctly (McDonald and Pape, 2002). The 
fee can be introduced gradually. A practical way to do this may be to have a realistic flat rate with 
progressive increments. Given that it may prove difficult to measure and price household waste 
collection on volumetric basis (so that block tariffs can be applied like in water or electricity), 
equity concerns can be dealt with through the application of differential rates along income lines. 
This policy can be guided by some form of property valuation, that is the higher the value of 
the home or the rent one pays, the more one pays for waste collection. Strict regulations to ban 
burning or illegal disposal of waste should be formulated and enforced because currently this 
may provide an easier option compared to paying for waste collection. This preference is evident 
for 40.4% of the households (see Table 4.1) who responded to be managing their own waste and 
one of the ways they use is burning.
The risk with such a model (market arrangement) as discussed by Rakodi (2003) and also 
revealed by the study is that since it is market-driven with contracts renewed annually, it is likely 
to be short term oriented and fragmented. No investor would be willing to invest adequately 
when it remains uncertain whether they would win the contract again in the coming year or not. 
Therefore their activities are just oriented towards keeping the payments from the council coming 
but not to make progressive efforts to improve solid waste management as a whole. Currently the 
arrangement of the service provision is not guided by income levels but in the event that households 
Table 4.3. Rating and priority of payment for services provision in Jinja (n=128).
Services Frequency Percentage
Electricity 12 5.5
Security 53 24.3
Waste management 19 8.7
Water 134 61.5
Total 218 100.0
Source: Household survey in Jinja, 2009.
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are made to pay for the service, questions would arise with regard to the provision for low income 
households. As Prasad (2006) in Oosterveer (2009) suggests, there is a significant conflict between 
social development on the one hand and the private sector’s motive for profit maximisation on the 
other. From the private sector’s perspective, low-income areas are unattractive because of their 
limited accessibility and they have high levels of risks regarding non-payment.
4.3.2 Mwanza: governance as communities and networks
In the governance model of ‘communities and networks’, the communities are the major 
implementers of SWM with minimal state involvement. The networks aspect is relevant because 
of the participation of other actors in SWM with varying degrees of inclusion.
Mwanza’s SWM governance arrangements comes close to that which can be described as 
‘communities and networks’. They come ‘close’ to this model because there are questions on extent 
to which these CBOs can exercise power. Although much of the SWM arena is dominated by 
CBOs and these CBOs are the major implementers of the policy, the council still dictates these 
policies, awards the contracts and generally steers everything that has to do with SWM.
There are 21 wards in Mwanza, out of which only 14 wards receive solid waste management 
services. These are the wards in the urban sections of Mwanza city. Privatisation of solid waste 
management resulted in the council awarding contracts to groups and in the financial year 
2008/2009, contracts were awarded to Community Based Organisations and two private companies 
that serve the wards in the Central Business District. The incorporation of the different actors and 
leaving the CBD which is a prime area for the private companies is one step in the direction of 
a MM approach in Mwanza. Every other ward is served by one or two CBOs. The contracts are 
annual and, like in Jinja, this has a negative aspect because it does not encourage the contractors to 
improve on their SWM efforts as they do not know whether they will win the tender the following 
year or not. One contractor actually says:
Why should I invest money in buying better equipment or even just making additional 
efforts as I may not win the tender next year, it would be better if the contract was 
for two or five years.
Considering a change in the contract arrangement to increase the length of the contract may resolve 
the dilemma above. The current contractual agreement is too short whereas the depreciation rate 
for waste collection vehicles, is for instance usually 4-10 years (Cointreau-Levine et al., 2000). 
Contract arrangements that run for three to five years with performance based incentives that are 
payable in addition to the fixed fee, when the contractor meets or exceeds specified performance 
targets, will work to encourage the contractors to invest adequately in SWM (see Kennedy, 2002; 
Craythorne, 2006). The challenge here for the CBOs in particular would be to seek additional 
funds in order to win tenders.
The contractors in Mwanza charge different rates for different land uses but all households pay 
a standard fee of Tshs 400 (USD 0.28) per household per month. At the time of the field work, 
all the CBOs and the private companies interviewed stated that a number of households still do 
not comply to making the payments of the USD 0.28 because, among many other reasons, of the 
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belief that it is the council’s responsibility to provide the service. This lack of regular payment 
impacts negatively on the sustainability of the groups providing the services.
Like in Jinja, the household survey carried out revealed that 25% of the households still think 
that it is the council who manages their waste (see Table 4.4) despite the clear revelation from 
field work that this work has been fully contracted out to CBOs and private companies. Just like 
in Jinja, again, in Mwanza this could also be due to the assumption that since the council is in 
charge of waste management, it is also the one providing the service.
Networks
Networks in the Mwanza arrangement are visible in the different actors involved in SWM albeit 
to different degrees. Apart from the council, CBOs and the private companies, just like in Jinja, 
there is NEMA, different government ministries and regional organisations, in particular, LVRLAC 
to which Mwanza is a member and the LVBC. ILO has been very instrumental in training the 
CBOs to earn their income from the waste collection and also urging them to form an association.
Legitimacy and influence on decision-making
Here, the emphasis is on legitimacy as a moral justification for political and social action. As 
Bratton (1989) says, it is a question of who has the right to assert leadership, to organise people, 
and to allocate resources in the development of enterprises.
First, the CBOs and the two private companies are legitimate organisations, officially recognised 
by the council and the people they serve. They are awarded formal contracts after having won 
through a democratic process (but not without complains of political interference). One public 
health inspector said:
While these contract arrangements are good, you cannot stop ‘wazee’ (the senior 
political officers) from influencing who gets a contract in a particular ward; there is 
a lot of pushing and pulling.
Table 4.4. Perceived service provider in Mwanza (n=200).
Service	provider Frequency Percentage
CBO 88 44
Municipal 50 25
Private company. 27 13.5
Self 35 17.5
Total 200 100.0
Source: Household Survey in Mwanza, 2009.
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The groups undergo registration as solid waste management service providers, pay a registration fee 
of Tshs 25,000 (USD 17.85). The private companies pay taxes to the Tanzania Revenue Authority.
Secondly these contractors are well known to the people they serve because the members 
of these CBOs are local and belong to/are residents in the wards they serve. Of the 82% who 
responded in the Table 4.4 as having known who their service provider is, about 70% are aware it 
is either a CBO or a private company. SWM provides a form of employment to these groups and 
in turn they are able to keep their surroundings clean.
The groups have been allocated wards as shown in the Table 4.5. During the field study, all 
sixteen groups were interviewed. They are groups made up of members ranging from six to as 
many as 30 (see the profile of one of the companies in Box 4.2). And it became clear that each 
contractor is to:
• sweep waste from the roads, drainage systems and open areas;
• remove sand on tarmac roads and drainage systems;
• unblock the drainage systems where there is dirt;
• collect waste and take it to transfer stations apart from the private companies who take their 
waste directly to the dumpsite;
• collect the fee from clients according to the Refuse Collection and Disposal By-law;
• ensure that the respective areas served are clean;
• prepare a programme/timetable for cleaning to be followed by the clients;
Table 4.5. CBOs/private companies and the wards served in Mwanza.
Ward CBO/private	companies
1 Pamba Prima Bins
2 Nyamagana Ujasiliamali Cooperation Limited
3 Isamilo Etia
4 Kirumba Mwepe
5 Mirongo Chassama
6 Mbugani Maendeleo Mbugani
7 Nyakato A Uzota
8 Nyakato B Tufuma
9 Nyamanoro A Muungano Wa Wajane
10 Nyamanoro B Maendeleo Mkudi Kilimahewa
11 Pasiansi Patuma
12 Igogo Kinyagesi B
13 Mkuyuni Himaja
14 Butimba Boresha Mazingira
15 Igoma Mkuwa
16 Kitangiri Charity organisation
Source: Field work in Mwanza, 2007-2009.
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• submit to the council an outline proposal or action plan showing how the work will be done 
in the respective ward;
• submit to the council a list of clients every three months;
• submit a monthly report of work to the city head of public health;
• ensure workers have proper outfits and protective gears for work.
One unique feature of the Mwanza arrangement is that all households are to pay a standard fee 
of USD 0.28 per household per month. In the event of non-payments the contractors can seek 
redress from the council legal office. Legal action is however expensive and politically sensitive. 
This is especially the case when political elections are about to take place as no political aspirant 
would like to go against his/her voters interests. It is also challenging to follow up on households 
that do not pay and a contractor in the CBD puts it is this way:
The cost I would incur in taking up a legal case with a household that does not pay 
would be much more than the amount of service charge for waste collection that such 
a household is to pay, besides a tenant may move house, how do I even trace such a 
person.
Even with such an arrangement of massive community involvement which, according to Pierre 
and Peters (2000), should result in minimum local government involvement and communities 
solving their own problems, the Mwanza city council is still at the helm of service provision, 
awarding contracts, and allocating roles and responsibilities.
As much as the groups are legitimate outfits with formal contracts and recognition by 
society, their role in SWM is weakened because of their minimal influence in decision making 
(see Helmsing, 2002) and the cases of non-payments by households who still perceive waste 
management as the responsibility of the council and of interference from political interests.
Relations and alliance
Just like in Jinja, also in Mwanza an assessment is made of the relationships between the different 
actors. While the relationship between the contractors and the municipality in Jinja is primarily 
based on sharing SWM responsibilities, in Mwanza, this is complemented by the sharing of the 
financial burden.
Box	4.2.	Example	of	a	charity	organisation	profile.
The organisation serves in Kitangiri Ward. It started in 2002 with eleven members and today 
the group has grown to 25 members, 14 women and 11 men. Their main roles in SWM is waste 
collection from point of generation to the transfer station. Every household, hotel and street in 
Kitangiri is served by this CBO. Households pay USD 0.28 but for cleaning tarmac roads, the 
payment is done by the council. The CBO complained about delayed payments from council.
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a. With the municipality. The community groups were asked how they communicate their needs 
to the council and all the 16 interviewed responded to be communicating through a public 
health officer representing the council in every ward. This officer monitors the SWM activities 
in the assigned ward and communicates the concerns of the CBOs to the city director.
Furthermore when assessing relations and alliances, it emerged that every ward has at least 
two transfer stations either in the form of open grounds collection facilities or a skip. The 
location of the transfer stations is decided upon by the public and the CBOs. The council is 
responsible for collecting the solid waste from the different transfer stations to the disposal 
grounds. (This interplay between different actors in designating transfer stations location and 
even in transporting waste from the point of generation to transfer stations by CBOs and to 
disposal sites by the council is another step in line with the MMA). The CBOs pay Tshs 8,000 
(USD 5.7) per trip to the council for transferring waste to the disposal grounds. The private 
companies however take their own waste to the disposal grounds and pay for its disposal. In 
addition, the CBOs and the private companies that have been awarded the SWM contracts 
are paid by the city council at a rate of USD 1.2 for every 300 m length of tarmac road that 
is cleaned daily.
On being asked if they receive any assistance from the council to further gauge their relationship 
with the council, all the groups, responded to be getting occasional legal assistance from the 
council to tackle defaulters of payments especially when it concerned business premises.
b. With other contractors. Unlike the situation in Jinja, as far as the contractors relating with 
each other is concerned, all the 16 groups interviewed in Mwanza belong to an association 
called the Mwanza Solid Waste Management Association (MASMA) (See the profile in Box 
4.3). MASMA meets once every month to share ideas on problem solving and opportunities 
that can be explored further. Apart from the association, neighbouring CBOs (that is CBOs 
working in neighbouring wards) work together in sharing experiences and sometimes even 
the use of equipment in case the workload is more than expected.
c. With households. Household satisfaction in Mwanza is low compared to that in Jinja. Where 
n=165, only 51% indicated to be satisfied about the service provision. Possible reasons for this 
could be that the largest percentage of service providers are CBOs who, as it emerged, have no 
incentive to invest and improve SWM. This could impact on their level of professionalism. It 
Box	4.3.	Profile	of	MASMA.
The association MASMA was formed in 2005 but officially registered in 2006. All the 16 CBOs 
involved in SWW in Mwanza are members of MASMA. The association charges Tshs 100,000 
(USD 71.42) as registration fees for each CBO. The association seeks to pull together service 
providers with different levels of experience, knowledge and status, providing an enriched 
forum for experience and knowledge sharing, hence for improving the working performance 
of its members.
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is also possible that the population has very high levels of expectation about the performance 
of the contractors. A number of the households gave recommendations in line with improving 
the skills of CBOs, improving the infrastructure used for collection, showing that they expect 
more than they are receiving (see Annex 4).
In general though, privatisation with the involvement of communities in SWM in Mwanza has 
considerably improved the waste collection rate. Of the 296 tons of waste generated daily, 261 
tons gets to the dumpsite, which is about 88% of waste generated. Before privatisation, only 28% 
of waste generated arrived at the dumpsite.
Payment systems
As mentioned before, households pay Tshs 400 (USD 0.28) for waste service per household per 
month. This is paid directly to the contractors and of the 165 households (82.5%) who responded 
to receive services either from municipality or CBO or private company, only a paltry 3.6% did 
not pay for these services. Among the households (n=200) 1% considered the fees too low, 45.5% 
considered them low, 32.5% moderate and 21% responded that it was not applicable or gave no 
answer. Interestingly though, SWM was not considered a priority compared to other services 
because in responding to the question their priority in payments for the different services, 76.5% 
(where n=200) indicated that they would pay for waste as the last service amongst the four (that is 
water, electricity, security and waste collection) while 88% would pay for water as a first (priority) 
service. There are many reasons for such findings, one of them could be as explained by McDonald 
and Pape (2002), who argue that receiving a service for free or having it heavily subsidised distorts 
not only its exchange value but its use value as well.
In the end of this analysis, although CBOs are perceived to be more participatory, less 
bureaucratic, more flexible, cost effective and having the ability to reach the poor and disadvantaged 
groups, using CBOs as the bulk service providers also brings to question issues regarding their 
sustainability. Some of the groups involved are small scale and depend on aid from other sectors 
in society. Non-payments by some households may contribute further to the unsustainability 
of CBOs operations. This situation has resulted in a reduction of the membership of some of 
the groups concerned and this means that less work can be done. Some of the groups had to 
diversify their activities, so now some are engaging in poultry keeping, stationery services (like 
photocopying and printing services) while others have sought loans from financial institutions 
to keep their activities running. This problem could possibly be solved by better informing the 
citizenry about the importance and practice of public-private partnerships. An active role by the 
council to facilitate payments by all households would be another contribution to the sustainability 
of these CBOs but gradual increments of the fee to be paid by the households would probably be 
more promising to the CBOs.
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4.3.3 Kisumu: governance as hierarchy and networks
The governance model of ‘hierarchies and networks’ refers to governance conducted by and through 
vertically integrated state structures with the imposition of laws and other forms of regulation. 
The network aspect is relevant because of the presence of other actors in the domain of SWM.
The situation in Kisumu comes close to this model of hierarchy and networks. This is the case 
because, as is already presented earlier in this thesis, the council is still solely responsible for solid 
waste management and the management style is actually still of the command-and-control type. 
The Department of Environment receives its directions and authority from the line ministry of 
Local Government and implements them at the local level. Unlike Mwanza and Jinja, Kisumu 
has no formal/official arrangement that involves non-state actors in collecting and transporting 
waste or in sweeping the roads.
The council does the road sweeping itself, as well as the collection, transfer and disposal of 
waste, but these council services are concentrated in the Central Business District and only a few 
residential areas also benefit from them. Non-state actors provide service to most of the other 
residential areas in an unofficial manner.
Despite the dominant role of local government authorities there are however also networks, 
because a number of other actors take part in SWM including the informal/unofficial 
groupings13,government ministries, NEMA, international organisations and others.
The field survey revealed the categorisation of the actors as presented in Table 4.6. These 
actors were involved in collecting, transporting, recycling and re-using solid waste in different 
residential areas.
Out of the 68 groups identified in Kisumu, 31 groups were interviewed. These groups have 
varying numbers of members ranging from 2 to 80. The profiles of three different groups that are 
involved in SWM in Kisumu are given in Box 4.4-4.6. Out of the 31 interviewed groups, 22 (71%) 
have been working on solid waste for more than five years meaning they were formed in the year 
2005 or earlier. This duration of their existence speaks for their consistency. Those interviewed 
revealed they take part in different activities in solid waste management including:
13 Informal groupings stand for all those other non-state actors who are not officially recognized by the 
council as SWM actors though they are actively involved in SWM. They are listed in Table 5.4.
Table 4.6. SWM Groups in Kisumu City Council and those interviewed.
SWM Number	existing	 Number	interviewed
Recyclers 23 6
Groups: CBOs and youth groups 27 17
Private companies/individuals 18 8
Total 68 31
Source: Field work in Kisumu, 2008-2009.
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• collection of scrap metals and plastics;
• re-use of containers;
• composting waste from households waste;
• recycling plastics and metals from household waste;
• collecting household SW/transporting to transfer stations and dumpsite.
Legitimacy and influence on decision making
Even with the municipality as the central locus of authority, legitimacy remains a legitimate 
concern here to be able to ascertain the legal mandate accorded to the groups providing SWM 
informally. Therefore in addition to the moral and social dimensions mentioned under the Mwanza 
arrangement, the legal dimension is vital as well (see Vedder, 2003). Most of these groups are 
registered by the ministry in charge of community development, they are however not formally 
recognised by law as actors in the domain of solid waste management. The presence and activities 
of these groups are nevertheless known by the council and some even responded to be operating 
through some form of ‘franchise’14 in areas allocated to them by the council. A question posed to 
the groups to try to establish their legitimacy, resulted in responses provided in Table 4.7.
14 The word franchise is in quotation marks because there are no legal papers to show for it and the arrangement 
is only franchise by name but not in actual sense.
Box	4.4.	Profile	of	Bamato	environmental	and	sanitation	project	(recycler).
This is a self-help group that started in 2000 and was registered as an association in 2001. Today 
the group has 25 members and four satellite points for the collection of plastics. The group buys 
the waste plastic from scavengers, individuals and other private collectors and recycles this into 
products that can be sold.
Box	4.5.	Profile	of	Carells	Garbage	Solution	Company	(private	company).
The company was formed in 2005 and has two members. They collect garbage once a week from 
households and charge Ksh 150 per household per month (USD 2.14). The company provides 
waste bags to households and has a pick-up truck.
Box	4.6.	Profile	of	Ten	Stars-Tuungane	(youth	group).
The group was formed in 2007. Ten youth groups have come together and today they have 
grown to a total number of 60 members. They collect waste from two estates, once or twice a 
week for free. Their activities are financed by Tuungane youth project which has other income 
generating activities as well.
4. Municipal authorities and non-state actors 87
With no legal papers to show the arrangements they are part of, most if not all of these groups 
are not legitimate in the SWM arena. This impinges on a number of issues, for instance seeking 
legal redress in case of payment defaults becomes a problem. Getting donor assistance also 
becomes a problem because questions will arise as concerning ties to the public, transparency 
and adherence to the mission of a group, representative status and the relationship between the 
group and the community served. On the other hand, in terms of community support, openness 
of information, democratic decision-making, these groups can be considered more legitimate 
than some official actors are.
The groups engaged in waste services are composed of local members, some serving their own 
residential areas and others doing it at no cost. As it turned out from the household survey, these 
groups form the largest percentage of SWM service providers (37.5%), combining the percentages 
on CBO (10.5%) and private company (27%) (see Table 4.8). Responses that were categorised 
as ‘Others’ and which account for 53.5% of all responses (see Table 4.9) included responses like 
‘dumping in pits’, ‘burning’ or ‘the landlord comes to collect the waste’.
As far as decision making is concerned, like in Jinja and Mwanza, also in Kisumu the council 
remains at the helm of SWM activities. The groups mentioned do not attend council meetings 
nor influence decision-making in any other manner.
Table 4.7. Legitimacy of groups.
Form	of	arrangement Numbers
‘Franchise’ 11
Quasi contract 1
Partnership 1
Unwritten authority to operate 2
Pay rent to council 1
None 15
Total 31
Source: Field work in Kisumu, 2008-2009.
Table 4.8. Service providers to households (n=200) in Kisumu.
Service	provider Frequency Percentage
CBO 21 10.5
Municipality 18 9.0
Private company 54 27.0
Others 107 53.5
Total 200 100.0
Source: Household survey in Kisumu.
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Relations and alliances
a. With the municipality. The groups were asked how they communicate their needs to the 
council to assess whether there is any form of communication and therefore a relationship 
with the council. The responses to the question are summarised in Table 4.9. About 68% of all 
groups communicate through the Department of Environment which further indicates that 
the council is aware of their existence and that also their activities are known by the council.
When asked if they receive any form of assistance from the council to further gauge the 
relationship they have with council, the groups gave responses which are listed in Table 4.10.
These percentages clearly show that the council is, to a certain extent, working together with 
the different groups. The 35% mentioned under capacity building’ refer to a number of the 
groups out of the 31 groups that have benefited from workshops and seminars facilitated by 
Table 4.9. Means of communication between groups and council.
Means	of	communication Number
Through Dept. of Environment 21
Through the NGO called Sana1 1
Through the association (Kiwama) 5
Through a broker 1
None 3
Total 31
Source: Field work in Kisumu, 2008-2009.
1 Sana is a registered NGO in Kenya established to encourage water and sanitation development in the 
Nyanza region. It has supported a number of CBOs involved in solid waste management. See http://
sanainternational.20m.com/About%20Sana.htm.1
Table 4.10. Assistance from the councils to the SWM groups.
Form	of	assistance Percentage	(where	n=31)
Capacity building 35
Trucks for transportation 35
Networking 9.7
Dumping waste for free 3
Conflict resolution 3
Managing dumpsite 6
Helping to get fee from defaulters 6
None 19
Source: Field work in Kisumu, 2008-2009.
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Shelter Forum, Practical Action and UN-Habitat under the auspices of the Council. These 
training sessions take place whenever funds are available and they have mainly been dealing 
with recycling opportunities, waste sorting and re-use.
b. With other service providers. In terms of relationships between the groups themselves, the 
groups revealed that they work together during cleanups and some even share their working 
equipment. Like in Mwanza, they also have formed an association called the Kisumu Waste 
Managers Association (KIWAMA; for a profile see Box 4.7).
Of those interviewed 16% were also member of a scrap dealers association. This is different 
from the situation in Jinja where the two contractors do not work together, citing business 
competition as the reason.
c. With the households. When it comes to the relationships between the service providers and the 
households, the household survey revealed that 70.6% (n=93) of the households are satisfied 
with their service provision. In trying to understand this occurrence, a detailed analysis 
revealed that of those receiving waste collection services, 58% (n=93) receive these services 
from the private companies and that 87% of these (n=54) responded to being satisfied with 
service provision. This high appreciation of the services provided by the private companies 
largely explains the general satisfaction rate of 70.6%. Given that the private sector is driven 
by profit and ingenuity, which keeps it innovative and competitive, it comes as no surprise 
that a high percentage of those served expressed satisfaction in the service provided, as this 
is particularly the result of private sector involvement.
Box	4.7	KIWAMA.
The Kisumu Waste Managers Association (KIWAMA) was duly registered in 2009 at the Attorney 
General’s office. The constitution governing its operations was enacted in the year 2009 and is a 
public document. KIWAMA also has a SACCO that operates as a micro-finance organisation, 
registered with the Ministry of Cooperative Development. Membership is both corporate and 
individual And the registration fee is Kshs 500 payable once upon registration. The youth 
represents 70%, women 23% and men 17% of the members. There are monthly meetings for 
members.
Roles and mandate:
• to bargain for its members on strategic positions with the local authority and other 
development partners;
• to sensitise members on their role in the SWM cycle in a bid to improve service delivery 
within Kisumu Municipal Council;
• to fundraise for activities from the members for instance in clean ups and environment days;
• to sign MOUs for partnerships on behalf of the members;
• to train members on entrepreneurial skills to increase their marginal returns.
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Payment systems
Kisumu’s scenarios differ from the other two councils when it comes to the payment systems. The 
areas that are served by the municipality have their costs taken care of in the water bill and some of 
the households responded that they pay for waste as part of their house rent. The private companies 
are operating in open competition and work purely on a willing-buyer-willing-seller basis. From 
the survey, their services are mostly offered in high and middle income estates. Payments are made 
at the end of the month as per a verbal agreement with the household. CBOs operate mostly in 
middle and low income areas and they also charge fees agreed upon with each household.
Given the high number of informal operators, they charge various fees for waste collection 
but the average fees for different residential areas are revealed through the household survey in 
Table 4.11.
Out of the 93 households that receive service from either the municipality, private company 
or a CBO, 79.6% pay for it and a high percentage of them (69.7% where n=74) considers the fees 
they pay moderate.
In terms of priority amongst services, just like in Jinja and Mwanza, households responded 
to consider paying for waste collection as the lowest amongst the four different services earlier 
mentioned. Where n=200, 51% would pay for waste as the fourth and last service.
The undoing of this arrangement in Kisumu is that it lacks steering and integration which 
ought to be the role of government in a wider governance system but on the other hand as argued 
by Rakodi, in a system in which municipal capacity is almost lacking, resources inadequate and 
bureaucratic processes lack efficacy, it is important for residents and businesses to cultivate not only 
political but also bureaucratic relationship - porous bureaucracy, the informal exchange relations 
between clients at all levels which ultimately may provide some of the poor with channels for 
obtaining access to services as personal or group favours. An example is that of Manyatta – a low 
income residential estate in Kisumu – where ten youth groups have come together and formed 
one group. They provide waste collection services to the residents at no fee. This complements the 
activities of other private collectors who provide service to some of the Manyatta residents at a fee.
4.4 Market, communities or hierarchical arrangement?
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, some observers suggest strengthening governmental 
authorities to take their responsibilities more seriously, whereas others consider the current African 
Table 4.11. Payment Rates for SWM services.
Residential	area Payment	rates	(Kshs/month)
Low income areas 40.00-100.00
Middle income areas 150.00-250.00
High income areas 250.00-500.00
Source: Household Field Survey in Kisumu, 2009.
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state fundamentally incapable of delivering such services in a reliable manner. According to the 
second view, active involvement of private companies, non-governmental organisations and local 
communities is pivotal to implement and manage urban environmental infrastructures.
The field studies reveal that in all the three municipal councils, the local government is still 
at the helm of SWM so it is not a full market-based governance for Jinja neither is it a complete 
community-based governance for Mwanza. Governments in the three case studies still enjoy an 
unrivalled position in society and they are still the obvious loci of political power and authority. 
Though they have been engaged in some kind of negotiation with other significant actors in society, 
their dominant role remains unquestioned. These local governments may become increasingly 
dependent on these other societal actors but they have remained in control of some unique power 
bases in society such as legislative powers, powers to award contracts and even the authority to 
determine service charges. Therefore while in theory, network governance could be the most 
appropriate model to manage SWM, the realities on the ground echo the need for (and perhaps 
a renewed interest in) recognising the importance of an active state in managing SWM. Given 
that an active engagement and effectiveness of the state remain critical variables, the state (with 
a focus on the municipalities who are charged with SWM) has to acquire skills which in the 
past were associated with the private sector: strategic planning and management, effective time 
management, respect of contracts, and timely delivery of licenses and approvals among others. 
The state must have the capacity to engage in partnerships with non-state actors in joint ventures. 
The state must also have the capacity to transform the laws, rules and regulations made in an 
era when the state was looked upon as the sole provider of public goods and even in charge of 
organising businesses. Therefore as much as effective market economies and societal institutions 
are essential they require a functioning and capable state in order to operate and grow. At the 
same time, evidence for the active participation of non-state actors in SWM in the three towns is 
unquestionable and this calls for considering their position as argued in the network governance 
discourse in future governance arrangements. With that understanding and based on the criteria 
of Modernised Mixtures (flexibility, accessibility and sustainability), then for each town (whose 
solid waste status is summarised in Table 4.12), the following conclusions can be drawn.
The ‘community dominated’ arrangement in Mwanza which includes CBOs, private companies 
and the municipality is more flexible than the other two urban centres. The private companies cover 
the wards in the CBD as they have the resources (financial and human) to take on the bigger work 
load. Further, the CBD areas are well structured and can easily be reached. Returns on investment 
is likely higher in the CBD than in the wards away from the CBD, this makes it easy to contract 
out the CBD to the companies and have more flexible arrangements in the neighbourhoods. The 
CBOs cover the other wards and their capacity compared to the private companies is lower. The 
municipality does the supervision and monitoring. This arrangement has ensured the accessibility 
of SWM services by most if not all households as is shown in the number of households receiving 
these (82.5%). While 96.4% of those who receive these services actually pay for them, the level of 
satisfaction amongst them was low compared to the other two towns. This brings to question the 
issue of sustainability vis-à-vis the CBOs’ large coverage. The low satisfaction in Mwanza compared 
to the other two urban centres is linked to the fact that CBOs who provide service to most of the 
households are not well equipped. Their contracts are annual, and this makes it not interesting 
for the CBOs to invest in their SWM equipment. The reason for using annual contracts is the 
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municipality’s aim to gauge performance and to only renew contracts on the basis of previous 
performance. For this arrangement to be sustainable though, the council should improve the 
working environment for these CBOs. The contract period could be made longer, for instance 
5 years, and the council could be allowed to terminate the contract before the end of the five 
years’ term if the contractor does not perform satisfactory. Performance based incentives could 
also be used to encourage the CBOs to deliver more. The user fees charged for collection should 
be gradually increased as well. The CBOs can then access loans from the existing microfinance 
institutions and in turn satisfy their clients better.
The ‘market dominated’ arrangement in Jinja having included private contractors, has reached 
a level of 60% in terms of service accessibility. The percentage can be increased further by bringing 
on board groups like CBOs to provide service to those who are not covered yet. According to Adei 
(2009) contractors cannot provide services below cost or without an acceptable minimum return 
on their capital and expertise. If that cannot be charged to consumers directly then other means 
have to be adopted. While today the contractors are paid from the property tax, their revenue 
can be improved by progressively demanding households to pay for the services provided. The 
Jinja municipal council can perhaps learn from Kampala City Council in Uganda which has 
awarded, via competitive tendering, a monopoly for a restricted area to (mostly local) private firms 
but subsidises firms working in poor areas (Oosterveer, 2009). This policy makes it somewhat 
affordable for poor households to also profit from SWM services. Privatisation is not to be excluded 
but should be firmly controlled (against corruption and underperformance) and not be limited to 
allowing contracts to large (foreign) companies, but include smaller local companies and NGOs/
CBOs. Proponents of the neo-developmental state claim that it is only through active government 
interventions that access of the poor to environmental infrastructures can be secured, as their 
economic and political power is too limited to realise this otherwise.
Table 4.12. Summation of SWM indicators in the three urban centres.
Town/SWM	status Jinja Mwanza Kisumu
Waste collection arrangement Private collectors 
formally contracted 
and the municipality
CBOs and 2 private 
collectors formally 
contracted and the 
municipality
CBOs, private companies 
and operating informally 
and the municipality
Percentage of households 
receiving SWM service
60% (n=218) 82.5% (n=200) 46.5% (n= 200)
Percentage of households that 
pay for waste collection
N/A 96.4% (n=165) 79.4% (n=93)
Satisfaction of SWM amongst 
households
62.6% (n=130) 51% (n=165) 70.6% (n=93)
Percentage of waste collected  
in the towns
40-60% 88% 35-45% (municipal and 
non-municipal)
Source: based on field work 2007-2009.
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The hierarchical arrangement in Kisumu ranks low when it comes to service accessibility 
and percentage of waste collected. This is because the municipal authority which is seen as the 
sole provider of SWM is limited in its resources and has not wholly linked up with the informal/
official sector. Though the percentage of households that receive SWM services (46.5%) is low 
compared to Jinja and Mwanza, the informal sector has certainly scored as is evident in percentage 
of service satisfaction. Therefore, there is need to rethink the official definition of informality and 
consider modernising the informal sector. Legitimising the involvement of these informal actors 
is one step towards improving the accessibility and sustainability of SWM. Providing an enabling 
environment in terms of well-functioning communication channels, adequate fee levels and active 
collaboration with municipalities would be another.
To this end, the definitive answer to how the urban poor can best be served is not community 
dominance, neither market dominance, nor hierarchical arrangements. A balanced arrangement is 
needed where all societal actors can play their role. It is clear that involving non-state actors as in 
a network governance arrangement is truly plausible and these actors, both formal and informal, 
need to work under an effective and strengthened government in order to afford all income 
groups to access solid waste management services and to ensure flexibility and sustainability of 
the services provided.
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Chapter 5. 
Opportunities for inter-municipal cooperation
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters have covered governance arrangements surrounding solid waste management 
in Kisumu, Jinja and Mwanza which come second after the capital cities in terms of their urban 
status and size. Building on the findings in Kisumu (Kenya), the aim of this chapter is to assess the 
opportunities for inter-municipal cooperation in solid waste management amongst three smaller 
urban centres in Kenya found in the Lake Victoria Basin: Kisii, Homabay and Migori municipalities.
The location of the three councils (Kisii, Homabay and Migori) of the Lake Victoria Basin 
in Kenya is shown in the section boxed with the white line in Figure 5.1. More details on their 
location are presented in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2 highlights the location and the distance between 
the three towns, while also some town councils are included that lie in their midst.
This chapter combines a discussion on SWM in the three small towns with a review of multi-
level governance and inter-municipal cooperation related to solid waste. In section 5.2, the concept 
Figure 5.1. Map of Kenya showing a portion of Lake Victoria Basin (GeoTASADA Ltd, Kenya - May 
2009).
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of multi-level governance is introduced and different organisational models for cooperation are 
discussed. Section 5.3 introduces the three towns within the broader research context of solid 
waste management pointing at opportunities of inter-municipal cooperation along the waste chain. 
Section 5.4 presents possible models for managing waste in the three towns while Section 5.5 
summarises the findings by drawing parallels between multi-level governance and the modernised 
mixtures approach. Section 5.6 present the conclusion.
5.2 Multi-level governance
This study seeks to discuss the multi-level governance (MLG) perspective by focusing on inter-
municipal cooperation framed along the arguments of what Marks and Hooghe (2003) refer to 
as the ‘Type II form of MLG’.
While the Type I form of MLG builds upon ‘general-purpose’ jurisdictions (governments) at 
different levels, and is mostly interested in the interactions between these levels and the sharing 
Figure 5.2. Part of Lake Victoria Basin in Kenya showing the three towns under study (GeoTASADA 
Ltd, Kenya - May 2009).
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of competences between them, Type II MLG is characterised by task-specific (instead of general 
purpose) jurisdictions, intersecting memberships and a flexible design that is responsive to 
temporary needs (Marks and Hooghe, 2003). Type II MLG consists of special-purpose jurisdictions 
that tailor membership, rules of operation, and functions to a particular policy problem. Such 
jurisdictions may very well span several (territorially or otherwise defined) levels. Provision is 
made for interactive arrangements in which public as well as private actors participate, aimed at 
solving societal problems or creating social opportunities.
Kenya has only two levels (tiers) of government - local and central/national with no regional 
level government in between them. This permits the study to take on MLG II which is not focused 
on nested administrative entities and therefore allows to move away from the hierarchical state 
centric arrangements as provided by Type I MLG.
The Lake Victoria Basin offers the functional space, or territorial arena, within which the 
three municipalities can experience territorial interdependence and geographical proximity 
which are important motivating factors for working together to solve shared problems or discover 
opportunities for engaging with the outside world (Conzelmann, 2008).
5.2.1 Multi-level governance and improved solid waste management
As managing solid waste at the municipal level has grown increasingly complex in terms of 
equipment, technology, personnel and the associated costs, rural and small councils are likely to 
find it difficult to fulfil their responsibilities in this area. Unlike their larger urban counterparts, 
rural and small urban councils often have a lower tax base, which means that the revenues for 
financing waste management activities are limited. By working together, however, most of the 
activities in the waste chain including effective recycling programs (for instance, the marketing of 
recyclables and purchasing of goods with recycled content), putting up state-of-the-art landfills, 
and providing waste-to-energy facilities could be within the reach of even small communities 
with few resources. When councils combine financial, administrative, personnel, and equipment 
resources (EPA, 1994), the costs of pursuing certain projects is spread among several jurisdictions. 
Still, differences in available resources between participating councils must be considered when 
trying to achieve equity even as economies of scale are realised.
With multi-level governance, externalities can be internalised through inter-municipal 
cooperation, but conflicts may still occur, for instance, hauling waste across jurisdictions can 
cause conflicts. Cooperation sometimes can require that waste be transported over long distances 
and through neighbouring municipalities. Communities along the routes leading to a shared 
solid waste facility might witness an increase in traffic. Concerns over the resulting congestion, 
pollution, and wear and tear of the roads could create conflicts among the communities concerned. 
This could be addressed for instance, by restricting traffic to use certain roads or paying taxes to 
the affected councils or other voluntary agreements.
Multi-level governance ensures that decision-making is carried out at the level of government 
that is closest to the individual citizen – a concept referred to as the subsidiarity principle. Local 
responsiveness is also achieved because local officials are in a better position to respond to local 
tastes and preferences than are officials of senior levels of government. MLG in the form of inter-
municipal cooperation also allows the different councils involved to retain a certain degree of 
98  Modernising solid waste management at municipal level
autonomy depending on the organisational model settled upon. Voluntary cooperation for instance, 
is common where local autonomy is highly valued: municipalities can retain independence while 
reaping the benefits of cooperation (Conzelmann, 2008).
Multi-level governance allows division of responsibilities according to capacity and availability 
of resources at different levels of government. There are functions in the waste chain like waste 
collection that would be better managed by individual councils in-house, while others would be 
more effectively handled when councils cooperate. The retention of certain functions within each 
council allows the public greater access to local decision-making and better accountability on the 
implementation of these decisions.
Therefore possible benchmarks that could present themselves as the different aspects of SWM 
when considering MLG and inter-municipal cooperation, to be discussed in the empirical section 
include:
• economies of scale;
• equity;
• externalities;
• the subsidiarity principle; and
• accountability.
5.2.2 Organisational models for cooperation
Cooperation can take different forms and different authors have categorised them differently. Table 
5.1 links the structures by drawing similarities from the explanations given by different authors/
institution. There are plausible arguments in each category; but employing arguments from the 
Modernised Mixtures approach on which this study is based, would lead to the following concerns 
related to these organisation models. These models should:
• Reflect the local realities including the available resources amongst the participating councils, 
the institutional framework and the legislation in place.
• Consider the balance between technical and institutional concerns, that is, which institutional 
model is fit for which technical undertaking. Balance the economic and institutional concerns 
and also the economic and technical concerns.
These concerns come out clearly in EPAs categorisation in which the concept of regionalisation 
is prominent and the management structures are defined accordingly. Dollery and Johnson’s 
(2005) categorisation also brings out the multi-level governance concept particularly in the first 
five models. These two categories are therefore taken into consideration in the rest of this study.
EPA (1994) uses the concept of regionalisation and distinguishes five management options 
for achieving this while giving strengths and weaknesses for each. They include:
• Intergovernmental agreements: these agreements are contracts between two or more 
municipalities to perform a specific task together. They may be informal arrangements 
or more complicated legal contracts. They constitute the most flexible model for regional 
cooperation, as councils can structure each project individually. On the other hand though, 
in the absence of a more formal organisation, financing for such projects can be difficult to 
obtain. Each participating council would have to raise money for the project individually. For 
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each new decision, all jurisdictions must regroup and reach a new agreement. Consequently, 
intergovernmental agreements often are better suited for more limited regional projects than 
for permanent ones.
• Authorities, trusts and special districts: they have political and financial autonomy. They are 
able to raise funds through bonds or taxes. Their autonomy helps these organisations sustain 
cooperative partnerships among communities and execute projects in an environment free 
of individual community politics. Member councils set up an advisory board or establish a 
reporting structure for the organisation that ensures proper oversight.
• Regional councils: sometimes referred to as councils of government, regional planning 
commissions, or regional development centres. A key characteristic of a regional council is 
its flexibility. They can be structured in such a way that they are able to meet the needs of the 
member councils. Through the council, public and private decision-makers can be brought 
together to consider a regional strategy. If regionalisation seems promising, the council then 
can plan and implement the program. Existing councils can lend their experience and enhance 
a shared sense of cooperation between different regional councils.
• Non-profit public corporations: they have financial autonomy and are able to issue tax-exempt 
bonds, making fundraising easier. Councils have control over decision-making because local 
officials sit on the board of directors. On the other hand, it can take a long time to establish 
such a public corporation because of the legal procedures involved and because political 
Table 5.1. Organisational models for cooperation.
Organisation	
model
EPA,	1994 Oakerson,	1999 Dollery	and	Johnson,	
2005
Price	Waterhouse	
Coopers,	2006
Category A Intergovernmental 
agreements
Co-ordinated 
production
Joint production
Voluntary 
arrangement
Joint Boards
Cooperative cross 
council efforts
Category B Shared corporate 
services
Category C Commercial sector 
(franchising and 
contracting
Private contracting
Franchising
Vouchering
Specialised lead 
service provider
Category D Regional councils Regional organisation 
of councils
Category E Authorities/trusts/
districts
Category F Non-profit public 
corporation
Category G Agency model
Category H Amalgamation
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considerations can influence the project, since councils/communities have control over 
decision-making.
• Commercial sector: contracting and franchising are the two most prevalent forms of commercial 
involvement in solid waste management services. As an organisational model, it can offer 
experience, access to state-of-the-art technologies, and lower costs. It can, however, also entail 
lengthy bidding procedures and require complicated contract negotiations. It may also mean 
that the participating councils have less control over the daily activities.
The model chosen for regional cooperation at any one time depends on factors as available 
financing, applicable laws, and existing government bodies or regional organisations. Another 
important factor in this regard is the amount of control that communities want to keep over 
the organisation and the type of SWM services and projects that the organisation oversees. For 
example, if a regionalisation effort entails constructing waste management facilities or providing 
solid waste services, a formal, legal structure with financing capabilities might be needed. For a 
one-time project or a limited, clearly defined effort (such as organising a hazardous household 
waste collection program or arranging for equipment sharing), a more flexible model like an 
intergovernmental/inter-councils agreement might be more appropriate.
There is also a taxonomic classification of alternative models of municipal governance developed 
by Dollery and Johnson (2005). They include:
a. Voluntary arrangements between geographically adjacent councils to share resources on an 
ad hoc basis whenever and wherever the perceived need arises.
b. Regional organisations of councils (ROCs) which constitute a formalisation of the ad hoc 
resource sharing model, typically financed by a fee levied on each member council as well as 
a pro rata contribution based on income rate, population, or some other proxy for size, which 
provides shared services to member councils.
c. Area integration or joint board models which retain autonomous existing councils with their 
current boundaries, but create a shared administration overseen by a joint board of elected 
councillors.
d. Virtual local government-consisting of several small adjacent ‘virtual’ councils with a common 
administrative structure or ‘shared service centre’. Such a centre would provide the necessary 
administrative capacity to implement the policies decided upon by the individual councils, 
with service delivery itself contracted out either to private companies or to the shared service 
centre depending on the relative costs of service provision and the feasibility of using private 
firms
e. The agency model in which all service functions are run by state government agencies with state 
government funds and state government employees in the same way as state police forces or 
state emergency services presently operate. Elected councils would act as advisory bodies to 
these state agencies charged with determining the specific mix of services over their particular 
geographical jurisdictions.
f. The most extreme form occurs when several small councils are amalgamated into a single 
large municipality
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5.2.3 Methodology
This part of the study employs an embedded case study research design explained already in 
Chapter 2. The data were collected in the following ways:
a. Document and literature review: documents with discussions on multi-level governance and 
inter-municipal cooperation in different parts of the world were reviewed. Next, different 
pieces of legislation in Kenya were also reviewed to find possible models for cooperation.
b. Direct observation was also used as a method of data collection particularly to observe the 
status of the waste management infrastructure in the three towns.
c. Given that inter-municipal cooperation in service provision is a relatively new concept in East 
Africa and in Kenya in particular, semi-structured interviews were used to obtain as additional 
information. The following resource persons were interviewed:
• the town clerk in Kisii;
• 4 public health officers- 2 in Kisii, and 2 in Migori;
• two private collectors in Kisii;
• two recycling firms in Kisii;
• town engineer in Homabay in charge of SWM;
• an NGO representative from Enviro-Watch Homabay;
• project officer-Kenya’s chapter working with LVRLAC.
d. Two stakeholders workshops were organised in Kisumu and Bukoba (Tanzania). The workshop 
in Kisumu was intended to discuss the possibility of working together as councils in the region. 
Some specific issues discussed here were the practical challenges and opportunities of inter-
municipal cooperation: The workshop brought together 19 stakeholders:
•  Given that there are Multi-Stakeholder forums (MSF) in each council, the study used the 
MSF ideology in such a way that participants were picked from the different sections to 
make the workshop quorum representative. Three from each of the small urban centres 
were selected (one representative from the national government, one from the local 
government and one from the non-state organisations) to make 9 participants for the 
workshop.
•  Five participants from the Kisumu City Council to share their best practices (the director, 
deputy-director, two Councilors and one officer, all from the department of environment).
• One representative from LVRLAC as a regional organisation.
•  Four researchers from the PROVIDE project.
In the workshop in Bukoba, the coverage of stakeholders was wider and they came not only 
from Kenya, but also from Uganda and Tanzania. This workshop was the follow up to the 
Kisumu workshop and was organised under the auspices of LVRLAC. The output of this 
workshop is discussed further in Chapter 7.
e. To measure the distance between the three towns, first a map of classified roads for the study 
area was obtained and from this the inter-local authority routes were identified. The distance 
between the most central (mean centre) place in each local authority boundary was estimated 
by tracing the dimensions along the routes earlier identified. Spatial data for estimating the 
proximity of the municipalities were obtained from the digitised Survey of Kenya (SoK), with 
1:50,000 toposheets. Data for the municipal/local authority boundaries were obtained from 
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the ILRI (International Livestock Research Centre) GIS Unit. Using Arsis 9.3, centroids (mean 
centres) for the local authority polygons were derived. The distance from the centroids of target 
local authorities were then estimated by tracing along the interlinking road network using the 
measure tool in Arc-map. The rationale here was that solid waste transportation would most 
likely be undertaken by vehicular transport.
5.3  Solid waste management in the three small towns: opportunities for inter-
municipal cooperation
5.3.1 Geographical location
Kisii, Homabay and Migori are all small urban centres found in Kenya in the Lake Victoria catchment 
and located within less than 100 kms from each other. Figure 5.2 gives a visual representation of 
the councils showing the distances between them by road and their location compared to Lake 
Victoria. Also included in the map are some of the town and county councils neighbouring the 
three councils who are likely to be affected by any cooperation efforts between Kisii, Migori and 
Homabay. Their ecological positioning is a first step towards inter-municipal cooperation. The 
councils will be able to internalise externalities of any joint activity but such consequences for the 
smaller town councils located in their midst need to be taken into consideration as well. The size 
and population figures of the three councils are presented in Table 5.2 and in combination with the 
level of service provision (see Table 5.3), these findings justify determining these municipalities 
as ‘small’.
5.3.2 Institutional organisation
Activities of solid waste management in the three councils just like in the primary towns discussed 
earlier, are the responsibility of the local authorities. Inter-municipal cooperation would uphold 
this subsidiarity principle as the local authorities would still remain responsible for SWM. 
This involvement of municipal authorities further ensures local responsiveness, because these 
Table 5.2. Municipalities’ profiles.
Municipality Kisii Homabay Migori
Size in km2 29 197 (of which 50% is located in the lake) 58.4
Population 
    1999a 65,253 56,297 95,446
    2008 (projected)b 77,983 71,552 123,541
Source: Compiled by author using data from the councils collected in 2009.
a 1999 population figures from population census of 1999 (CBS).
b 2008  Population projections are based on information from district development plans and Central 
Bureau of Statistics
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Table 5.3. Brief on SWM in the three municipalities.
Municipality Kisii Homabay Migori
SWM institutional 
organisation
Under the public health 
department
Under the town engineer Under the public health 
department
Staff numbers 54 49 50
Staff 1 public health officer
1 environmental officer
2 foremen
4 headmen
4 drivers
42 street cleaners
1 engineer
1 works officer
1 foreman
1 headman
2 drivers
4 loaders
39 sweepers
1 public health technician
1 supervisor
2 foremen
2 drivers
29 loaders
17 street cleaners
Waste generation domestic, commercial, 
street sweeping, medical, 
institutional and industrial
domestic, commercial, 
street sweeping, medical, 
institutional 
domestic, commercial, 
street sweeping, medical, 
institutional 
Storage litter bins, polythene bags, 
crude dumping points
litter bins, 4 transfer 
stations and crude 
dumping points
dumping points (hot 
spots) along the road
Collection manual loading from 
dumping points
manual loading from 
transfer stations and 
dumping points
manual loading from 
dumping points
Frequency of 
collection
CBD daily by council
main market daily
daraja mbili market twice 
daily by council
a few residential areas 
daily by youth groups
other places occasionally 
by the council if the waste 
becomes a nuisance 
CBD daily by council
bus park daily by council
Sofia market weekly by 
council
main market twice daily by 
council
other places occasionally 
by the council if the waste 
becomes a nuisance
CBD daily by council
market daily
bus park daily
Along the main road 
(Kisii-Migori) from 
residential areas daily
other places occasionally 
by the council if the waste 
becomes a nuisance
Transport equipment 1 tipper, 1 tractor 1 tipper, 1 tractor 1 tractor
Disposal site about 1 km from CBD, 
next to a hospital and a 
river
about 1 km (within town 
residential area), no 
attendant, not fenced
about 5 kms from CBD, no 
attendant, not fenced
Private involvement some youth groups in 
waste collection
some CBOs involved in 
street sweeping
none
Source: Author’s construction from field interviews and councils’ records, 2009.
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local authorities are considered to be closest to the public as opposed to a national or regional 
government. Though the Local Government Act Cap 265 allows these local authorities to have 
joint operations, it does not specify which organisational models these authorities can take on. 
Interviews conducted in each council with officers responsible for waste management revealed 
that the three councils had never considered inter-municipal cooperation to provide solid waste 
management service. The officers gave a number of reasons why this is the case and this included: 
the different resource allocations for different activities in each council and the desire to maintain 
that autonomous status in running their services which according to them would be eroded by such 
cooperation. One public health officer in Kisii responded to the question on cooperation by asking;
Who would allow us to take our waste to their jurisdiction and why should we allow 
others to bring their waste to our town?
These sentiments seem to have been fuelled partly by indictments over poor performance by small 
councils in Nyanza Province by the government because the field interviews were conducted not 
long after the following press report was released:
A new performance report released by the Government indicts civic authorities in 
Nyanza over poor performance. The province has produced eight of the ten worst 
performing local authorities. Besides, the region’s 37 local authorities did not feature 
in the best ten among Kenya’s 175 local authorities. According to the evaluation report 
released last month by President Kibaki, the poor performers are the town councils 
of Keroka, Nyamache, Masimba, Yala, Ogembo and Suneka. Others were Homabay 
County Council and Migori Municipal Council. According to experts, the poor showing 
is a result of the authorities’ small sizes. Ten out of the 27 civic authorities in the region 
are categorised as ‘small,’ hence their limited viability’. Government Indicts Councils 
over Performance by Mangoa Mosota, Standard Newspaper 23rd June 2008.
The three towns under study are all in Nyanza province and this poor performance had led to 
talks of merging such small councils.15 The stakeholder workshop held in Kisumu that brought the 
different councils official from the three councils together however, provided room for discussions 
which allowed them to understand both the opportunities and challenges of inter-municipal 
cooperation in SWM.
For a long time, SWM in these councils has not been prioritised and has been reduced to 
just one of the several functions under the public health department as in Kisii and Migori or 
the engineers department as in Homabay. The impact of this situation has been that appropriate 
allocations for personnel, budget and finances, vehicles and equipment have received low priority 
while other ‘more important’ departments were allocated more resources. For instance, in Migori 
municipality, in the financial year 2007-2008, their Local Authority Transfer fund allocation was 
Kshs 26,670,627 (USD 381,009) (see Annex 5 for LATF allocation to the three councils over the 
15 Political Pride is no Reason to Turn Villages into Districts, Mike Owuor, Local Daily Newspaper, The 
Standard Edition 20th March 2009.
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years). Their total expenditures on waste management were Kshs 2,937, 651 (USD 41,966), out of 
which only Kshs 339,000 (USD 4,843) was used on equipment and Kshs 150,000 (USD 2,143) on 
maintenance, the rest (83.4%) was used for worker’s remuneration. The revenue from waste was 
only a paltry Kshs 257,000 (USD 3,671) as compared to the figure of expenditures. Establishing 
the Department of Environment in each council with its own budgetary allocation and seeing to 
it that the funds generated by the department are ring fenced for operation and maintenance will 
probably empower these councils in seeking solutions to SWM even beyond their jurisdictions.
Equity concerns
The three local authorities receive almost similar allocations from the Local Authority Transfer 
Fund (LATF). In the Financial Year 2008/2009, they got the following allocations:
• Migori USD 427,158
• Homabay USD 456,551
• Kisii  USD 409,572
These figures (and even those for previous years) do not show huge differences, which means that 
there would be no major equity concerns when it comes to cooperation amongst them. There 
are no clear rich or poor councils. The LATF is a reflection of the service provision and in turn 
the revenue because it is disbursed to improve service delivery and financial management, and 
to reduce the outstanding debt of the local authorities. At least 7% of the total fund is shared 
equally among the country’s 175 local authorities; 60% of the fund is disbursed according to the 
relative population size of the local authorities. The balance is shared out based on the relative 
urban population densities. The likely challenge here is the amount that each council allocates 
to waste management.
5.3.3 Waste generation
Substantial solid waste is generated daily in these three municipalities. The typical municipal waste 
stream contains general waste (organics and recyclables), special wastes (household hazardous, 
medical and industrial waste), and construction and demolition debris. The waste stream is mixed 
because there is no separation or waste sorting done at the point of waste generation.
According to the field interviews, the generation rates are approximately 0.5 kgs per person per 
day (see report by CAS Consultants, 2005). This gives the following estimations of the quantity 
of waste generated per day in the year 2008:
• Kisii  39 tons
• Homabay 36 tons
• Migori 62 tons
The figures are estimated to increase together with the population growth (see Table 5.4). While 
these amounts may seem modest compared to the 1-2 kgs per person per day generated in 
developed countries, the problem is that most wastes in these councils is not collected through 
the municipal collection systems because of among other reasons inadequate waste management 
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resources. To be noted is that, over 70% of the waste generated in the councils is organic and this 
can be explained by their geographical location and economic activities. These towns are located 
within a very rich agricultural hinterland especially Kisii town. Fishing is a main income earner 
for the inhabitants of Homabay, while agriculture is also the major income earner in Migori. These 
agricultural and fishing activities generate considerable organic waste.
5.3.4 Collection and transportation
For health reasons, given that all three municipalities are in equatorial climates (highland equatorial 
for Kisii, inland equatorial for Homabay and mild inland equatorial for Migori) which means they 
witness relatively high temperatures, waste should actually be collected daily. This consideration 
makes the challenges and costs of solid waste management in these towns even more daunting. 
Moreover, because when services are available they generally are provided to the CBD and the 
wealthier neighbourhoods. In other areas, uncollected wastes accumulate at roadsides, are burned 
by the residents, or are disposed of in illegal dumps which leads to environmental pollution and 
increases the risks of disease outbreaks.
In all three municipalities, the solid waste generation exceeds the existing collection capacity. 
On average the amount collected does not go beyond 30% of the total quantity of waste generated 
for each town. For instance, Kisii Municipal Council has only one tipper and one tractor with the 
following dimensions (see Table 5.3):
• A Ford Model 5030 tractor with a non-tipping trailer. Trailer body dimensions 3.2×1.9×0.6 
m heaped = 3.6 m3.
• An Isuzu tipping truck. Truck body dimensions 3.2×2.3×0.9 m heaped = 6.6 m3.
The tractor/trailer collects four loads of waste generated per day (five days per week) while the 
truck collects three loads per day (five days per week) and deliver them to the disposal site. Based 
on Manus (2005), the average density of waste in this town is 450 kg/m3 (500 kg/m3 from the 
market and 400 kg/m3 from other transfer points). Calculating the total amount of waste that 
Table 5.4. Population projected versus waste generated per day.
Municipalities Population		
growth	rate1
2008 2010 2015
pop. tons/day pop. tons/day pop. tons/day
Kisii 2.0% 77,983 39 81,134 41 89,554 45
Homa-bay 2.7% 71,552 36 75,468 38 86,221 43
Migori 2.9% 123,541 62 130,810 65 150,910 76
Total 273,076 137 287412 144 326,685 164
1 Population growth rates are taken from the Central Bureau of Statistics in Kenya based on 1999 
population census.
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the two vehicles are able to transport to the dumpsite per day combining this information on the 
dimensions of the vehicles, the density of the waste and the loads per day would give:
• 8.91 tons/day for the truck;
• 6.48 tons/day for the tractor/trailer.
In total only 15.39 tons/days out of the 39 tons/day generated in Kisii ends up in the dumping site. 
It is generally considered that a collection rate of 80% provides a good service as it is estimated 
that 20% will be removed from the waste stream by recycling or composting. This means that 
whether the council retains the use of the existing models of vehicles or modifies them to include a 
skip trailer for example, there would still be a need to increase their numbers by 3 to 5 more (that 
includes a spare in case of breakdown) to efficiently manage the increasing quantities of waste.
As of July 2009, with the help of UN-Habitat, Homabay Council had acquired three 60 hp 
tractors with trailers for waste transportation, and a similar gesture was to be extended to Kisii 
under the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation initiative. In terms of their depreciation rate these 
tractors are considered to have a long life span (10 years) as compared to trucks (7 years) and 
they are also cost-effective given the short haul distance to the disposal site. This means that with 
proper maintenance and operation, the councils will be able each to handle their waste collection 
‘in-house’ and there would not be significant economies of scale when considering common 
collection arrangements. Though the councils expressed their desire to manage their own waste 
collection (to the council officials from interviews conducted, this was a mark of autonomy for 
each council), without the input from UN-habitat there would be greater economies of scale in 
inter-municipal cooperation. This option could entail for instance contracting collection out to 
one firm that would serve the three towns. Another option, purchase of standard vehicles was 
one of the issues identified for cooperation by the participants at the Kisumu workshop. This is 
because acquiring just one small tipping truck (an Isuzu NQR for example with the same load 
capacity as the tractor/trailer) would cost USD 40,000 and above (Manus, 2005), a figure which 
far exceeds the total expenditure for waste in the municipality of Migori for instance.
Collection by all the three councils is done at no fee at all, the refuse collection charge (RCC) 
collected from the business and commercial areas are used to subsidise the service to low income 
areas which cannot afford to pay the collection charges. This, according to field interviews, 
is considered a fair practice on the basis that the low-income areas purchase their food and 
clothing from local traders who in turn purchase from the larger traders in the business areas, 
thus any RCC paid by the commercial areas ‘trickles down’ to the lower income areas as a cost 
increase on their purchases. On the other hand though, interviews with the council officials in 
all the towns revealed that these RCCs are not adequate to cater for the SWM budget in total and 
this is evident is the inconsistencies of waste collection in the residential areas by the council. 
Introducing user fees for household waste collection for the in-house collection arrangement in 
each council would make it more sustainable. This way the councils would be able to take care of 
the operations and maintenance necessary for the equipment given to them by UN-Habitat next 
to the other collection tasks.
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Transfer stations
Of the three councils, only Homabay municipality has transfer stations in the form of four 
designated transfer points built in concrete and situated in the CBD, main market and residential 
estates (see Figure 5.3). The town engineer informed that these transfer stations were constructed 
with help from UN-Habitat. In Migori, residents put the waste at certain dumping points by the 
roadside which is then picked up by the municipal workers. In Kisii, certain households served by 
the private collectors use polythene bags and collection is door to door, while those in the CBD 
use litter bins and the rest of the households dump their waste at certain dumping points by the 
roadside which is then picked by the council workers. Participants at both Kisumu and Bukoba 
workshops showed interest in the technology of transfer stations constructed in Homabay. They 
looked at it as a best practice that could be shared with other councils after they learnt at the 
workshop that they could actually seek financial help from UN-Habitat for it.
According to Cointreau (2005), transfer facilities have only modest economies of scale – a 
small-scale transfer station would handle 80-120 tons/day, thus serving up to 240,000 people/daily 
shift. With Homabay having its own, the councils can each consider having their own transfer 
stations. This however, would only work if the locations of the current disposal sites are retained. 
In the event that a common disposal site for the three councils is considered and that the travel 
Figure 5.3. A transfer station in Homabay municipal councel.
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time to this site exceeds 30 minutes (Bartone, 2000), then the option of common transfer stations 
would be more attractive.
5.3.5 Disposal
Most of the waste collected is deposited in open dumps (see Figures 5.4 and 5.5) which as mentioned 
earlier, are relatively near the CBD and residential areas for all the three municipalities. These 
dumpsites are potential breeding grounds for disease-causing vectors. The town engineer in 
charge of SWM in Homabay indicated that the council burns the waste at the dumpsite to reduce 
its volume but they are still faced with the challenge of the accumulating the ash from the burnt 
material. Smoke from burning refuse may also be damaging to the health of nearby residents 
while the smell degrades the quality of life. Of special concern is also in all the three councils, 
the presence of medical (hospital) waste in the municipal waste stream which poses immense 
danger especially to the staff working at the dumpsite and those people scavenging the dumpsite.
This situation shows that the current way of disposal is not sustainable. A feasibility study 
done by CAS consultants in 2005 for Kisii and Homabay already stated that the current disposal 
sites should face closure in less than five years. However, NEMA recommends a move towards 
developing landfills whose costs are very prohibitive for such small councils working individually.
Figure 5.4. Disposal site in Homabay municipal council.
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Based on the studies mentioned, the estimated costs of a sanitary landfill in Kisii municipality 
for instance, excluding the costs for constructing the access road and acquiring the land, are shown 
in Table 5.5. These costs include: ground works (excavation and fill), tracks and building (site 
office/workshop/store), fence, bottom water proofing, leakage drainage system, leakage treatment 
system and gas collection. The figures show estimated costs for landfills occupying different surfaces 
assuming the piling depth is 10 m. These costs far exceed even the LATF allocation for Kisii (for 
instance, in the FY 2008/09 the total allocation was USD 409,573) yet the LATF allocation is not 
only intended for SWM.
Figure 5.5. Designated disposal site in Kisii municipal council.
Table 5.5. The estimated costs of constructing a sanitary landfill in Kisii Municipality (adapted from 
feasibility study by CAS consultants for the Republic of Kenya, 2005).
Surface Lifespan Cost	in	USD	
2 ha 5 years 811,800
5 ha 13 years 2,029,500
10 ha 8 years 1,217,700
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There are significant economies of scale when it comes to the disposal and treatment of waste. 
For a sanitary landfill, the economies-of-scale are based on the need to fully utilise heavy landfill 
equipment that has an adequate compaction ability, as well as the ability to push, spread, grade and 
cover waste. Typically, a landfill should handle at least 300 tons/day (from up to 600,000 people/
daily shift) (see Cointreau, 2005). These figures can only be realised when the three councils under 
study cooperate and include the smaller town councils between them.
A common landfill was also one of the suggestions for cooperation raised by the participants 
at the Kisumu workshop. Therefore considering the amounts of waste, the population served and 
the costs of construction, a common landfill would be more attractive as the costs can be shared 
amongst the councils. Issues of location of such landfill, odour and traffic to the landfill will need 
to be taken to consideration as costs and benefits cannot be distributed equally among all the 
councils. To come to an agreement, the councils will have to consider tradeoffs. Incorporation of 
smaller town councils that lie in the midst of these three, who are likely to face externalities from 
the cooperation, could serve to increase the amounts of waste generated and population served 
to realise the needed economies of scale. Voluntary agreements would offer a suitable mode to 
seek their incorporation.
5.3.6 Recovery and re-use
Plastic waste
Recovery and re-use of waste is done on individual (person) basis. In Kisii for instance, there 
are business men involved in collecting scrap and plastics from scavengers which is then sold in 
large quantities to bigger firms and transported to Nairobi. Table 5.6 gives details on the quantity 
of plastic collected per day and the quantity sold from two firms. From interviews with the two 
firms’ representatives, the average quantity sold is calculated taking into consideration weekends 
and market days when the amount collected is higher than the recorded 300 kgs per day for 
instance for Ngab scrap dealers and the quantity is usually lower on certain days of the week thus 
the average figure of 2,000 kgs per week.
There was no evidence of a junk shop or plastic waste collection yard in Homabay and Migori. 
The officers in charge of SWM in these two councils reported that plastic recycling is done by 
individuals on a smaller scale and sold at the market on a retail basis for storing paraffin and water.
Though participants at the Kisumu workshop were enthusiastic about a joint recycling plant 
and getting a viable market for the products, the total amount generated, given that the two firms 
in Kisii are the major plastic waste dealers, is not enough to warrant a common plant for the three 
Table 5.6. Plastic recycling in Kisii municipality.
Recycling	individual Quantity	collected Quantity	sold Cost	per	kilo
Ngab scrap dealer 300 kg per day average 2,000 kgs per week buying at Kshs 8, selling at Kshs 12
Masosa Jua kali 250-500 kg per day average 3000 kgs per week buying at Kshs 8, selling at Kshs 12
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centres. Instead, the plastic waste from the three towns can be collected and shredded to add value 
to it and then sold at higher price to processors in Nairobi. This can be done by a private firm.
This conclusion is reached based on reviewing the profiles of firms involved in plastic recycling 
in Nakuru and Nairobi (Kenya) and in other countries, in order to compare amounts of plastic 
wastes used and cost of a recycling plant. The profile of a plastic waste recycling firm in Nairobi 
is given in Box 5.1.
Organic waste
As mentioned earlier, over 70% of the waste generated in these councils is organic. At the 
stakeholders’ workshop, an environmental officer from Migori pointed out that at certain times 
of the year, there are farmers who request the council workers transporting the waste to dump 
it on their farms as farm manure. This is done at a small fee agreed between the worker and the 
farm owner. While this is waste re-use in some way, the fact that it is done unofficially and that 
the waste is not sorted, poses health risks to the people involved.
According to Cointreau (2005), municipal compost facilities using mechanised equipment 
would be economic with capacities of 200 tons/day (from up to 400,000 people/daily shift) to 
enable the full use of loading and turning machinery. Looking at projections on the population 
and the waste generated in the coming years (see Table 5.4), it would be economically interesting to 
construct a large compost plant serving the three councils. Considering waste from smaller town 
councils in the midst of these three would help to augment the amounts and achieve economies 
of scale.
Research done by Manus Coffey (2005) for UN-Habitat on LVWATSAN shows that the 
dumpsites in particular those in Kisii and Homabay present possibilities of producing biogas as 
a recovery measure.
Processing plants such as waste-to-energy plants and anaerobic digesters need to have duplicate 
process lines so that one keeps on working while the other is down for maintenance and repair. It 
is noted that for economies of scale, they need typically at least 300 tons/day (from up to 600,000 
Box	5.1.	Green	Africa.
This is a plastic recycling firm in Nairobi, Kenya owned by Mr. Evans Githinji. Green Africa 
recycles plastics into fencing poles; has a staff of 24 employees, and 23 collection yards. They get 
a supply of 3 to 4 tons daily and per kilo they pay 15 Kenya cents (USD 0.002). It takes fifteen 
minutes to produce one pole and the firm produces 100 poles per day. The firm owner bought 
the processing machine which is second hand at USD 14,286. The poles are sold locally and 
have become favourites particularly to flower farms and Kenya wildlife service because they are 
resistant to termite attack, to rot caused by moisture retention and to animal attacks. The cost 
of one plastic pole is Kshs 450 (USD 6.4) compared to a wooden pole which goes for between 
Kshs 200 to Kshs 250 (USD 2.9 to USD 3.60).
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people/daily shift) (Cointreau, 2005). This again can only be realised when the councils cooperate 
and put their organic waste together. At the Kisumu workshop the participants learnt about a 
bio-digester using slaughterhouse waste in Homabay that was put up with the help of UNIDO. 
It takes up 40 m3 of waste every week. This ignited discussions on possible options like having 
the other councils transport their slaughterhouse waste to Homabay or put up a bigger capacity 
digester or each council having their own digester. The possibility of each council seeking help 
in terms of resources to construct its own bio-digester like Homabay appeared more attractive 
to the workshop participants. That Homabay already has its own digester, makes the option of 
constructing another joint plant unfeasible as Homabay may not join in the venture therefore not 
achieving economies of scale. Focusing on waste from slaughter houses, it is possible to consider 
having small size affordable bio digesters that can be put up in each council.
5.3.7 Private sector involvement
The involvement of the private sector in waste collection is minimal and only evident in Kisii. In 
Kisii, some youth groups are involved in collecting waste from certain residential areas and the 
council records that these groups have managed to collect 10% of the total amount of waste collected 
in the town. In Homabay some CBOs take part in street sweeping and the occasional clean-up 
exercises. The private sector here is however, active in the plastic recycling as discussed above. 
A novel discovery is the inclusion of the private sector in the recently formed Multi Stakeholder 
Forums (MSFs) in Kisii and Homabay under the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Initiative. 
The MSFs are made up of representatives from the municipal council, CBOs, NGOs, private 
entities (business) and other stakeholders. The MSFs are introduced to promote accountability and 
increase public access to information. These MSFs in the councils are some form of accountability 
networks (Scott, 2000) that ensure that interventions are developed and implemented in a manner 
that is informed by and responds to the needs of the local stakeholders. The MSFs are also set 
up to ensure transparency and corruption-free implementation of projects because among them 
are members selected to be part of projects implementation units which allow the monitoring of 
projects’ progress and this is necessary for inter-municipal cooperation.
5.4 Possible organisational models for inter-municipal cooperation in Kenya
Based on the study findings on solid waste management problems in these towns and the wider 
institutional settings (legal and administrative situation) in Kenya, several different organisational 
models are applicable. These options are presented below.
1. Joint boards/joint production. The legislation in Kenya allows for the creation of joint boards, 
in particular, the Local Government Act Cap 265 which guides the functions of all local 
authorities. PART VII section 104 -106 of the Act makes a provision for the creation of Joint 
Boards amongst local authorities similar to those presented by Dollery and Johnson (2005) 
as ‘joint production.’ This creation of a joint board would make it possible for the councils to 
put their resources together and get, for instance, into a joint venture of organic waste re-use. 
When the councils would put their re-usable waste together, the amount increases which 
would make it viable to consider the option of putting up a local plant.
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2. Commercial sector, in particular private contracting. The Local Government Act PART IX section 
143 empowers local authorities to enter into contracts. They can jointly seek the services of a 
private entity similar to what EPA (1994) categorises under the commercial sector. This option 
would allow the councils, for instance, to source a firm to transport waste from the transfer 
stations to a common landfill.
3. Regional organisation of councils. There are existing regional bodies which provide good 
platforms for inter-municipal cooperation. There is for instance, the Lake Victoria Region 
Local Authorities Corporation (LVRLAC) which acts as a Trust for those local authorities 
who are members. There is also the Lake Victoria Basin Commission.
Such regional organisations could also work as regional councils as classified by EPA (1994) or 
what Dollery and Johnson (2005) refer to as a regional organisation of councils. The regional 
councils provide a regional agenda that complements the self-organising SWM mechanism 
of the individual member local authorities.
Given that the three councils all belong to LVRLAC, the councils can with the help of LVRLAC 
source for funding to obtain SWM resources. They can further harmonise any conflicting goals 
and objectives of waste management by developing binding agreements. As a starting point 
towards cooperation, using such an existing regional body to facilitate development in solid 
waste management is preferable, since the connections between local governments have already 
been established and financial and technical experience is being built through various projects. 
Such an organisation is likely to have considerable political and financial independence. This 
autonomy helps the regional organisation to sustain cooperative partnerships among councils 
and execute projects in an environment free of individual council politics. Councils could go 
further and set up an advisory board or establish a reporting structure for the organisation 
that ensures proper oversight.
Even with such legal provisions, there are no clear specifications of how to avoid conflicts or cases 
of free-riders as relates to inter-municipal cooperation and in particular, cooperation in solid 
waste management. As much as informal agreements would offer an easier and flexible option, it 
is important that the terms and conditions for cooperation agreement are committed to writing. 
A written document helps to ensure that all parties are aware of their respective responsibilities, 
and it facilitates review and approval of the agreement by the appointed board or the oversight 
unit. And from the different options presented, the regional organisation of councils seems to offer 
more possibilities for cooperation as an immediate solution. This is because such an organisation is 
already in place and would provide the needed structure to kick- start the cooperation process. This 
would reduce the logistical costs that would have otherwise been used in setting up a joint board 
or an oversight organisation to oversee cooperation or even supervise a private firm contracted 
to provide service jointly to the three councils.
5.5 Modernised mixtures and multi-level governance
In tandem with the arguments of the Modernised Mixtures approach, the multi-level governance 
concept, not only brings a shift in governance but also seeks to address local challenges in a manner 
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that considers the limited resources available to the small urban centres in the lake basin region 
thereby ensuring flexibility and robustness.
From the field work, it becomes clear that certain funds for service delivery flow from the 
national level to local authorities, but that the primary responsibility of waste management lies 
with the local authorities.
The multiplicity in levels of governance comes in because first, not all functions will necessarily 
be handled in-house, that is each council on its own, and some may have to be handled in 
cooperation (see Table 5.7):
• local policy determination: single council decides how the waste will be collected e.g. outsourced 
or in-house), and on which days;
• local management: single council handles the administrative aspects of waste management 
(i.e. human resources);
• local service delivery: single council delivers the service with staff contracted to it, on its terms 
and conditions.
• in cooperation policy determination: policy decisions such as how the waste will be treated 
and when, are made by a group of councils;
• in cooperation management: administration is handled by a body like a joint board or an 
oversight unit in a regional council;
• in cooperation service delivery: staff delivering the service are contracted to a joint board or 
an oversight unit in a regional council; rather than individual councils.
The field interviews and the stakeholder workshop revealed that the councils would like to remain 
autonomous and therefore handle the primary functions in policy making. Service delivery and 
management on the other hand could be done in house or in cooperation. They were however 
categorical that waste collection is a function they would like to see remain in-house because they 
believe this is a first mark of autonomy for each council in SWM.
The stakeholders at the workshop were also in agreement that certain capital-intensive programs 
like putting up a landfill would be best done in cooperation because of the cost implications 
Table 5.7. Possible service provision structures.1 
Function/	activity Policy	determined Service	managed Service	delivered
Option 1 locally locally locally
Option 2 locally locally in cooperation
Option 3 locally in cooperation locally
Option 4 locally in cooperation in cooperation
Option 5 in cooperation locally in cooperation
Option 6 in cooperation locally locally
Option 7 in cooperation in cooperation locally
Option 8 in cooperation in cooperation in cooperation
1 Constructed by the author guided by information compiled from reviewing literature.
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involved. Therefore from the 8 options given in Table 5.7, Options 1 to 4 would work well as they 
allow local policy determination and option 8 on cooperation in all areas comes in where capital 
intensive projects are involved.
Second, there is also the interplay between a private and a state ordering as explained by 
Picciotto (2008) as he characterises multi-level global governance. Picciotto argues that regulation 
typically involves a mixture of legal forms, both public and private, and an interplay between 
state and private ordering, or, frequently, the emergence of norms with a hybrid status. For 
instance, for all the 8 options listed in the table above, the councils may decide to involve private 
contractors in the collection and transportation of waste or even the construction of a landfill. 
In Kisii for instance, there are already private collectors whose role in waste management could 
be strengthened by legitimising them and providing assistance like secondary collection of their 
waste. The existence of multi-stakeholder forums at the council level serves to ensure input from 
public and private actors.
Local realities, like institutional organisation, resource availability, the presence of non-state 
actors which are key to the MMA, are therefore also taken into consideration in multi-level 
governance. These local realities should hereby be described through the lenses of subsidiarity and 
local responsiveness, economies of scale and externalities, participation, access and accountability 
to local decisions and equity. In the end, the aim is to seek an appropriate mix of institutions, and 
financial and technical resources.
5.6 Conclusion
Multi-level governance, particularly its type II form is characterised by task-specific (instead of 
general purpose) jurisdictions, intersecting memberships and a flexible design that is responsive to 
temporary needs. In this type II form of MLG, jurisdictions may very well span several (territorially 
or otherwise defined) levels. This allows this study to consider inter-municipal cooperation to 
address solid waste management amongst Kenya’s small urban centres in the Lake Victoria Basin.
Solid waste management within each of the three councils under study remains a daunting 
task right from generation to disposal and re-use/recycling. According to the field study, these 
three councils experience somewhat similar solid waste management problems as is evident in 
their institutional organisation, the amounts of wastes that remain uncollected, inefficient waste 
transportation, dumpsites that face closure and recycling/re-use efforts that need to revamped. 
Efforts from non-state actors where present remain limited. The latest information reveals that 
as of July 2009, UN-Habitat had donated 3 tractors to Homabay and a similar gesture was to be 
extended to Kisii under the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation initiative. This is an early indication 
that certain functions within the waste chain can still be handled in-house, by each council on 
its own. However, there are other functions that will need inter-municipal cooperation because 
of, besides other reasons, the economies of scale. Among these functions are the putting up of a 
common landfill and a central compost plant. The existing institutional and legislative framework 
in Kenya allows municipalities to develop such cooperative ventures. There are also organisational 
models that present themselves for adoption in the event of such cooperation, for instance, joint 
boards and regional councils. The study presents alongside the discussion certain challenges that 
would need to be addressed for inter-municipal cooperation to be possible. While there are clear 
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obstacles to inter-municipal cooperation, it also presents opportunities for joint problem solving. 
Without necessarily being consolidated under one unit, the local authorities can manage some 
of the SWM problems across jurisdictions using the different methods or approaches to inter-
municipal cooperation discussed. Multi-level governance mechanism would thus complement 
the self-organising mechanism of individual local authorities. It should be noted though that 
given the different governance arrangements in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, these conclusions 
are specific to the small urban councils in Kenya. These conclusions are particularly applicable to 
towns that have geographical proximity and share somewhat similar SWM problems.

Modernising solid waste management at municipal level 119
Chapter 6. 
Regional organisations and networks in cross border SWM at 
municipal level
6.1 Introduction
When local governments confront common regional problems, they can pursue the benefits of 
coordination with other local entities through regional governance organisations such as regional 
councils of governments or regional partnerships (Kwon, 2007).With environmental concerns 
having transcended most political boundaries, Erie and Mackenzie, (2007), posit that there is 
greater need for coordination across these boundaries to solve transportation, environmental and 
other infrastructure-related challenges. Building on Chapter 5 therefore, this empirical chapter 
seeks to answer research question four which is: What is the role of regional organisations and 
networks in enhancing cross border solid waste management amongst municipalities in the Lake 
basin?
To answer this, the chapter first presents the institutional context for cooperation in the Lake 
Victoria Basin. Guided by conceptual framework 2, presented in Chapter 2, the institutional context 
at the regional, national and municipal level is discussed as a first step in looking at cross country 
municipal cooperation. Here emphasis is made on identifying the constraining and enabling 
factors to such cooperation. This is followed by a section on regional arrangements under which 
two regional organisations are presented. These are the Lake Victoria Basin Commission and the 
Lake Victoria Region Local Authorities Cooperation which are considered as representing the 
formal and informal regional structures respectively and which have been involved in SWM in 
one way or another in the lake basin. These organisations are assessed for their role in SWM by 
the municipalities in the lake basin by looking at municipal autonomy in decision making and 
resource availability. The aim of this study being to find out how cross border cooperation is actually 
put into practice and in turn point to feasible options for adequate institutional arrangements in 
the regional context
6.2 Background-institutional context for cooperation
This section gives a background discussion on the institutional context for cooperation at the 
regional, national and municipal level, mentioning the enabling and constraining factors to 
cooperation at the three levels.
6.2.1 The East African community context
The East African Community (EAC) context is the regional context, whereby EAC refers to the 
Republic of Kenya, the Republic of Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania (and most recently 
also Rwanda and Burundi) who together as contracting parties signed for its re-establishment 
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under the EAC treaty of 1999. This history of working together sets the ground for regional and 
sub-regional cooperation that affects the three countries.
Enabling and constraining factors for cooperation
There are legislative and organisational factors that enable cooperation between the three countries 
bordering Lake Victoria. The EAC treaty of 1999 certainly sets the pace with its general objective 
being to develop policies and programs aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among 
the partner states in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology, 
defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit. Articles 87, 104, 111 and 
112 are some of the provisions in the treaty that provide the legal back-up for cooperation in joint 
project financing, and in the free movement of persons, labour and services. Specific mentioning 
of environment and natural resource management is done in:
• Article 111 section 2
a. to preserve, protect and enhance the quality of the environment;
b. to contribute towards the sustainability of the environment;
• Article 112 section 1
a. to develop a common environmental management policy that would sustain the eco-
systems of the partner states, prevent, arrest and reverse the effects of environmental 
degradation;
d. to take measures to control trans-boundary air, land and water pollution arising from 
developmental activities.
All these provisions though general on trade, movement of persons and environmental issues, cover 
waste management in one way or another and have a bearing on Lake Victoria Basin which is a 
shared resource amongst the three (but also including Rwanda and Burundi) as shown in Table 6.1.
Each partner state according to the treaty is to designate a ministry, with ministers who will 
belong to a council (one of the institutions under the EAC), that acts as the policy organ of the 
EAC. Today each state has a specific ministry to effect EA regional cooperation. The EAC organs, 
institutions and laws take precedence over similar national ones on matters pertaining to the 
Table 6.1. Lake Victoria surface area, shoreline and basin area per country (FAO, 2000).
Country Lake	surface	area Shoreline Tributary	basin
km2 % km % km2 %
Kenya 4,113 6 550 17 38,913 21.5
Tanzania 33,756 49 1,150 33 79,570 44.0
Uganda 31,001 45 1,750 50 28,857 15.9
Rwanda 0 0 0 0 20,550 11.4
Burundi 0 0 0 0 13,060 7.2
Total 68,870 100 3,450 100 180,950 100
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implementation of the EA Treaty. Emanating from the EAC, are regional organisations that offer 
a platform for cooperation.
Efforts of cooperation at this level however, are likely to face certain constraints, for instance, in 
its Articles 111-113, the treaty calls for common laws and strategies on the movement, trafficking 
and trade in hazardous waste. From the field research in both the primary urban centres and 
even the small urban centres introduced in Chapter 5, there is no segregation of waste at source 
or at the point of disposal (except for Jinja now) meaning that the chances of hazardous waste 
getting mixed with other waste at the disposal site are very high which could affect initial efforts 
of cross-country cooperation in SWM. This could be the case where for instance, neighbouring 
councils develop a common landfill and where the public is opposing the setting of such a facility. 
Yet it is important that the planning and decisions made at this regional level are in line with the 
practical situation at the local level.
Generally though, it is clear that the institutional context at the regional level already provides 
a framework that enables cooperation of the three countries under EAC.
6.2.2 National context
The national context like the regional level has constraining and enabling factors regarding cross-
border cooperation. The characteristics of the national administrative system (its federal or unitary 
character, the number of administrative levels and the distribution of responsibilities between the 
different tiers) and the position of the local government as a second, third or fourth tier in the 
administrative system of the respective countries provide the point of departure for cross-country 
inter-municipal cooperation, as they set the conditions that determine the necessity or possible 
advantages for cooperation in solid waste management.
Enabling and constraining factors
Apart from the regional framework in place, the three countries are also all unitary states with 
decentralised local governments. As mentioned in the previous chapters, they only have central 
and local level of government. Within the local levels of government, Tanzania and Uganda have 
higher and lower ones. Regional units within countries like Tanzania16 exist for administrative 
reasons but are not considered sub-ordinate government levels to the state as is the case with 
the local governments. These similarities in state structures are part of the conditions that make 
efforts in cross-country cooperation possible.
The level of decentralisation however differs between the three countries as alluded to in 
preceding chapters. Such differences in the levels of decentralization means that municipalities 
in the respective countries have different levels of administrative, fiscal and political autonomy. 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, the different countries have different conditions related to the 
16 In Tanzania, small Regional Secretariats were established  (with the enactment of Regional Administration 
Act No. 19 of 1997) to take the place of the regional development directorates which tended to duplicate 
the functions and responsibilities of the local government authorities. The Regional Secretariats have been 
given a redefined back-stopping role to the local government authorities within their area of jurisdiction.
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autonomy of budget-making accorded to local authorities by the central government, different 
systems of staff deployment and different percentages of funds devolved to local authorities. Still, 
in all the three countries urban authorities are responsible for SWM.
Generally, with regard to the institutional context at the national level, the factors constraining 
cooperation stand out more because the different levels of decentralisation in the three countries 
affect the urban authorities in particular where it concerns SWM.
6.2.3 Municipal council context
The Lake Victoria Basin has more than 80 urban authorities.17 These are categorised into:
• town councils and (Divisions in Uganda) which are the lowest level of urban authority;
• municipal councils;
• city councils which is the highest level of urban authority.
The combined number of city councils is as expected relatively small, there are fewer cities and 
more town/division councils in the lake basin. The size or scale of the towns may influence their 
involvement in collective activities. There are also other enabling and constraining factors in line 
with the level of discretion and the degree of autonomy that municipalities have in carrying out 
their SWM duties.
Enabling and constraining factors
At the moment, each urban council is managing its own waste (in its jurisdiction), and develops 
its own by-laws. This situation gives the councils a certain leverage in making certain decision 
concerning cooperation. There are SWM decisions however, like putting up a landfill that go 
beyond the level of a municipal authorities and require involvement and permission of a national 
environmental authority like National Environment Management Council (NEMC) in Tanzania 
and the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) in Kenya and Uganda. In Kenya 
for instance, NEMA is the body that issues licenses for landfills, transfer stations, recycling 
plants and incinerators. This organisation also issues permits on exporting hazardous waste and 
requires the exporter to get a prior informed consent document from the national authority of 
the receiving country.
Within their respective countries, local authorities are allowed to cooperate with each other. 
What the local government legislations do not explicitly mention is whether this cooperation can 
be extended to be cross country and therefore a common frame of reference for cooperation in 
SWM at this level is lacking.
Most of these councils especially for Uganda and Tanzania as discussed in Chapter 3, are also 
heavily dependent on central government funds and therefore priorities for the use of resources 
may be more inclined to national programs.
17 Given that membership of LVRLAC only totals up to more than 81 local authorities in Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania excluding Rwanda and Burundi.
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The institutional context for cooperation at the municipal level is thus very much dependent 
on the national level which as shown above is dominated with a number of constraining factors.
6.2.4 Methodology
Two organisations were purposively selected for further study because of their involvement in 
SWM of municipal councils but also because they give a clear representation of a statutory and 
a voluntary organisational arrangement.
The data used to inform this chapter were collected through a review of relevant documents 
with particular emphasis on the East African Community Treaty of 1999, the Protocol for 
Sustainable Development of The Lake Victoria Basin and the Lake Victoria Region Local Authorities 
Cooperation Strategic Plan 2009-2014. Two workshops also informed the discussion in this chapter:
• One held in Kisumu, January 2009 that brought together stakeholders from the small towns 
in Kenya (Kisii, Migori and Homabay) as mentioned in Chapter 5.
• Another in Bukoba in February 2009. It was spearheaded by LVRLAC and the participants 
came from local authorities in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania.
Interviews were held with resource persons in the municipalities and the relevant institutions 
as listed in Chapter 5. Observations on the status of the waste management infrastructure also 
informed this work. The interviews entailed questions (see Annex 6) that asked about the specific 
role of regional organisations in waste management (if any) and the existing networks as well as 
about future possibilities for cooperation in service provision.
Following prior qualitative work from document analysis and information drawn from the 
administered interviews that informed Chapter 5, together with information from the workshops, 
this chapter uses an open coding system to codify data. The data were then interpreted and 
conceptually ordered according to discussions of modernised mixture approach and regional 
governance. Conclusions drawn on the basis of this research help to bring to light the contributions 
from this study not only to waste management in East Africa but also to the body of knowledge 
on regional governance.
6.3 Institutional arrangements for cross country cooperation
Institutional arrangements at the regional context just like those discussed in preceding chapters 
in municipalities within specific countries, can be either formal or informal. Looking at these 
different arrangements is important because it is now clear that performance of institution-based 
development is likely to be undermined or enhanced by the nature of the institutional arrangement.
Figure 6.1 below shows a continuum of regional arrangements showing increasing formalisation 
from one end with voluntary arrangements which in most cases are informal to statutory 
arrangements at the other end which are formal in nature. Different kinds of arrangements lie in 
between these extremes.
The voluntary regional arrangements are such that members (local governments) participate at 
will and must approve the regional council’s activities. The organisations have limited authority to 
force members to do what they do not want to do. Thus even though a formal institution has been 
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created, its operation remains heavily reliant on self-organising. The specific policy actions that 
such regional councils take are the product of bargaining and the available mechanisms of collective 
choice (Gerber and Gibson, 2005 in Sung, 2007). A challenge for this kind of arrangement is the 
negotiation about an equitable distribution of its benefits which will be affected by asymmetries 
in economic and political strengths between the actors/members.
Statutory regional arrangements such as, for instance, the regional districts are seen as 
formalised institutions aimed at promoting regional cooperation. They are likely to impede more 
ad-hoc forms of cooperation between the localities (see Mullin, 2007). They have less autonomy 
retained by the individual local government actors involved, in other words, there is reduced local 
control due to more regulated practices. Where transaction cost barriers to institutional collective 
action are substantial, voluntary regional governance arrangements may not be possible and 
statutory approaches such as the regional districts may be more efficacious (Feiock, 2007).Yet again 
the benefits of voluntary regionalism exceeds the transaction costs when the cooperation produces 
repeated interactions among the participants, compatible incentive structures, mechanisms to 
establish reputations, and linkages across various policies and issues.
To assess these arrangements, the following two benchmarks built in the modernised mixtures 
criteria are used:
• Municipal autonomy in decision making allows the study to establish the flexibility of the 
regional arrangement to incorporate decisions by municipal authorities in SWM interventions. 
Inherent in the autonomy is also the power of municipal authorities to act and act collectively, 
or what Davoudi and Evans (2005) refer to as political capital.
• Resource availability; for a regional arrangement to be viable in the long term, it must have 
or be able to mobilise resources commensurate with its policy agenda (Davoudi and Evans, 
2005). This assures the functioning of an organisation in performing its role in SWM at the 
municipal level and in turn guarantees its institutional sustainability to strengthen the networks 
amongst member municipalities. Resources here refer to both material and non-material.
6.4 Regional arrangements on SWM in the Lake Basin
Although there are a number of constraining factors as presented in the preceding section, the 
study learnt that there are nevertheless several regional arrangements that have been developed so 
far in the lake basin. These arrangements range from very light structures of mutual information 
Statutory 
arrangement
Voluntary 
arrangement
Increasing formalisation 
Figure 6.1. Continuum of regional arrangements.
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exchange via networking (equivalent of meeting, discussing, starting to coordinate actions in 
workshops, seminars) to more formal bonding /organisation on SWM. The arrangements involve 
small urban centres and in some cases a mix of the larger and small urban centres indicating 
that the variations in scale/size of the urban centres has not been particularly a constraining 
factor. The different kinds of cooperative arrangement depict some kind of networked polity, 
where state institutions are working with non-state institutions especially under the voluntary 
arrangement model of cooperation (Annex 7 shows part of the outcomes of the Bukoba workshop 
where participants drew a list of the potential and ongoing activities under SWM carried out 
in cooperation). The study however elaborates further on two regional organisations which 
represent the opposite ends of the continuum (in Figure 6.1). These two are the Lake Victoria Basin 
Commission (LVBC) and the Lake Victoria Region Local Authorities Cooperation (LVRLAC) 
which are categorised by the study as statutory and voluntary respectively.
Under each organisation, the place of the municipal authority within the organisation is 
discussed. Using the benchmarks of municipal autonomy and resource availability, the organisations 
are assessed for their role in SWM and finally a typical case of their interventions in SWM is 
presented.
6.4.1 Lake Victoria Basin Commission (statutory)
The Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) is a specialised institution of the EAC that is 
responsible for coordinating the sustainable development agenda of the Lake Victoria Basin. The 
study categorises it as a statutory body because it was established by the Protocol For Sustainable 
Development of the Lake Victoria Basin under its Article 33 in 2001 as a permanent apex institution 
of the community responsible for the lake basin. This means it is legally mandated to perform 
the activities it is accorded.
The objectives and broad functions of the secretariat of the commission is to promote, coordinate 
and facilitate development initiatives within the Lake Victoria Basin. The commission envisages 
a broad partnership of the local communities around the lake, the East African Community and 
its partner states as well as the development partners.
The place of municipalities within the organisation
LVBC’s mandate is spread over three partner states (Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania) and therefore 
all urban authorities in the Lake Victoria Basin are covered by LVBC’s work. Recently, Rwanda 
and Burundi have become part of LVBC too. There is no membership arrangement.
Organisational arrangement
The organogram in Figure 6.2 depicts the organisation’s arrangement however, the municipalities 
do not feature anywhere. This is despite the fact that the commission has a number of programs 
at the local level. There is a Sectoral Council which is the principal policy and decision making 
organ for the commission but its members are Ministers from the partner states, which therefore 
means that the emphasis for the use of resource is likely to be on national programs and not on 
specific municipal council needs. Municipal councils may therefore merely benefit from programs 
that have been identified by others at the national level.
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The coordination Committee comprises of all Permanent Secretaries from the three Partner 
States whose Ministries’ mandates relate to the Lake Victoria Basin Commission, particularly Water, 
Agriculture, Transport, Communication, Energy, Tourism and Wildlife, Fisheries, Environment 
and Economic development. Again here, the permanent secretaries are the non-political civil 
service heads in their respective ministries and are thus more aligned to the national level policies 
and interests. The committee submits reports and recommendations to the Sectoral Council on 
the implementation of the Protocol for Sustainable Development of the basin.
The Sectoral Committees are composed of senior officials of partner states, heads of public 
institutions, representatives of regional institutions, representatives of business and industry and 
civil society. These committees are responsible for coordinating regional activities, preparing 
comprehensive implementation of programs and submit from time to time reports and 
recommendations from the working groups. While civil society could have served as a close 
representation of the local level interests and concerns, field work findings18 revealed however, 
that there is not yet a formal collaboration between the Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) 
and the Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) who are supposedly part of the committees. There has 
been no deliberate involvement of CSOs in Sectoral Committees as proposed nor in the working 
groups and other operational/advisory structures set up to tap into their views on planned policies 
and strategies.
The secretariat of the Commission whose headquarters is based in Kisumu (Kenya) is responsible 
for coordinating the preparation, negotiation and implementation of national and regional programs. 
Specific functions include establishing a regional database and promoting the sharing of information, 
facilitating research and studies on sustainable development of the basin, mobilising resources for 
implementation of projects and programs among other administrative duties.
18 Report of the national consultative meeting held between Uganda civil society organizations and LVBC 
on 30th April 2009, Kampala Uganda
Lake Victoria basin commission
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Figure 6.2. Organogram of Lake Victoria Basin Commission (author’s construction from field data).
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This arrangement on the whole has no place for municipal/local authorities and given the 
involvement of LVBC at the local level in among others, SWM projects/programs, the study 
concludes that programs that target municipal authorities are generated or decided upon at the 
national level.
Municipal autonomy in decision making
The organisational arrangement has a National Focal Point (NFP) in each partner state which are 
the main links between the specific program(s) and the partner states. They are also responsible for 
the coordination and harmonisation of the Lake Victoria Basin activities by the various Ministries, 
NGOs, special interest groups and other development partners in the partner states. Yet even 
for these NFPs which essentially constitutes the lowest level of contact, the arrangement is still 
centralised with national ministries from the partner states playing the lead role. This portrays 
the limited flexibility when it comes to the involvement of urban authorities in decision making 
within LVBC. Municipal authorities are thus not in a position to act collectively or push for an 
agenda at a regional level under this organisation’s framework and thus infrastructure-related 
interventions by LVBC are likely to remain restricted to individual municipal councils only. Where 
the commission has had a local level project like Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation Program 
(LVWATSAN), they had project management units at the national level, project implementation 
units at the town level and Multi-Stakeholder Forums. It should be noted though that these units 
at the local/town level only come in at the implementation stage of a project and not at its initial 
planning and design stage. The result of this situation is that interventions made at the local 
level may not necessarily respond to the immediate needs of the local authorities, instead local 
authorities may just welcome an intervention because it has been made available to them (see 
Box 6.1 for examples of interventions).
Resource availability and mobilisation within LVBC
Information/knowledge resources
From the field interviews in the small towns, the study learnt that within projects undertaken by 
LVBC urban councils have benefited from knowledge ranging from technical scientific knowledge 
presented by experts to experiential knowledge from non-experts shared during workshops.
LVBC has organised the sharing of knowledge amongst a number of local authorities particularly 
under the Lake Victoria Water and Sanitation program through workshops and exchange visits. 
LVWATSAN has involved small urban centres. The towns involved all vary significantly in terms 
of institutional strength and weaknesses and the availability of human and financial resources. 
Under LVWATSAN, a regional approach to training and capacity building has been introduced 
so that the towns can learn from each other particularly with regard to case studies, best practices 
and information on what works and what does not, across the region. Therefore there has been 
a free flow of information and knowledge amongst participating municipal councils which is 
essential for collective learning.
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LVBC has also organised a transfer of technical knowledge. Under LVWATSAN, for instance, 
Kisii Municipality in Kenya received small pick-ups for waste transfer and the study learnt that 
the council drivers benefited from technical training on how to use the vehicles.
Material resources
Finances: The primary funding mechanisms for the LVBC are contributions from the partner states. 
Funding also comes from development partners. Taking for instance, the budget for financial 
year 2007-2008 which was USD 2,858,519, partner states contribution was USD 1,664,019 and 
the funding from the development partners totaled USD 1,194,500. With its funding assured 
from partner states and development partners, LVBC portrays a more secure financial standing 
even as relates to its role in SWM than a voluntary organisations whose funds are dependent on 
membership subscription.
Staff: The functioning of the national focal points (NFP) in each partner state requires full-
time staff. From the field work, it was evident that under the current structure, the NFP officers 
in addition to the Lake Victoria Basin Commission have also other national responsibilities and 
Box	6.1.	Typical	cases	of	LVBC	intervention	through	LVWATSAN.
Kisii	municipality
Kisii is one of the small towns in Kenya that has benefitted from LVWATSAN. Field work in 
Kisii town revealed that in October 2008 the council was given waste transfer vehicles. A small 
pickup, manufactured by NDUME Engineering limited of Gilgil, also in Kenya, which uses a two 
wheeled tractor as a power source and has been modified to suit UN-Habitat’s requirements. It 
has a flat deck body with a very low loading height (see Figure 6.3). The flat body carries eight 
bins of waste which can be lifted onto or off the pick-up by hand. These little pickups are to be 
used to collect waste bins from businesses and residential premises and transfer them into large 
containers or low loading height trailers, which will then be transported to the disposal site. At 
the time of data collection - Dec 2008-April 2009 - the vehicles were still packed at the council 
parking area because they had no number plates (official registration) yet and therefore could 
not be put on the road to use.
Homabay	municipality
Homabay is another of the small towns found in Kenya that has benefitted from LVWATSAN. 
Apart from two pick-ups and collection bins like those received in Kisii town, Homabay also 
has been donated four concrete waste transfer stations (bunkers) built in the town (see Figure 
5.3). As already mentioned in Chapter 5, they are located:
one in the market /CBD emptied daily;
one in Sofia market away from CBD emptied weekly;
one in a site service scheme (residential) and another in Makongeni residential. These are 
emptied once a fortnight).
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hence are seriously overstretched and accordingly need beefing up. On the other hand, these 
staff are paid by partner states relieving LVBC off this burden and thus allowing LVBC to use its 
resources to undertake other things, including capital projects under SWM as is exemplified in 
Box 6.1. LVBC as an organisation is able to develop a ring fenced budget specifically for SWM.
Therefore from the angle of resource availability, material and non-material, LVBC is well 
positioned to intervene in SWM as a regional organisation but its interventions so far have 
remained oriented towards individual councils and not on cross-border cooperation.
These interventions bring out the supporting role of LVBC. It is actually providing back-up to 
the small urban centres in carrying out their traditional SWM tasks of collection, transportation 
and disposal of solid waste. LVBC has provided transportation vehicles and even built transfer 
points. The true success of these interventions in Box 6.1 can only be measured in the long term. 
The study however, questions the interventions as to whether they actually responded to the 
immediate needs of the municipal councils or whether the municipalities just welcomed the 
interventions because they were made available to them. This question is raised because taking the 
case of Kisii Municipality for instance, the vehicles were lying in the packing area more than six 
months after delivery which points to the lack of urgency for this intervention. Further, according 
to the Manus Coffey 2005 Consultancy report on SWM in Homabay and Kisii municipalities, 
organic wastes which remain in the corners of the bunkers decomposes thereby causing odour 
Figure 6.3. Pick-up for waste transfer.
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problems and also harbour a reserve of bacteria which then speed up the start of decomposition 
in subsequent wastes. All wastes must be removed completely at least every two days if the bunker 
is not to become a source of health problems. It should be noted though that the bunkers in the 
residential areas are emptied only once a fortnight and that even the bunker in Sofia market is only 
emptied once a week. See Figure 6.4 of an overflowing bunker in a residential area. This points to 
the low level of ecological and institutional sustainability of the interventions made.
Generally though, LVBC being a formal institution has had a number of strengths particularly 
when it comes to its access to resources. LVBCs sources are assured. As a result LVBC is able to 
develop interventions even in large scale SWM infrastructure thereby playing a supporting role 
to the small urban centres. That there is no place for the municipalities in this organisational 
arrangement however, points to the limited autonomy of the municipalities to take part in decision-
making and in turn influence the kind of interventions they receive. It also depicts their inability 
to act collectively with other municipalities under the LVBC framework.
Though the interventions so far have been within individual municipalities only, there are 
clear indications that this formal nature of LVBC and the supporting role it plays so far is likely 
to influence the role it would play when enhancing cross-border cooperation in infrastructure.
Figure 6.4. A bunker overflowing with waste.
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6.4.2 Lake Victoria region local authorities cooperation (voluntary)
Lake Victoria Region Local Authorities Cooperation (LVRLAC) was formed in 1997 as a regional 
cooperation of Local Authorities in the Lake Victoria Region on the initiative of the mayors of 
Entebbe (Uganda), Mwanza (Tanzania) and Kisumu (Kenya). LVRLAC’s main role is to facilitate 
local authorities in responding to concerns of sustainable management around Lake Victoria of 
which waste management is one. It is categorised as a voluntary arrangement in this study because 
membership is open and authorities are free to join as they deem fit. Actually a main attribute of 
voluntary regimes is their flexibility and because of this characteristic, LVRLAC has developed 
into a growing network organisation with over 81 local authorities from the Lake Victoria Basin 
of East Africa - in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. Contacts have been made with the governments 
of Burundi and Rwanda, and the intention is to also incorporate local authorities from these 
countries in the future.
With the focus being on urban authorities, members range from very big size authorities with 
populations of over 500,000 people, for instance, Mwanza city council in Tanzania, Kisumu city 
council in Kenya and Kampala city council in Uganda to the small town councils with a population 
of less than 100,000 people, for instance, Ahero town council in Kenya as shown in Table 6.2. 
Town/Divisions councils are the majority in terms of LVRLAC’s urban authorities membership, 
probably because there are many more townships compared to cities and municipalities in the 
lake basin. The diversity of membership is a key strength for LVRLAC as this can be a rich source 
for knowledge and information exchange.
The place of municipalities within the organisation
The network governance structure of the organisation as shown in the organogram in Figure 6.5 
has a General Assembly (GA) constituted by all subscribing members (the majority of whom 
are the local authorities) as the supreme decision making organ of the organisation. The GA is 
Table 6.2. Local authorities in numbers and according to levels.
Level/scale Kenya Uganda Tanzania
City council 1 (Kisumu) 1 (Kampala) 1 (Mwanza)
Municipal council 6 (e.g. Homabay, Kisii, 
Migori, Siaya, Busia)
5 (e.g. Jinja, Masaka, 
Entebbe)
3 (Musoma, Bukoba, 
Shinyanga
Town/division Council 7 (e.g. Ahero; Awendo; 
Rongo; Oyugis; Bondo
27 (e.g. Lukaya; Busia; 
Mukono; Mpigi;Rakai; 
Kira; Lyantonde)
-
District council (rural) - 4 (Kalangala, Mayuge, 
Mpigi, Wakiso)
20 (e.g. Bariadi, Bukoba, 
Bunda, Chato, Gheita)
County rouncil (rural) 11(e.g. Nyando, Suba; 
Rachuonyo)
6 (e.g. Buwama, Kasanje, 
Katabi)
-
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responsible for determining the overall direction of the network. Compared to the LVBC, this 
arrangement presents a more decentralised organisational model which affords the local authorities 
a key position in the organisation. The GA elects an Executive Committee which is the policy 
making organ of the network with the responsibility to oversee the day-to-day activities of the 
organisation. There are other administrative committees that are part of the organisation as well 
(including project steering and standing committees). The management function of the network 
is vested within a regional secretariat currently based in Entebbe, Uganda and supported by three 
country-based sub-secretariats in Kampala (Uganda), Kisumu (Kenya) and Mwanza (Tanzania). 
In essence LVRLAC has a regional framework under which country offices are linked.
Municipal autonomy in decision making
Being the constituting members of the annual General Assembly which is the top organ within the 
organisation, then certainly the municipal authorities have more autonomy in decision making as 
compared to their position in LVBC. These members have statutory/legislative and administrative 
mechanisms at their disposal which provides great potential to enlist policy changes at the local 
level within the Lake Victoria Region with LVRLAC playing an enabling role. Yet there are always 
differences to contend with. Despite their numerical dominance at the top level of decision making 
and even a shared policy agenda on promoting sustainable development in the Lake Victoria Basin, 
political, administrative and fiscal differences amongst members influence their capacity to act 
collectively. Where acting in this case would mean deciding and implementing a regional waste 
treatment plant for instance, so far the interventions under a common regional framework related 
to SWM infrastructure have been carried out in individual urban authorities and not collectively.
Annual general assembly
Administrative committees
(executive, project steering and standing committees)
Regional secretariat
Kenya 
sub-secretariat
Uganda 
sub-secretariat
Tanzania 
sub-secretariat
Member local authority implementation and action 
programs
Figure 6.5. Organogram of LVRLAC (author’s construction from field data).
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Resource availability and mobilisation within LVRLAC
Information/knowledge resource
Like LVBC, members of LVRLAC under specific projects, have benefitted from both technical 
and experiential knowledge. Member councils involved in the pedagogic program (which is 
described later in this chapter) for instance, have received training on how to set up and run the 
pedagogic centres.
A number of workshops including the Bukoba that informed this study have allowed sharing 
and exchange of information. The Bukoba workshop for instance was on regionalising waste 
management and enabled the participating member councils to share their experiences on best 
practices. See Box 6.2 on a part of the outcome of the Bukoba workshop.
While the organisation is committed to improve information and knowledge sharing (as put 
down in its strategic framework) among its members, not all members under LVRLAC have 
benefitted from the information sharing. Just seven member councils took part, for instance in the 
pedagogic program whose selection for inclusion according to an interview with project officer, 
included amongst other things resource endowment of a particular council and having an active 
department that addresses SWM.
The study further learnt that despite the existence of a monitoring, evaluation and reporting 
(MER) system, there is limited practical application of the system due to poor data collection, 
management and sharing between the LVRLAC secretariats and the member local authorities 
most of whom do not have the modern ICT-equipment. This makes effective network performance 
measurements difficult as it limits to a great extent the possibilities for feed-back from and 
continuous dialogue between the organisation and its members.
Box	6.2.	Information	sharing:	Bukoba	workshop	in	February	2009.
Exemplary practices on SWM amongst urban authorities in the Lake Victoria Basin:
• Community partnerships, micro/small-scale enterprises in solid waste management (sorting 
at source, composting, recycling), community contracting, Municipal support mechanisms, 
e.g. Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste and Management Programme (KISWAMP).
• Use of technical methods (for example composting, ecological sanitation – ECOSAN and 
biogas), e.g. Kampala City Council ECOSAN and Homabay Bio-digesters.
• Public-private-community partnerships, e.g. Mwanza City Council contracting.
• Commercialising of waste collection and transportation mechanisms, e.g. Kampala City 
Council landfill management and private waste collection (skipless system).
• Innovative disposal methods (composting, biogas, semi-engineered and sanitary landfills), 
e.g. Kampala City Council.
• Strengthening financial and economic implications of solid waste management, e.g. KISWAMP.
• Municipal capacity development and sensitisation on waste management, e.g. CDS (financing 
toolkit).
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What could be beneficial however, in the LVRLAC arrangement is the diversity of its 
membership, shown in the different sizes of the urban centres, which at any one seating can 
become a rich source of information/knowledge. The Kisumu workshop for instance allowed 
participants from smaller municipal councils to learn from Kisumu City council’s experience under 
the Kisumu Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan specifically on the component of ‘waste 
is money’. These small councils were encouraged to seek opportunities to train small voluntary 
groups to look at SWM as an opportunity to make money.
Material resources
Finance: the members which are local authorities pay a membership fee and an annual subscription 
as shown below:
• full membership fee: USD 1,500 (paid once);
• annual subscriptions:
• district/city councils: USD 500;
• municipal councils: USD 400;
• town councils/divisions: USD 300.
There is also the possibility for associate membership of LVRLAC open to any cooperation, 
authority, organisation and individual that is interested in promoting the use of Lake Victoria 
resources for public benefit, but does not meet conditions for full membership.
The project officer informed the study that the organisation cannot however, rely on the 
members subscriptions because it is too little. The organisation has an annual budget of general 
operation that comes to an average of USD one million and the organisation therefore has to raise 
funds from donors like SIDA.
Staff: LVRLAC maintains a small staff structure and has been working on the assumption that 
the paid staff of the member local authorities will backstop the work of the network without any 
extra remuneration (voluntarily). LVRLAC’s project officer informed the study that this however, 
is not the case. The study learnt that, even the identity, roles and image of sub-secretariats hosted 
within the member local authorities are still unclear and poorly understood by the member local 
authorities. There have been experienced delays in the provision of office space and services by 
those members hosting parts of LVRLAC administration. For instance, when the operational 
procedure of the sub-secretariats are not compatible with the bureaucratic processes of the host 
member local authorities. Some of the Network organs specifically the standing committees are 
reportedly dysfunctional.
Generally, resources both material and non-material under LVRLAC appear limited. This has 
had an impact on its role in SWM within individual urban authorities. From field work it became 
clear that certain projects undertaken have stalled and this is seen in one of the cases under box 6.3.
These interventions point out to the supplementary role of LVRLAC. Compared to LVBC, 
LVRLAC’s role is more one of adding on to the traditional tasks of SWM by the local authorities. 
These interventions are essentially demonstration centres on what are considered best practices 
on SWM like waste re-use. The interventions in smaller towns (Masaka, Homabay and Musoma) 
presented in Box 6.3 show successful connections with the departments in the councils dealing 
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Box	6.3.	Typical	LVRLAC’s	intervention	through	environment	pedagogic	centres.1
Kisumu	City	Council	in	Kenya
Kisumu was the first environmental pedagogic centre (EPC) to be established and became fully 
operational in 2004. It reached the most advanced stage as EPC but momentum of the project 
slowly dwindled over time and at the time of field work (2007/08) there was nothing much 
to show for it on the ground. The reasons for this failure varied but they include inadequate 
human capacity, budget restraints because a lot of money went into paying external consulting 
agencies and also the political situation where there was violence and destruction of property 
after elections.
Masaka	municipal	council	in	Uganda.
The EPC was initiated in May 2008 and its status is 85% complete. EPC’s new construction is 
adjacent to the Public Health Department building in the town centre hence highly accessible. 
Hosted by the environment department, the facility is fully integrated into the functioning of the 
department and will be applied to demonstrate best practices in environmental management. 
The EPC constituted demonstration garden plots, a composting unit, a solar powered main hall, 
an exhibitions hall, office space, a resource room and roof water harvesting.
Homabay	municipal	council	in	Kenya.
The EPC was initiated in March 2007 and its status is completed. Homabay’s EPC is very suitably 
located within the town centre at a site earmarked for future expansion of the council offices. 
It has enrolled participation of a youth group that also uses the centre as learning ground on 
various innovations and environmental practices. The tree nursery supplies the council with 
seedlings for its town greening program while schools often use the facility as a practical learning 
centre. The centre is constituted of demonstration garden plots, a greenhouse, a tree nursery, 
water harvesting facilities, composting, a solar powered building and a host of information 
displays including one on bio-digesters.
Musoma	municipal	council	in	Tanzania
The EPC was initiated in June 2008 and its status is 90% completed. It is a unique EPC in the sense 
that it uses the concept of a recreational learning centre by establishing different components 
of the EPC within a park environment. It is strategically located within 200 meters of the town 
hall and though not fully completed yet, it has fully established a vibrant tree nursery that is 
supporting the town greening initiative. It has also attracted partnerships with CBOs dealing 
with environmental management.
1 The EPCs are part of the Swedish support to the Lake Victoria Initiative (LVI). Centres are established 
with the aim of demonstrating to the population how various environmental issues can be dealt with, 
for example through general information on environmental conditions and challenges.
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with environmental issues and an integration with ongoing plans and projects. It remains to be 
seen whether these centres will remain active in the long term or whether like the one in Kisumu, 
they will stall.
Overall, LVRLAC as an informal institution has allowed municipal authorities a key place in its 
organisation arrangement and in turn in its decision making. The informal nature of LVRLAC is 
associated with the massive political will of member local authorities. Their numerical dominance 
notwithstanding, these municipal authorities have not been able to act collectively to cooperate 
in infrastructure provisions. Apart from the differences (politically, administrative and fiscal) 
inherent to the diversity in the member councils, the weak state of its resources does not sustain 
the supplementary role of LVRLAC in developing SWM interventions or in steering collective 
action. Its interventions so far have remained implemented in individual municipalities only.
6.5 Conclusion
There are a number of enabling and constraining factors for cross-country municipal cooperation 
in SWM. These factors are evident in the institutional context at the regional, national and 
municipal level within the three countries in the Lake Victoria Basin. The enabling factors are 
the supportive legislation at the regional level as well as existence of regional organisations that 
could provide a platform for cooperation. Constraining factors are the differences in the levels of 
decentralisation in the three countries and even different municipal by-laws. These factors directly 
affect the efforts of cooperation. There is however, still a number of regional arrangements that 
have been developed so far though most of these are informal or of a voluntary nature and do not 
involve cooperation in infrastructure provision on SWM. Two regional organisations (LVBC and 
LVRLAC) were assessed for their role in enhancing cross-country SWM in an attempt to analyse 
how cross-border cooperation is being put into practice and to conclude on feasible institutional 
options for SWM at the regional context.
LVBC is categorised by the study as statutory and thus formal. As an organisation, it is looked 
at as an enabling structure that can provide the platform for cooperation having been formed 
within the East African Community. However, it does not have a place for municipal authorities 
in its organisational arrangement meaning that municipalities have little if any influence on 
decision-making on SWM interventions by the organisation. It also means that municipalities 
have not had the power to act collectively under LVBC. LVBC however, has both material and 
non-material resources, which safeguards its supporting role in SWM. Interventions in SWM 
infrastructure provision so far under LVBC though under a common framework, have been 
realised in individual municipalities only.
LVRLAC on the other hand is categorised by the study as voluntary and therefore informal. It 
is an enabling structure to cooperation just like LVBC. The organisation’s annual general assembly 
is made up of local authorities who are its ultimate decision makers. Thus municipalities have a 
key position under the LVRLAC arrangement. However, even with their numerical dominance, 
municipalities have not been able to act collectively in infrastructure provision. The study links 
this occurrence to the inherent differences (political, administrative and fiscal) among the member 
councils but also to the informal nature of LVRLAC’s operation which presents a constraining 
factor to effective cooperation. In its supplementary role, LVRLAC has lacked sufficient resources, 
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material and non-material, and this does not empower it to steer its members to act more 
collectively. Interventions in SWM infrastructure provision so far, just like under LVBC have been 
in individual municipalities only.
The institutional context particularly at the regional level brings out higher expectations 
for cross-border cooperation in SWM. This is particularly the case because the East African 
Community and the regional organisations are already in place. In reality, there is however, 
relatively little cooperation and most of it is in non-material aspects. The presence of this evidence 
for regional cooperation though in non-material aspects, points nevertheless to the possibility of 
further cooperation in SWM infrastructure provision in the long term. The two organisations - 
LVBC and LVRLAC - portraying formal and informal arrangements, can thus be looked upon as 
playing different roles when it comes to infrastructure provision. Both of them would offer services 
and infrastructures based on their specific strengths. The formal organisation would doubtless be 
more satisfactory from a legal standpoint, as it would allow all the participating municipalities to 
benefit from the legal stability essential to the implementation of joint activities. Given its position 
with the national governments and partners, the formal organisation could play a key role in 
getting or mobilising resources for infrastructure provision. Yet, to have a meaningful impact, it 
would have to reconstitute its organisational structure to bring the local authorities on board and 
to allow them to take part in decision making. This transformation would serve to ensure that 
inventions made are in line with local needs. The informal organisation is more flexible and would 
allow more easily for local self-governing. It would thus play a key role in pulling the municipalities 
together to act collectively particularly in information and knowledge sharing. But even then it 
needs to seek innovative ways of getting more financial resources in addition to the membership 
subscriptions. This way it will provide a stronger platform for cooperation.
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Chapter 7. 
Conclusion and discussion
7.1 Introduction
This chapter formulates the conclusions when answering the research questions that were formulated 
at the beginning of this study. The chapter begins by giving an overview of the framework under 
which the study was built including a brief explanation of the conceptual models, research questions 
and methodology. Conclusions made for each preceding chapter are then given. Section 7.2 begins 
by looking at the internal organisation of three municipalities (Kisumu, Jinja and Mwanza) to 
assess their performance of SWM tasks. This section also looks at their collaboration with non-
state actors at municipal level to compare the different service arrangements. Section 7.3 deals 
with collaboration amongst municipalities by assessing the opportunities for inter-municipal 
cooperation. It also looks at the role of regional organisations and networks in enhancing cross-
country SWM cooperation at the municipal level. Section 7.4 presents some concluding remarks.
7.1.1 Study overview
This thesis aimed at contributing to the improvement of solid waste management at the benefit 
of the urban poor in the Lake Victoria Basin in East Africa. More specifically, it focused on 
institutional arrangements for infrastructure and service provision at the municipal level. With 
the current global trends towards decentralisation of national governments’ responsibilities, then 
certainly the local/municipal level and in turn municipal authorities take centre stage. There is 
much agreement that municipal authorities have not performed adequately, yet it is also clear that 
they remain the everyday face of the public sector; the level where essential services are delivered to 
individuals and where policy meets people (World Bank, 2000). To take it even further, municipal 
authorities are the legal owners of waste once it is put out for collection (Schubeler, 1996). Taking 
a bioregional perspective therefore, that is, covering the Lake Victoria Basin, this study sought 
to analyse SWM arrangements in different municipal authorities in the three countries found in 
the lake basin in order to gain insights and present feasible options for institutional arrangement 
for SWM at the municipal level.
Two conceptual frameworks (Figures 2.1 and 2.2) were thus developed to guide the study 
towards identifying different institutional layouts. At the centre of both conceptual frameworks 
is the municipal authority.
The first conceptual framework (Figure 2.1) shows the different elements of the SWM tasks 
under the full or partial responsibility of municipalities. Secondly, it illustrates that a municipal 
authority when seeking to fulfil the SWM task and responsibilities enters into a number of 
different relationships with other actors both formal and informal. Thirdly, it shows that municipal 
authorities operate in between the national and neighbourhood/ward levels wherein the households 
are found. Fourth and finally, the figure indicates that the actual SWM arrangement at municipal 
level can be judged with the help of three kinds of criteria: flexibility, accessibility and institutional 
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and ecological sustainability, all of which have been operationalised to reflect the local conditions 
under study.
The conceptual framework on SWM at municipal level (Figure 2.1) was developed for national 
and local SWM situations within a particular country but SWM issues could also transcend country 
boundaries and be looked at as cross-country cooperation. And this is why the study developed a 
second conceptual framework, shown in Figure 2.2. This second conceptual framework brings on 
board the regional concept which allows the study to look at cross country municipal cooperation 
under the umbrella of the East African Community. The framework is broken down to look at 
enabling and constraining factors for cooperation at the state level, at the municipal level and 
specifically under SWM infrastructure.
The criteria of flexibility, accessibility, institutional and ecological sustainability are found 
within the Modernised Mixtures Approach (MMA) which has been used to adapt Ecological 
Modernisation Theory for the study of SWM and sanitation. Under MMA, SWM systems 
have been deliberately and reflexively reconstructed in response to the challenge of a changing 
social, economic, and environmental context in East Africa (Spaargaren et al., 2006). Intelligent 
combinations of formal and informal, public and private, citizen participation and professional 
management then become evident. With this understanding, the following research questions 
were formulated to structure the study:
1. What is the current status of the (physical) environmental infrastructures and the level of 
service provision for SWM in three designated urban centres in EA namely Kisumu (Kenya); 
Mwanza (Tanzania) and Jinja (Uganda)?
2. What are the existing policy arrangement for SWM in the three urban centres and what can 
be learnt from the differences and/or similarities amongst them?
3. What are the possibilities for cooperation in solid waste management amongst small 
neighbouring municipalities in Kenya namely Kisii, Homabay and Migori municipalities?
4. What is the role of regional organisations and networks in enhancing cross border infrastructure 
provision in solid waste management amongst municipalities in the lake basin?
Chapters 3 and 4 answered the first and second research questions by looking at three urban 
authorities in the Lake Victoria Basin: Kisumu City Council in Kenya, Jinja Municipal Council in 
Uganda and Mwanza City Council in Tanzania. The three were selected for comparison because 
of similarities in urban status – they are all regarded as primary urban centres as they come just 
below the capital cities in their respective countries. This in turn means that differences in public 
service provision levels and population dynamics are considered minimal. The three are also 
found in the Lake Victoria Basin. These general similarities allowed for a comparative method to 
learn from the differences and also the similarities existing in their SWM systems. To make an 
in-depth comparison, a case study research design was employed. The three urban centres thus 
provided multiple cases bringing out insights which would have otherwise been lost in a single 
case study. The study was able to discuss exemplary practices as well as shared problems/obstacles 
in SWM. Building on the findings of the three towns, the study went ahead to look at three other 
smaller urban centres but this time all three in Kenya. The three served as embedded units within 
the Lake Victoria Basin and they are Kisii municipal Council; Migori Municipal Council and 
Homabay Municipal Council. Work done in these three small urban centres informed Chapters 
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5 and 6 and in turn answered research question 3 and part of research question 4. The role of 
two regional organisations (Lake Victoria Basin Commission and Lake Victoria Region Local 
Authorities Cooperation) in enhancing cross-border SWM in the lake basin was also assessed 
and answered the other part of research question 4.
Within the cases under study, both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and 
analysis were used. There were data that could be drawn from household surveys while other data 
came from interviews, stakeholder workshops, document analysis and observation. Combining 
both methods allowed the study to benefit from the flexibility of qualitative methods to do an 
intensive examination of the cases as well as from the advantage of generalising the findings to 
other urban authorities in East Africa made possible by the quantitative methods.
7.2 Internal organisations and collaborations with non-state actors
7.2.1 Performance of tasks
In response to research question 1 which is on the current status of (physical) infrastructure 
and the level of service provision for SWM, the study looked at the internal organisation of the 
three primary councils mentioned earlier focusing on their performance of tasks under both the 
technical and social dimensions along the waste chain. The technical dimension refers to waste 
flows together with the infrastructure and technologies and their direct planning and management. 
The social dimension captures the relational capacity of municipalities, specifically the qualities 
of relationships municipal authorities engage in in order to have the tasks under the technical 
dimension performed well. Therefore issues to do with public/citizen participation, public-private 
partnership and social trust are key here. Interviews with resource persons, observing the SWM 
infrastructure and document analysis were particularly useful for this section.
Looking at the performance of the three councils, the study concludes that first the three 
municipalities ‘share’ an overall level of performance that is rather low. In the SWM policy 
cycle, these East African municipalities are still in their infancy phase, what is referred to in the 
modernisation discourse as a phase of simple modernity (see Scheinberg, 2008, Scheinberg and 
Mol, 2010). It is not a fully developed management system yet. This is explained in the collection 
rates which are low to average with Kisumu recording 25-30%, Jinja has 40-60% but Mwanza stands 
out with 88%. There is no evidence of efforts to organise at source separation/recycle or re-use by 
the municipal authorities themselves (except, very recent, the case of Jinja in composting). This 
can be interpreted to mean that achieving ecological sustainability has not been a priority for these 
municipal authorities. All the three still use large vehicles which are inadequate in number but 
also to handle the high density kind of waste generated. They all use open dumping grounds and 
except for Kisumu, waste management is still lumped with medical health issues in the department 
of public health and it is not seen as a distinct environmental problem.
Nevertheless they have differences in the performance of the tasks with some being centralised, 
others decentralised and in some cases a mix of the two with different measures of success. This 
leads to the second conclusion which is that there are no fixed routes/practices in the performance 
of SWM tasks instead there are lots of variations. This in turn means that there is room for 
manoeuvre at municipal level to improve on performance of SWM. These improvements are being 
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made in the different towns already. Jinja and Kisumu are cases where the municipal authority has 
had relative autonomy in decision making to organise SWM accordingly. This is reflected in the 
involvement of even supra local actors where UN-Habitat and other organisations are working 
together with Kisumu city council to develop an Integrated Solid Waste Management Plan. In 
Jinja, the World Bank and NEMA are working with the council to develop a compost plant at 
the disposal site. This means that the council wants to make an additional step in addition to the 
traditional tasks of waste collection, transportation and disposal. Mwanza shows how improved 
access to both material and social resources improves SWM. Though limited in resources (financial 
and equipment) for SWM, it has with the guidance of its by-laws, made use of social resources. 
The council therefore only has to do or pay for cleaning of public areas and management of the 
disposal site in addition to supervising the contractors. This, as also mentioned by Awortwi (2003), 
worked to reduce the social and financial burden of the municipal authority (where Kisumu had 
an expenditure of USD 420,000 for SWM in year 2006/2007, Mwanza spent only USD 150,643 in 
the year 2007). This means that relative autonomy in decision making and access to resources both 
material and social are some of the possible routes for manoeuvre to improve the performance 
of SWM on the whole.
Third, municipalities which embrace SWM as a task with only the technical dimension and 
little consideration of the social dimension, tend to show a lower performance. This is evident in 
the percentages of waste collected, service coverage and differences in municipal resource needs 
for SWM in the three urban authorities. Of the three municipalities, Mwanza has incorporated 
the social dimension and because of that, collection is higher at 88% compared to Kisumu where 
the municipal council is wholly responsible for SWM with a waste collection percentage of 
between 25-30%. Jinja comes in the middle with between 40 to 60%. Kisumu council being solely 
responsible, has to employ more staff and is currently facing a deficit of 34 staff members to make 
up the optimal number of 71 whereas the staff in Jinja including the casual sweepers are just about 
30 in total. In Mwanza there are about 55 workers in total. Kisumu also needs to incorporate more 
resources (finance and equipment) compared to the other two councils who are benefiting partly 
from resources of the other public and private actors. Therefore to improve on performance of 
SWM tasks, municipalities have to look at SWM as a socio-technical system integrating both the 
technical and social dimensions.
7.2.2 Collaborations (formal and informal)
Research question 2 considers the existing policy arrangement for service provision. And in 
response to this question in addition to findings under research question 1, the study assessed 
the formal and informal collaboration with non-state actors. Hereby the focus was on issues of 
legitimacy and influence on decision making, relations and alliances between the municipality 
and the non-state actors, amongst the non-state actors themselves and between these actors 
and the households and also the payment systems. In this section, the debate between the neo-
developmental state and network governance was key. Interviews held with the different SWM 
actors and household surveys were particularly useful. The following conclusions are made:
First, the different forms of collaborations show different levels of success. This is evident 
in Table 4.12 which shows the percentages of households receiving service, service satisfaction 
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amongst households and the percentage of waste collected, all of which are indicators for the 
success or failure of the SWM system. This is the case where Mwanza has a formal community 
dominated arrangement but also with the involvement of some private firms in the CBD and the 
municipal authority. Jinja has private firms working formally with the municipal authority while 
in Kisumu, it is the council but with informal involvement of both community and private entities. 
This supports the arguments of EMT for inclusion of ‘modern’ institutions in this case, the private 
firms(markets) and the CBOs (civil society) as we seek solutions to environmental problems.
Yet despite these collaborations, municipal councils are still the loci of authority in SWM at 
the municipal level. In all the three councils under study, it is the council authorities that make 
decisions on SWM, award and terminate contracts, monitor/supervise contractors and in some 
cases make payments to the contractors. The data gathered from the interviews and responses 
from households indicate that leaving SWM solely to the private sector raises concerns of equity 
particularly to the urban poor, and leaving it solely to the community raises concerns of sustainable 
service provision. But from another angle it could be viewed to confirm what Moyo et al. (1998) 
write about the presence of some kind of residual resistance or lack of enthusiasm on the part of 
local/municipal authorities to share responsibilities with private sector enterprises. Nevertheless, 
it remains clear that municipal authorities as institutions are still needed to take a lead in SWM 
at the municipal level.
Third, municipalities that incorporate non-state actors formally, show better performance than 
those municipalities that ignore this option. And this has been particularly the case where non-
state actors entail both the civil society and the private companies because this mix of different 
groups captures different social and economic realities on the ground. To support this, Table 4.12 
shows the field findings where the percentage of households receiving SWM is higher in Mwanza 
at 82.5% compared to Kisumu at 46.5% where the arrangement is informal. In Jinja where the 
municipal council has only incorporated private companies, the percentage of households served is 
60%. It is easier for the municipal authorities to monitor the performance of formal arrangements 
because the actors are under their supervision.
Fourth, even with formal incorporation, the duration of the contract arrangement in relation 
to the type of non-state actor contracted affects performance. The one year contract arrangement 
is considered short in both Jinja and Mwanza and the effect of this is seen especially in Mwanza 
where competition amongst contractors is not evident per se. The majority of the contractors in 
Mwanza are small CBOs with little initial investments trying to establish a niche in SWM. The 
uncertainty of winning the contract come the following year has resulted in little investment in 
SWM (see Karanja, 2005 and Awortwi, 2003).
Finally, a balance between legitimacy and efficiency serves to improve SWM. While the 
legislation and the legality of the procedure of contracting out service provision is a source of 
legitimacy for the municipal authority and the formal non-state actors in Mwanza and Jinja, public 
acknowledgement also allows achievement of higher levels of legitimacy. Public acknowledgement 
comes from efficient service provision which is reflected in this study in the performance of the 
SWM tasks in terms of percentage of waste collected, service coverage, service satisfaction and 
even percentage of households that pay for service provision (see Table 4.12). Kisumu shows a case 
where informal actors though not recognised as legal SWM service providers, are legitimate in the 
eyes of the public. This is evident from the percentages of service satisfaction (70.6% where n=93).
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The balance between legitimacy and efficiency for the case of Kisumu could therefore be achieved 
by linking the municipal authority with these informal non-state actors. These actors have control 
over a significant proportion of the population and they have shown (internal) consistency with 
71% of those interviewed having been in the solid waste sector for more than five years already.
The findings presented in Table 4.12 show remarkable differences in the three towns. While 
Mwanza has taken the leading position in terms of percentage of households receiving SWM, 
percentage of households that pay for waste collection and percentage of waste collected compared 
to the other two towns, service satisfaction amongst households in Mwanza is lower. The findings 
do not give definite explanations of this result but picking from the list of recommendations by 
households on how services can be improved, then a probable explanation could be high levels 
of expectation from households. It is possible that households are not just content with high 
collection rates but are keen on the quality of service given as well. The satisfaction rate could 
also be associated with the duration of the contract which is considered short and thus a deterrent 
for contractors to make investments to improve on their performance of SWM. The level of 
professionalism of the CBOs may also be wanting given that a number of them are involved in 
other activities than SWM to sustain their incomes. But this suggestion remains to be tested in 
further research.
7.3 Inter-municipal cooperation
The study discussed Inter Municipal Cooperation (IMC) as involving a number of local authorities, 
or municipalities, in proximity to one another, which join forces to work together on SWM. These 
municipalities could be in one and the same country which is presented in section 7.3.1 or they 
could be from different neighbouring countries as presented in section 7.3.2.
7.3.1 Cooperation within a country
Research question 3 seeks to find out the possibilities for cooperation in SWM amongst smaller 
neighbouring municipalities. To respond to this question, the study assessed opportunities along 
the waste chain for IMC amongst three small urban centres in Kenya. Data that informed this 
section were obtained from interviews with resource persons and a stakeholders’ workshop in 
addition to document analysis. There are two conclusions on IMC in SWM in Kenya.
First, IMC offers potential for improving SWM amongst small urban centres. This is because 
these small urban centres have low tax base and in turn low revenues. The total transfers from 
central government to the three small councils under study in the financial year 2008/2009 were: 
Migori - USD 427,158; Homa-bay - USD 456,551; Kisii - USD 409,572 and yet this is not only 
intended to be used for SWM. Take Migori for instance, whose total expenditures on SWM 
in the year 2007/2008 were USD 41,966 while the transfer from central government was USD 
381,009 that year. The amount allocated to waste management is not enough to purchase even a 
waste collection tractor at USD 40,000 for instance and still pay workers and have a balance for 
maintenance and repairs. This in combination with the amounts and types of waste generated, 
population figures, geographical proximity and minimal differences in the amount of funds 
transferred from central government transfer to the three councils support the conclusion that 
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IMC would offer potential for improving SWM specifically regarding waste transportation vehicles, 
waste disposal infrastructure and waste treatment facilities as they all present great economies 
of scale if provided jointly.
Second, IMC would work where individual municipalities are left in control of primary 
functions within their jurisdiction. From a stakeholders’ workshop which brought the three 
councils together as well as interviews held in individual councils, it was evident that councils 
would like to retain certain primary functions like policy making and service delivery in waste 
collection. This way, they feel assured that they are still in control or have autonomy over waste 
management within their jurisdiction. This means that cooperation would not be a welcome 
idea under waste collection despite the economies of scale. The stakeholders were however, in 
agreement that waste disposal and waste treatment would serve well for cooperation. Thus, in 
tandem with the multi-level governance perspective, some services can be handled in-house 
within a municipality while other services can be handled in cooperation. With the supporting 
legislation (The Local Government Act Cap 265) and possible models for cooperation (joint 
boards, contracting and under existing regional organisations) in Kenya, then certainly there is 
potential for IMC in solid waste management infrastructure provision which can be exploited to 
improve the SWM sector as a whole.
7.3.2 Cross country inter-municipal cooperation
Research question 4 addresses the role of regional organisations and networks in enhancing 
cross country SWM infrastructure provision amongst municipalities in the Lake Victoria Basin. 
To respond to this, the study looked at enabling and constraining factors for cooperation at the 
regional, national and municipal level, narrowed down to assessing the roles of two regional 
organisations that it categorises as statutory (formal) and voluntary (informal). As in section 
7.3.1, interviews and two stakeholder workshops were key sources of data.
The study concludes that cross country municipal cooperation in infrastructure provision in 
the lake basin is not yet well developed. One would expect that with the shared resource, that is 
the lake basin, and the regional collaboration through the EAC as well as the flexibility of SWM, 
cooperation would be easily attained. From the interviews, observations and document analysis 
however, there is no evidence for cross country cooperation in SWM infrastructure. Though under 
a common framework efforts from these regional organisations are effected in municipalities 
individually in the different countries. The study links this outcome to the constraining factors 
at the national and municipal level. These constraining factors include the different levels of 
decentralisation in the three countries which in turn speak for differences in administrative, fiscal 
and political decentralisation to the municipal levels. The councils in the different countries have 
different autonomy levels over budget making, over staff recruitment while also the percentages 
of grants/funds that flow from the central government to the municipal councils are different. 
Cooperation in non-material aspects like information sharing and exchange visits is however, 
evident.
The formal and informal organisations can play different roles in enhancing cross country 
cooperation in SWM infrastructure provision. The formal organisation (LVBC) has so far played 
a supporting role to individual municipalities. Because of its strategic position with the three 
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national governments and development partners, this organisation is seen to be able to play a 
key role in sourcing and mobilising resources for infrastructure provision. It also has the legal 
stability necessary for joint activities. The informal organisation (LVRLAC) has so far played a 
supplementary role for individual municipalities. Given its flexibility which allows local self-
governing, it is seen to be able to play a key role in bringing the local authorities together on a 
common agenda on SWM particularly in the non-material aspects. The organisation mainly realises 
this by promoting information and knowledge sharing through joint stakeholders workshops or 
similar forums.
7.4 Concluding remarks
It is clear by now that SWM practices are governed differently in different countries and in turn 
in municipalities. The arrangements for service provision revealed by the research are outside 
the conventional or traditionally -recognised institutional arrangements and evolved into locally 
specific solutions. Even where the arrangement was formal, this was not implemented to its full 
extent, for instance the research did not come across a system that can be defined as fully franchised 
or a properly defined service/management contract. Instead the arrangements were structured 
by what seemed to work best locally. Resource mobilisation and allocation, management aspects 
and service provision are organised differently in different municipalities. Taking this reality 
into account therefore, means that modernising the institutional arrangement as affirmed by 
UN-Habitat (2010), will involve identifying, capitalising on, nurturing and improving on the 
local arrangements that are already working well in a particular locality. Modernised mixtures 
in urban solid waste management may be flexible, but they definitely need to build on existing 
practices in a particular context.
There is a possibility of a complete shift from municipal provision to other arrangements in 
the coming years. Nevertheless municipal authorities today are indeed at the centre of solid waste 
management in the East African urban authorities as presented in the conceptual models and 
they perceive of themselves that way. Although the overall levels of their performance are low, and 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens is not well established, the municipalities are reluctant to let 
go SWM as one of their key power resources. They recognise the need for improvement in many 
respects (following the solid waste chain) and not the least because they fear the damage done to 
legitimacy when there is a case of structural underperforming in SWM. While recognising the 
need for improving in a locally adopted way (modernised mixtures), some options for improving 
are more often tried/explored and recognised as feasible options than others. In general, formal 
relations are given priority over informal relations, and political public solutions are privileged 
over other (civil society/market based) solutions and strategies. As a result, the ideology of 
developmental state is reinforced while the notion of the network state is given less attention. The 
two cases of innovation (intermunicipal cooperation and international cooperation) made clear 
the constraining aspects of these new structures are given more emphasis by the actors involved 
than the new enabling aspects.
Against this overall background, the three criteria for SWM as provided by the MM-model 
are not (yet ) met, and whether this will be improved in the near future remains to be seen.
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Annex 1. Household (estate) questionnaire
1. General information:
Gender (male/female) ……………
Age ……………
Occupation ……………
Family size ……………
2. Household income
 ○ Less than 5000
 ○ 5000-10,000
 ○ 10,000-20,000
 ○ More than 20,000
3. Who collects waste from your household?
 ○ Municipal ……………
 ○ Private Co. ……………
 ○ CBO/Youth group ……………
 ○ Other (specify) ……………
4. How many times a week? ……………
5. Do they provide waste collection container? Yes/No
Which type? ……………
And do you pay for the container? Yes/No
How much? ……………
6. How would you rate their service provision?
 ○ Satisfactory ……………
 ○ Very satisfactory ……………
 ○ Not satisfactory ……………
 ○ Other (specify) ……………
7. Do you pay for waste collection? Yes/No
8. How much? ……………
How did you reach an agreement on the amount to be paid? ……………
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9. How would you rate the amounts you pay for waste collection?
 ○ Low
 ○ Moderate
 ○ High
 ○ Other (specify)
10. Which service do you pay for:
 ○ First ……………
 ○ Second ……………
 ○ Third ……………
 ○ Fourth ……………
Amongst Water & Sewerage, Electricity, Security and Waste Management.
11. Any suggestion for improving waste collection?
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Annex 2. Interview guide for municipal authorities offices
1. Which department of the council deals with solid waste?
2. How is it organised? (organisation structure)
3. How many staff members are involved in waste management? (personnel)
 What are their qualifications?
4. What equipment does the council have for waste management?
5. What is the council budget for waste management?
• Revenue from waste?
• Expenditure to waste management?
• Source of money spent on waste management?
6. Which regulations govern solid waste management?
 Are there any by-laws on waste management?
7. Which areas does the council serve in terms of waste collection?
8. How often is waste collected?
9. On average, how much waste is collected per day?
10. Any recycling initiatives by the council?
11. Does the council work in cooperation with other stakeholders in waste collection?
 If yes, who are these stakeholders?
12. What kind of cooperation?
13. Any kind of monitoring of these stakeholders?
14. What challenges does the council meet in waste management?
 Do the different levels (LCs) present a challenge in waste management?
15. What is the way forward to make better waste management?
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Annex 3.  Household responses on prioritising payments according to services 
offered
1st	service 2nd	service 3rd	service 4th	service
Kisumu	(n=200)
51% would pay for water 
as a first service
47% would pay for 
electricity as second 
service
76% would pay for 
electricity as third service
76% would pay for waste 
as last service
Mwanza	(n=200)
88% would pay for water 
as a first service
82% would pay for 
electricity as a second 
service
38% would pay for 
security as third service
76% would pay for waste 
as a last service
Jinja	(n=218)
61% would pay for water 
as a first service
31% would pay for 
electricity as a second 
service
31% indicated security as 
third services
52% would pay for waste 
as last service
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Annex 4.  List of selected recommendations from households for improving SWM
Jinja
• There is need to increase the frequency of collection at household level.
• There is need to explore other options like recycling.
• Increase the number of skips and bins to enhance proper disposal of solid wastes.
• There is need for monitoring of waste disposal at household level by the authorities.
• There is need to increase the capacity: staff and equipment for effective solid waste management.
Mwanza
• Areas selected as collection points should be fenced.
• Effective enforcement of laws/by-laws on waste management.
• Emphasize commitment by CBOs and private corporations towards waste management services.
• Employ adequate numbers of sanitation workers.
• Enhance community participation and involvement.
• Every 100 meters should a collection point be made.
• Every house should have a bucket for waste collection.
• Government should provide an adequate number of waste collection vehicles to enhance the 
process of waste collection.
• Government should provide modernised waste collection vehicles for waste collection.
• Government should improve infrastructure for areas that cannot access the waste collection 
services.
• Government should provide public education on waste management to the community.
• Improve infrastructures, increase the number of sanitation workers provide enough waste 
collection equipment.
• Increase the amount levied for waste collection.
• Increase the number of CBOs and private corporations and employ an adequate number of 
sanitation workers.
• More education on waste management and the amount paid for waste collection is also low.
• Municipal should provide refuse collection in the streets.
• Municipal to educate the community on waste management, collection fees, regular meetings 
with community members.
• Nobody should be allowed to burn waste unless permitted by the council.
• Not to bury wastes.
• Provide waste collection to areas not accessing the service.
• Provision of a recycling system at every collection point to help in waste management.
• Provision of waste collection service to areas that do not access the service.
• Punish those that do not pay for the waste collection services.
• Reduce the waste collection fees so that everyone can afford the service.
• The CBOs and private companies should improve cleanliness during night.
• The city council should engage the service of competent CBOs and private companies.
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Kisumu
• There is need for better organisation among the SWM groups.
• The landlords should provide the service.
• There is need to increase the frequency of collection.
• There is need for competition to help better the services.
• Municipal council should provide the CBOs with transport.
• There is need to provide bins instead of polythene bags because they are not durable.
• Privatisation of SWM services.
• The system for SWM should be well structured.
• An estate wide approach should be adopted so as to cover as many households as possible.
• The CBOs and other groups should be funded since they do not have adequate facilities.
• The government should provide bins, skippers and eco-bags for free.
• The frequency of collection should be increased.
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Annex 5.  Local authority transfer fund1 over the years in Homabay, Kisii and 
Migori
Year Homabay	MC Kisii	MC Migori	MC
FY 1999/2000 2,972,316 4,128,733 2,400,713
FY 2000/2001 7,062,893 5,920,255 8,510,357
FY 2001/2002 10,755,999 9,949,273 13,124,776
FY 2002/2003 10,755,999 9,949,273 13,124,776
FY 2003/2004 12,952,911 11,801,700 12,133,543
FY 2004/2005 13,816,804 12,568,444 12,941,159
FY 2005/2006 17,272,378 15,653,423 16,171,622
FY 2006/2007 25,911,313 23,302,870 24,247,780
FY 2007/2008 28,502,994 25,603,104 26,670,627
FY 2008/2009 31,958,568 28,670,083 29,901,089
Total allocation from 1999/2000 to FY 2008/2009 161,962,175 147,529,158 159,226,442
Source: Records from Association of Local Government Authorities in Kenya, 2009.
1 Funds in Kshs.
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Annex 6. Research-interview schedule for regional organisations
1. What is the organisation involved in generally?
2. Does organisation play any role in (solid) waste management in the Lake basin?
 What specific roles?
3. Which municipalities/councils are covered under the solid waste management?
 Why those municipalities? (criteria)
4. Which legislation and strategy govern their operations if any?
5. What is the organisation’s:
• budget;
• equipment; and
• staffing/personnel dedicated solely to waste management?
6. Possibilities for a regional approach in solid waste management amongst small urban councils?
• Opportunities from an organisation point of view, and
• Possible challenges?
7. What role is the organisation likely to play in such an arrangement?
8.  Possibilities of the organisation participating in a workshop in Homabay, Kenya to steer a 
regional approach in January 2009?
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Annex 7. Potential and existing areas of cooperation under SWM
Key	elements Approaches
Technical	aspects	(material	flow)
Technologies • Awareness creation to LAs on various technologies for SWM (e.g. bio-
digesters, ECOSAN)
• Capacity building of LA staff to implement the technologies
• Acquiring technologies through partnerships with private sector and 
development agencies
Waste generation • Sorting: waste generators should be responsible for their waste
• Review and enforce by-laws
• Promote sorting and 3Rs
Collection and Transport • Common transport for recyclable material
• Solicit common investment in local area for recycling purposes
• Share trucks
• Common contractor to transport the wastes
• Promote private-public partnerships
Disposal • Collaboration and cooperation to develop common sanitary landfill
• Allow for LAs to use constructed landfill at a cost
Waste to wealth • Sorting
• Recycling
• Composting
Non-technical	aspects	(non-material	flow)
Innovations • Market for the products made from waste materials
• Improvement of production methods (capacity building)
• Facilitate access to micro-credit scheme to support entrepreneurship 
development (availing information, sensitisation on loaning schemes)
Exchange study visits • Networking
• Promote good practices
Regulation • Develop common regional LV body on SWM to oversee regulation/policies 
and harmonise them and later feed into the EAC
Networking • Documentation and posting to common SWM website
• Strengthen LVRLAC secretariat in SWM
• LVRLAC monitoring mechanism in SWM
Participatory planning • Public dialogue – bottom top planning
• Gender mainstreaming
Community participation • Setting aside public clean-up days
• Organising cleanliness competitions (e.g. household level, village level, etc.)
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Public private partnership • Promoting partnership with the private sector
• Encourage companies to fulfil corporate social responsibility
• Forwarding of proposals for funding to the private sector
• Making market connections
Community sensitisation • Focal point discussions
• Extension services
• Public debates
• IEC materials, visual aids like video shows, drama
Voluntary services • Provision of incentives (certificates of appreciation)
• Public appeals
Source: Information compiled from Bukoba and Kisumu Stakeholders Workshops in 2008 and 2009.
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Annex 8. Interviewed key informants from different institutions
Name Department/organisation Designation
1. George Wesonga LVRLAC Entebbe Project Officer
2. Julius Coredo Onyango LVRLAC Kisumu Project Officer
3. Leah Oyake Ombis Nairobi City Council Director of Environment
4. Benard Obera Kisumu City Council Director of Environment
5. Harun Gulla Kisumu City Council Deputy director of Environment
6. Zacheaus Okok Kisumu City Council Officer, Environmental Department
7. Eutichus Okeyo Ochieng Ten Stars, Tuungane, Kisumu CBO Member
8. Joseph Ochieng SANA Kisumu Officer
9. Mathew Abuto Public Health Department Migori 
Municipal Council
Public Health Officer
10. Gerald Kibathi NEMA-Migori Municipal Council Environmental Officer
11. Joseph Ayieko Jangoe Youth Development Group-
Migori
CBO Leader
12. Paul Onyango Okello Homabay Municipal Council Town Engineer
13. Mary Kerubo Kisii Municipal Council Head Public Health Officer
14. Alphonse Mwanda Kisii Municipal Council Public Health Officer
15. Gibson Gidudu Jinja Municipal Council Principal Health Officer
16. Kigumba Wilberforce Jinja Municipal Council- Health Inspector
17. Bituti Grace Jinja Municipal Council Health Inspector
18. Beatrice Arigo Jinja Municipal Council- Contractor
19. Ernest Nyavihanga Jinja Municipal Council Environment Officer
20. Vicky Kakaire Jinja Municipal Council Environment Officer
21. Audiphace Sabbo Mwanza City Council Public Health Inspector
22. Dr. Kimaro Mwanza City Council City Director of Health
23. Fredrick Salukele Mwanza PhD student in Mwanza
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Summary
Solid Waste Management (SWM) as a subject has been extensively studied but taking the municipal 
authority as the focal point and using the Ecological Modernisation Theory to study it, gives it a 
new spur. Further approaching the study on a comparative basis of urban centres/municipalities 
that share an environmental resource in this case the Lake Victoria Basin and all having a common 
vision under the East African Community, attracts more attention to the subject matter. Impacting 
on the same shared resource – the Lake – this research sort to establish whether institutional 
arrangements of the different countries and in turn municipalities could generate insight into 
improving the plight of the urban poor as concerns management of solid waste.
Municipalities as the custodians of waste once its put out for collection have been reported 
numerously as performing poorly. This comes at a time when there is continuing debate on 
changing authority and shifting roles from the state to non-state actors. Yet it is also clear that 
municipalities have and continue to play an important role as an intermediary between the 
state and the public. Drawing upon the ecological modernisation theory, the study argues that 
‘modern’ institutions (including the state/municipality; market and community) are key in 
bringing improvements to environmental infrastructures. This argument is presented through a 
number of theoretical discussions including the debates of centralised vs. decentralised systems of 
infrastructure and service provision; developmental state vs. the network governance arrangement 
and the theory of multi-level governance. The Modernised Mixtures Approach (MMA) is used 
to adapt Ecological Modernisation Theory for the study of SWM and sanitation. Under MMA, 
SWM systems have been deliberately and reflexively reconstructed in response to the challenge of 
a changing social, economic, and environmental context in East Africa. The modernised mixtures 
approach provides the criteria needed to assess performance of SWM infrastructure and service 
provision. The specific criteria include accessibility (particularly of the poor to avoid exclusion of 
particular groups): to what extent are specific groups included and excluded from environmental 
infrastructure due to financial, physical or cultural reasons?; flexibility and resilience (in both 
technological and institutional respect): how does the system or unit fit into more embracing 
future systems and how does it behave in times of instability in various dimensions (climate, 
political, economic, institutional)?; and ecological sustainability of the infrastructures and practices 
involved: to what extent do the new systems or the new technological options that become part 
of existing systems, improve the environmental performance of the urban infrastructure? These 
criteria are operationalised to reflect the local situation.
Therefore, to adequately make conclusions on the institutional arrangements, this study 
looked at:
• the status of the (physical) environmental infrastructures and the level of service provision 
for SWM in three designated urban centres in EA;
• the existing policy arrangement for SWM in those centres ;
• opportunities for cooperation in SWM amongst smaller neighbouring municipalities in the 
Lake basin;
• the role of regional organisations and networks in enhancing cross border SWM infrastructure 
provision.
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Two conceptual frameworks helped to place the municipal authority at the centre within a nation 
and also at the regional level linking it to the other actors who are at different levels(household, 
neighbourhood, state and regional) and linking all these actors to the waste chain. The criteria of 
accessibility, flexibility and sustainability are then used to make assessments.
This study is based on case study research design. Multiple methods of data collection were used. 
Interviews with resource persons played a big role and provided data on the status of infrastructure, 
the policy arrangement, the possibility of IMC and also the role of regional organisations and 
networks in SWM. Household questionnaires were administered to gather data particularly on the 
relations between households and service providers as part of assessing the status of infrastructure 
and service provision as well as the policy arrangement.
Observation was helpful in providing data on the status of infrastructure. A stakeholders 
workshop brought neighbouring councils together to assess opportunities of IMC and the role of 
regional organisations and networks in SWM. Documents served as support for the information 
derived from other sources.
The status of infrastructure and service provision exhibited different performance levels amongst 
the three main municipalities studied. Kisumu showed a centralised system of infrastructure 
provision and management. The centralised system involves use of large scale infrastructure. 
The centralised arrangement resulted in only a section of the population receiving services. The 
type and amount of resources available were found inadequate. Mwanza and Jinja had a mixture 
of both centralised and decentralised systems where infrastructure and services came from both 
the municipality and the non-state actors which assured service provision to a bigger section of 
the population. The study thus concluded that SWM that incorporates the technical and social 
dimension reduces the centralised and decentralised dichotomy and in turn improves SWM.
The policy arrangement in the three municipalities depicted different array of actors which 
speaks for the relationship between municipalities and non-state actors and in turn their 
performance in SWM. In Kisumu, the involvement of non-state actors is informal and though 
the municipal authority is aware and even supports these actors, their informality affects their 
legitimacy as legal SWM service providers and in turn the performance of SWM. Jinja has formally 
incorporated private firms in form of contracts depicting an arrangement somewhat similar to 
a market arrangement. The services of these private firms are however, concentrated in the CBD 
where waste is more, given that they are paid per skip emptied. Areas away from the CBD do not 
receive frequent services. Mwanza has formally incorporated a mix of CBOs and private firms 
in form of contracts. CBOs are the majority depicting an arrangement referred to in the study as 
community dominated. This arrangement has afforded an almost 100% collection rate. In all the 
three councils however, the municipal authorities are still the loci of authority in SWM. Here the 
study concluded that a mixed arrangement that incorporates formal and informal actors with a 
mixture of actors from the state, community and private firms depicting a network arrangement 
as opposed to a developmental state of affairs, improves SWM infrastructure and service provision
The study further concluded that there are opportunities for inter-municipal cooperation 
amongst small neighbouring municipalities in Kenya in SWM. Their geographical proximity, 
combined population numbers, limited resources and low tax base in individual municipalities, 
the institutional arrangement and supporting legal framework as well as the amount of combined 
waste, present justifiable opportunities for cooperation. This is particularly the case in waste 
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transportation, treatment and disposal as these present great economies of scale. The municipalities 
indicated the need for IMC that would leave certain primary functions within individual 
municipalities as a way of assuring them that they are still in charge of SWM and in turn autonomy 
over their jurisdictions. This pointed towards a multi-level governance arrangement.
The role of regional organisations and networks came out as both supportive and supplementary 
from the formal and informal regional organisations respectively. Their roles are faced by both 
constraining (the different decentralisation levels amongst the three East African Countries) and 
enabling factors(common legislation at the regional level and local level legislation that supports 
cooperation). Cooperation that cuts across the three countries was therefore evident in information 
sharing, capacity building and exchange of exemplary practices. Efforts at infrastructure 
provision by the regional organisation were however, limited to individual municipalities. The 
study concluded that cross country cooperation in SWM infrastructure provision is not yet well 
developed but that both the formal and informal regional organisations can play different roles 
in enhancing this cooperation.
The final general conclusion of this study is that while exemplary practices can be shared, 
institutional arrangements are typical to a specific location and therefore modernising SWM 
calls on identifying, capitalising on, nurturing and improving on the local arrangements that 
are already working well in a particular locality. Network-states options would result in better 
performing systems for SWM. This is because legitimacy of municipality would be increased while 
financial resources would be channelled towards market parties (and community organisations) 
under the control or supervision of the municipal authorities. Intermunicipal cooperation and 
international cooperation are two innovations in SWM for the case of East Africa urban authorities 
but attention needs to be shifted to factors that will enable the cooperation as opposed to focusing 
on constraining factors alone.
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Samenvatting
Er bestaat veel onderzoek naar het beheer van vast afval (SWM). Vernieuwend in dit onderzoek is 
de nadruk op het gemeentelijk niveau en de toepassing van de ecologische moderniseringstheorie. 
In deze vergelijkende studie wordt gekeken naar stedelijke centra/gemeentes met een gedeelde 
natuurlijke hulpbron – het Lake Victoria Bassin –, en een gedeelde visie geformuleerd door de Oost-
Afrikaanse gemeenschap. In dit onderzoek wordt gekeken hoe en of verschillende institutionele 
arrangementen in de verschillende landen en gemeenten van invloed zijn op het gebruik van deze 
gezamenlijke hulpbron en wat mogelijkheden zijn voor verbetering van de situatie van stedelijke 
armen wat betreft het beheer van afval.
Uit eerder onderzoek blijkt dat gemeentes vaak slecht functioneren als toezichthouders van 
afval na de inzameling. Deze observatie kan geplaatst worden in het huidige debat rondom de 
veranderende rol van de staat. Gemeenten spelen een belangrijke rol als intermediair tussen de staat 
en het publieke actoren. Beredeneerd vanuit de ecologische moderniseringstheorie beargumenteert 
deze studie dat ‘moderne’ instituten (waaronder de staat/gemeenten; markt en gemeenschap) een 
sleutelrol spelen in de verbetering van milieu infrastructuren. Dit argument wordt ondersteund 
door de behandeling van een viertal theoretische discussies. Ten eerste het debat rondom centrale 
versus decentrale systemen van infrastructuur en dienstverlening. Ten tweede een discussie over de 
ontwikkelende staat versus vormen van op netwerken gebaseerde governance arrangementen. Ten 
derde een discussie over de theorie van multi-level governance. Ten vierde wordt de ‘Modernized 
Mixtures Approach’ (MMA) gebruikt om de ecologische moderniseringstheorie geschikt te maken 
voor de bestudering van SWM en sanitatie.
Het gebruik van de MMA heeft geleidt tot een opzettelijke en reflexieve reconstructie van SWM 
systemen. Met deze aanpak wordt een antwoord gezocht op de uitdaging van een veranderende 
context in Oost-Afrika op sociaal, economisch en milieu gebied. De ‘Modernized Mixtures 
Approach’ draagt tevens de criteria aan die nodig zijn om de prestatie van SWM infrastructuur 
en dienstverlening te beoordelen. De specifieke criteria omvatten toegankelijkheid, flexibiliteit 
en veerkracht, en ecologische duurzaamheid. Toegankelijkheid richt zich specifiek de armen om 
uitsluiting van bepaalde groepen te voorkomen. Hierbij is de centrale vraag in hoeverre specifieke 
groepen binnen- en buitengesloten zijn van milieu-infrastructuren door financiële, fysieke en 
culturele redenen. Flexibiliteit en veerkracht wordt zowel op technologisch als institutioneel opzicht 
gebruikt. De centrale vraag hierbij is hoe het systeem inpasbaar is in alomvattende toekomstige 
systemen, en hoe het zich aanpast in tijden van instabiliteit op verschillende dimensies (klimaat, 
politiek, economisch, institutioneel). Het criteria ecologische duurzaamheid richt zich op de 
betrokken infrastructuren en praktijken. De centrale vraag hierbij is in hoeverre de nieuwe 
systemen, of de nieuwe technologische mogelijkheden die onderdeel zijn geworden van het 
bestaande systeem, bijdragen aan de milieuprestaties van de stedelijke infrastructuur. Deze criteria 
zijn geoperationaliseerd om ze te kunnen inpassen in de lokale situatie.
Om op een adequate manier conclusies te kunnen trekken over de institutionele arrangementen 
heeft deze studie gekeken naar:
• De status van de (fysieke) milieu infrastructuren en het niveau van dienstverlening voor SWM 
in drie stedelijke centra in Oost-Afrika.
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• De bestaande beleidsarrangementen van SWM in deze centra.
• De mogelijkheden voor samenwerking wat betreft SWM in kleinere aangrenzende gemeenten 
in het Lake Victoria bassin.
• De rol van regionale organisaties en netwerken in het stimuleren van grensoverschrijdende 
SWM infrastructuur verlening.
Twee conceptuele raamwerken zijn gebruikt om gemeenten centraal te stellen in de analyse, en 
deze te kunnen plaatsen binnen nationale en regionale niveaus. Door de centrale positie die zij 
innemen, koppelen gemeenten verschillende actoren uit verschillende niveaus (huishouden, 
buurt, land en regio) aan elkaar, en aan de afvalketen. De bovengenoemde criteria bereikbaarheid, 
flexibiliteit en duurzaamheid zijn gebruikt om hiervan een beoordeling te maken.
De empirische kern van deze studie is een vergelijkende case studie analyse. Hiervoor zijn 
verschillende methoden van data verzameling gebruikt. Interviews met sleutelfiguren hebben 
een grote rol gespeeld. Hiermee is informatie verzameld over de status van de infrastructuur, het 
beleidsarrangement, de mogelijkheden voor samenwerking tussen gemeenten (inter-municipal 
cooperation, IMC) evenals de rol van regionale organisaties en netwerken in SWM. Enquêtes zijn 
gebruikt om data te verzamelen over de relatie tussen huishoudens en dienstverlenende instanties. 
Deze informatie is gebruikt om de status van de infrastructuur en dienstverlening te beoordelen 
evenals het beleidsarrangement.
Observatie was een belangrijke en nuttige manier om data te verkrijgen over de status van de 
infrastructuur. Een workshop met stakeholders heeft ervoor gezorgd dat aangrenzende gemeentes 
gezamenlijk de mogelijkheden voor IMC en de rol van regionale organisaties en netwerken hebben 
beoordeeld. Hiernaast zijn documenten gebruikt ter ondersteuning van informatie verkregen uit 
andere bronnen.
De status van infrastructuur en dienstverlening liet zien dat de drie belangrijkste gemeentes 
die zijn bestudeerd, verschillen in prestatieniveau. Kisumu toonde een gecentraliseerd systeem 
van infrastructuurvoorziening en beheer. Het gecentraliseerde systeem impliceert gebruik van 
grootschalige infrastructuur. In dit gecentraliseerde arrangement ontving slechts een deel van de 
bevolking de diensten. Het type en de hoeveelheid beschikbare middelen werden ontoereikend 
bevonden. In Mwanza en Jinja werd een mix van gecentraliseerde en gedecentraliseerde systemen 
gevonden. De infrastructuur en de diensten werden geleverd door zowel de gemeentes als private 
actoren, waardoor de dienstverlening aan een groter deel van de bevolking werd verzekerd. In 
deze studie wordt geconcludeerd dat wanneer in SWM de technische en de sociale dimensie 
wordt geïncorporeerd, de dichotomie tussen centralisatie en decentralisatie wordt verminderd 
en daarmee verbetert SWM.
Het beleidsarrangement in de drie gemeenten duidde op een verschillend scala aan actoren die 
de relatie tussen gemeenten en private actoren weerspiegelen, alsook hun prestaties in SWM. In 
Kisumu is de betrokkenheid van private actoren informeel. Hoewel het gemeentelijke gezag zich 
hiervan bewust is en deze actoren zelfs steunt, beïnvloedt deze informele situatie hun legitimiteit 
als wettelijke SWM dienstverleners en daarmee de prestaties op het gebied van SWM. Jinja heeft 
private bedrijven formeel opgenomen waarbij er wordt gewerkt met contracten. Daarmee lijkt 
de regeling enigszins op een markt arrangement. De diensten van deze bedrijven zijn echter 
geconcentreerd in de central business districts (CBD) waar er meer afval is, aangezien zij per 
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geleegde afvalcontainer worden betaald. In gebieden verder weg van CBD worden de diensten 
niet op frequente basis geleverd. Mwanza bestaat formeel uit een mengeling van community-
based organisations (CBOs) en private bedrijven welke door gecontracteerd zijn. CBOs zijn in de 
meerderheid, in deze studie geduid als community dominated. Dit arrangement heeft een ratio 
van bijna 100% ten aanzien van afvalinzameling. In alle drie de gevallen vormen de gemeentes 
echter nog steeds het centrum van autoriteit in SWM. In de studie wordt geconcludeerd dat een 
netwerk arrangement de SWM infrastructuur en dienstverlening verbetert, dit in tegenstelling 
tot een arrangement waarbij de staat (in dit geval gemeentes) de controle heeft over de gang van 
zaken. Een netwerk arrangement houdt hier in dat formele en informele actoren samen worden 
gebracht en er een mix is aan actoren vanuit de staat, gemeenschap en private bedrijven.
De studie concludeert verder dat er kansen zijn voor intergemeentelijke samenwerking tussen 
kleine naburige gemeenten in Kenia ten aanzien van SWM. De geografische ligging ten opzichte 
van elkaar, gecombineerd met inwoneraantallen, beperkte middelen en lage belastinginkomsten in 
de afzonderlijke gemeentes, zorgt ervoor dat het institutionele arrangement en het ondersteunende 
juridische kader alsook de hoeveelheid van gecombineerd afval, een valide basis voor mogelijkheden 
tot samenwerking bieden. Dit is in het bijzonder het geval voor het vervoer, de verwerking en 
de afhandeling van afval, aangezien dit een groot schaalvoordeel oplevert. De gemeentes wezen 
op de noodzaak van IMC waarbij een aantal primaire functies bij de afzonderlijke gemeenten 
zouden blijven liggen, zodat er zekerheid is dat zij nog steeds verantwoordelijk zijn voor SWM en 
zodoende de autonomie over hun jurisdictie behouden. Dit duidt op een multi-level governance 
arrangement.
De rol van regionale organisaties en netwerken was zowel ondersteunend als complementair 
aan de formele en informele regionale organisaties. Deze rollen gaan samen met beperkende 
factoren (de verschillende niveaus van decentralisatie in de drie Oost-Afrikaanse landen) en 
factoren welke versterkend werkten (gemeenschappelijke wetgeving op regionaal en lokaal niveau 
waarmee samenwerking wordt ondersteund). Grensoverschrijdende samenwerking tussen de 
drie landen was evident in het delen van informatie, capaciteitsopbouw en de uitwisseling van 
succesvolle praktijkvoorbeelden. Pogingen om te komen tot een voorziening op het gebied van 
infrastructuur door de regionale organisatie bleven echter beperkt tot de individuele gemeentes. 
Deze studie concludeert dat samenwerking tussen de verschillende landen in de voorziening 
van SWM infrastructuur nog niet goed ontwikkeld is, maar dat zowel de formele als informele 
regionale organisaties verschillende rollen kunnen spelen om deze samenwerking te versterken.
Tot slot is de algemene conclusie van deze studie dat, hoewel succesvolle praktijkvoorbeelden 
kunnen worden gedeeld, institutionele arrangementen kenmerkend zijn voor een specifieke locatie. 
De modernisering van SWM zal dus gekoppeld moeten worden aan het identificeren, voortbouwen, 
voeden en verbeteren van lokale structuren welke reeds succesvol zijn op een specifieke plaats. 
Netwerk arrangementen, waarin alle partijen deelnemen in de besluitvorming, zullen bijdragen 
aan een beter presteren van SWM systemen. De reden hiervoor is dat de legitimiteit van gemeentes 
wordt versterkt terwijl financiële middelen naar marktpartijen (en community-based organisations) 
gaan, gecontroleerd door of onder supervisie van gemeentelijke autoriteiten. Intergemeentelijke 
en internationale samenwerking zijn twee innovaties voor SWM in de stedelijke omgeving van 
Oost-Afrika, maar de aandacht moet worden gericht op de factoren die samenwerking mogelijk 
maken, in plaats van enkel aandacht te hebben voor beperkende factoren.
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